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Foreword
In today’s world of global competition and trade, industrialized economies are striving to retain their lead 
in technology and innovation, emerging economies are seeking to catch up while less developed economies 
are initiating measures to promote industrialization and structural change. In this context, benchmarking 
national industrial performance is crucial for many economies, irrespective of their level of development. 
UNIDO has a longstanding tradition in benchmarking country-level industrial performance. The Competi-
tive Industrial Performance (CIP) index was first published in the Industrial Development Report 
2002/2003. Since then, the CIP index has undergone several revisions to include additional dimensions 
of industrial performance. The CIP index in its current form is the result of a one-year validation process 
conducted by UNIDO with the support of international experts.
The CIP index is a composite index that measures ‘the ability of countries to produce and export manu-
factured goods competitively’ (IDR 2002/2003), using several individual indicators to proxy various dimen-
sions of industrial performance. Compared to other composite indices, the distinctive features of the CIP 
index include a focus on industrial competitiveness and manufacturing development, a division between 
performance and its drivers as well as the exclusive use of quantitative and transparent data.
This publication discusses the concept of competitiveness and industrial performance and provides a theo-
retical foundation and justification for the CIP index, ten years after its first publication. The results of 
the benchmarking exercise are analysed by country, region and over time, building on the CIP index as 
well as the individual indicators of industrial performance. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is performed to 
assess the robustness of the CIP index to variations of assumptions made in its construction.
The content of this publication can serve as a reference point for initiating a dialogue with Member States 
on issues related to industrial performance and industrial policy priorities, while advocating the benefits 
of industrial development as a solution to global challenges such as poverty reduction, migration or politi-
cal unrest. It can also facilitate monitoring of the long-term impact of UNIDO’s technical cooperation 
projects by providing baseline data as well as evidence of progress towards higher industrial performance 
by Member States.
We trust that this publication will be useful to development practitioners engaged in policy advice and 
technical cooperation, and to policymakers in the field of industrial development.
Kandeh K. Yumkella
Director General, UNIDO
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Executive Summary
The proliferation of reports and academic policy debates addressing competitiveness and competitive indus-
trial performance clearly shows that governments are increasingly concerned with these issues as well as 
with understanding their structural drivers. The growing use of benchmarking exercises and competitiveness 
indices responds to governments’ clear need to assess their economies’ relative competitiveness at each point 
in time and over time. Competitiveness is a concept that is widely used but difficult to define explicitly. 
The UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance Report adopts a tractable meso-concept of competitive-
ness, namely industrial competitiveness. Accordingly, industrial competitiveness is defined as the capacity of 
countries to increase their presence in international and domestic markets whilst developing industrial sectors 
and activities with higher value added and technological content. 
Given the particular emphasis assigned to manufacturing industries, the UNIDO Competitive Industrial 
Performance Report and its main diagnostic tool – the Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index 
– is a unique response to the current renewed worldwide interest in manufacturing industries as the main 
engine of economic growth. The Competitive Industrial Performance Report stands as the most compre-
hensive global comparative analysis of industrial competitiveness, including 135 countries in the world 
2010 industrial competitiveness ranking. Modern manufacturing systems consist of complex interdependen-
cies, often across a range of industries which contribute a variety of components, materials, production 
subsystems, and production-related services. The competitive industrial performance benchmarking analysis 
offers a first snapshot of these intricacies at the country level, providing a visualization of global trends 
and the current industrial competitiveness of nations.
The Competitive Industrial Performance index
Ten years after its initial inclusion in UNIDO’s Industrial Development Report 2002/3 Competing Through 
Innovation and Learning, the Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index has become the main diag-
nostic tool adopted by UNIDO for benchmarking and measuring the industrial competitiveness of nations. 
The first UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance Report presents a new Competitive Industrial 
Performance (CIP) index through which governments can benchmark and track countries’ relative com-
petitive industrial performance over time. The CIP index can also be used as a diagnostic tool for designing 
policies and assessing policies’ effectiveness. Despite being a composite index, the CIP index gives govern-
ments the possibility to look at countries’ relative performance over time in the various sub-indicators 
composing the index. Thus, countries can be compared across a plurality of sub-indicators capturing their 
industrial structure, technological and export performance.
The CIP index now consists of eight sub-indicators grouped along three dimensions of industrial com-
petitiveness. The first dimension relates to countries’ capacity to produce and export manufactures and is 
captured by their Manufacturing Value Added per capita (MVApc) and their Manufactured Exports per 
capita (MXpc). The second dimension covers countries’ level of technological deepening and upgrading. 
To proxy for this complex dimension, two composite sub-indicators – industrialization intensity and export 
quality – have been constructed. The degree of industrialization intensity is computed as a linear aggrega-
tion of the Medium- and High-tech manufacturing Value Added share in total Manufacturing Value Added 
(MHVAsh) and the Manufacturing Value Added share in total GDP (MVAsh). Countries’ export quality 
is obtained as a linear aggregation of the Medium- and High-tech manufactured Exports share in total 
manufactured exports (MHXsh) and the Manufactured Exports share in total exports (MXsh). Finally, the 
third dimension of competitiveness entails countries’ impact on world manufacturing, both in terms of 
their value added share in World Manufacturing Value Added (ImWMVA) and in World Manufactures 
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Trade (ImWMT). The CIP index is a composite index obtained through a geometric aggregation of these 
six sub-indicators to which equal weights have been assigned. The following table summarizes the configu-
ration of the CIP index. 
In contrast to other competitiveness indices currently available, the CIP index provides a unique cross-
country industrial performance benchmarking and ranking based on quantitative indicators and a select 
number of industrial performance indicators. Rankings are provided at the global and regional levels, as 
well as by adopting different country groupings for 135 countries in 2010. This offers governments the 
possibility to compare their country’s competitive industrial performance with relevant comparators, that 
is, not only with countries from the same region but also with countries at the same stage of economic 
or industrial development across the globe. Countries’ industrial competitiveness can be assessed over time 
using the UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance index. Such a longitudinal analysis allows govern-
ments to track the trajectories countries have followed to attain their current position and to identify the 
winners and losers in world competitive industrial performance rankings. Governments are also provided 
with a tool to track patterns of change in countries’ industrial structure, technological developments of 
the manufacturing sector, gains or losses in their share of world manufacturing value added and share of 
manufactured exports. Finally, dynamic indicators such as annual growth rate can be computed to reveal 
the speed at which countries’ structural economic variables have been changing.
10.07.13   10:43
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The 2010 industrial competitiveness of nations
The world ranking reveals a pronounced yet familiar pattern (Table 1)1. Among the most industrially competi-
tive nations in the world, we find high income industrialized countries, as well as China ranked seventh. The 
top five positions are occupied by Japan, Germany, the United States, the Republic of Korea and China, 
Taiwan Province. While the first three countries have held top positions in the ranking since 1990, the two 
latter economies placed fourteenth and tenth, respectively, in 1990. Together, the top five economies account 
for nearly half of the share of world manufacturing value added and one-third of world manufactures trade. 
The United States alone accounts for half of the top five’s total world manufacturing value added, while 
Germany accounts for one-third of the top five’s world manufactures trade total. Although these economies 
are all highly industrialized, the manufactured export per capita indicator reveals both the distinct export 
orientation of these economies and the distinct pull of their own internal demand. The small ‘city state’ of 
Singapore is not included in the top five, although the country displays the world’s highest manufacturing 
value added per capita and the highest manufactured exports per capita.
The first low-income economy in the top quintile is China. Given its population size and stage of develop-
ment, China is the country with the lowest manufacturing value added per capita and manufactured exports 
per capita in the top quintile of the world ranking, but ranks second in terms of world manufacturing value 
added share behind the United States, followed by Japan in third position. Over the last 15 years, China’s 
share in world manufactures trade has increased by 11 percent on account of its export-led development model. 
The manufacturing industry is the main sector of China’s economy, accounting for 35 percent of overall GDP. 
China’s performance in medium-tech industries is quite remarkable, despite the country’s stage of development. 
Other low-income economies in the top quintile include Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand.
The rest of the top quintile is occupied by high income European industrial countries (with few exceptions), 
a number of emerging economies and Canada. Overall, countries in the top quintile of the ranking account 
for 83 percent of world manufacturing value added and of world manufactures trade. 
Economies ranked in the upper middle quintile include industrial powers primarily from Asia and Latin America. 
This quintile comprises some of the most populated countries in the world, including (ranked by population 
size) India, Indonesia, Brazil, the Russian Federation, Philippines, Viet Nam, Turkey and South Africa. Australia 
and some oil net exporters are in this quintile as well. The lower middle range as well as the bottom of the 
ranking mostly includes low income or relatively small economies, with the exception of Iran 
only exceptions being South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritius. The four BRICS economies 
in the upper middle quintile are ranked in the following order: Brazil, the Russian Federation, South Africa 
and India. Taken together, they account for almost half of the manufacturing value added share of the entire 
upper middle quintile and one-third of the manufactures trade share of the entire upper middle quintile. Despite 
the tremendous differences between Brazil, the Russian Federation and South Africa, they have comparable 
figures in terms of manufacturing value added per capita, while India – given its population size – reports the 
highest share in world manufacturing value added combined with the lowest manufacturing value added per 
capita. Among the emerging industrial economies, Viet Nam ranked 54 in 2010 and hence entered the upper 
middle quintile (the country ranked 72 in 2000).
1  The analysis of the world ranking was performed by quintiles of the world ranking. The top, upper middle, middle, lower 
middle and bottom quintiles of the rankings are identified by different colours. The descriptive statistics detailed in the table are 
the mean, median and standard deviation. The possibility of comparing the mean and the median is particularly important when 
one or more countries perform very differently from the others (outliers). In this case, the mean will be biased, while the median 
provides the average value in the countries’ distribution. Finally, the standard deviation describes the distribution of the economies’ 
performances.This information is particularly relevant if we aim to understand the extent to which economies’ performances differ 
in the quintiles and groups. 
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(Islamic Republic 
of), Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria. Most African economies occupy the bottom quintile of the ranking, 
the 
ix
Economies occupying the middle quintile of the CIP ranking are again very heterogeneous. With the 
exception of four large and highly populated countries, nam ely Iran (Islam ic Republic of), E gyp t, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, the remaining countries are mainly small economies from South and Central Asia, 
Latin America and Africa. Overall, the average manufacturing value added per capita and manufactured 
exports per capita of the economies in the middle quintile are half of the shares registered in the upper middle 
group. The lower two quintiles of the CIP ranking include the least industrialized economies in the world. 
Taken together, they account for about 0.6 percent of world manufacturing value added and 0.7 percent 
of world manufactures trade. The majority of these countries are from the African continent. The largest 
country in the lower middle quintile in terms of population size is Nigeria with a population of roughly 
160 million. Nigeria and Algeria are among the main exporters of oil and natural gas in the world. The 
manufactured export share indicator, which is below (almost half) the average share of the lower middle 
quintile,  characterizes their manufactured exports structure.
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MHXsh  
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%
1 0.5409 Japan 7993.99 5521.02 53.70 20.39 79.75 91.62 14.126 6.532
2 0.5176 Germany 4666.91 13397.43 56.76 18.57 72.34 86.81 5.317 10.219
3 0.4822 United States of America 5522.09 2736.13 51.52 14.85 64.74 76.76 24.036 7.974
4 0.4044 Republic of Korea 4782.7 9280.33 53.41 29.09 75.85 96.85 3.220 4.183
5 0.3649 China, Taiwan Province 6153.1 10825.16 61.88 29.87 72.40 96.01 1.968 2.318
6 0.3456 Singapore 8198.27 35709.08 73.41 24.47 68.99 89.76 0.521 1.519
7 0.3293 China 820.018 1123.62 40.70 34.16 60.52 96.25 15.329 14.063
8 0.3118 Switzerland 7168.38 23651.56 34.91 18.44 69.67 91.49 0.750 1.657
9 0.3114 Belgium 3793.78 34137.53 42.28 14.99 54.95 87.38 0.552 3.326
10 0.3095 France 2885.09 7237.36 45.41 12.16 65.77 88.42 2.494 4.189
11 0.2945 Italy 2847.72 6935.05 39.33 14.94 53.93 91.62 2.325 3.791
12 0.2896 Netherlands 3324.63 22081.02 40.07 12.48 55.01 73.97 0.759 3.374
13 0.2850 Sweden 6559.37 15375.64 46.96 20.04 57.69 89.70 0.838 1.316
14 0.2782 United Kingdom 3162.34 5247.64 41.99 11.44 63.22 79.54 2.691 2.989
15 0.2695 Ireland 6506.68 23959.50 64.07 23.11 53.84 91.65 0.407 1.004
16 0.2436 Austria 4869.48 14926.31 41.74 18.43 59.97 86.97 0.569 1.167
17 0.2345 Canada 3077.73 6667.54 37.35 11.88 55.72 62.14 1.437 2.084
18 0.2220 Finland 6795.27 12001.19 45.36 24.72 48.98 91.10 0.500 0.592
19 0.1979 Spain 1896.88 4571.87 34.28 12.01 57.40 83.74 1.183 1.910
20 0.1931 Czech Republic 2148.21 11816.28 44.62 28.15 67.94 90.99 0.302 1.113
21 0.1834 Malaysia 1426.92 5930.92 41.76 27.10 63.49 83.30 0.551 1.533
22 0.1776 Mexico 1007.93 2166.16 38.45 15.99 78.71 80.09 1.538 2.212
23 0.1712 Thailand 1053.66 2517.15 46.16 36.61 61.82 83.93 0.949 1.518
24 0.1705 Denmark 3887.02 12839.14 30.51 12.46 51.88 72.81 0.294 0.651
25 0.1696 Poland 1489.98 3639.62 35.35 22.51 58.14 87.83 0.781 1.277
26 0.1647 Israel 3235.62 7728.48 55.61 13.83 55.79 96.21 0.325 0.520
27 0.1562 Slovakia 2303.72 11125.34 43.32 27.43 66.26 93.80 0.172 0.556
28 0.1438 Australia 2660.73 4520.90 23.01 10.10 20.00 46.72 0.786 0.894
29 0.1402 Hungary 1210.31 8291.96 53.47 21.08 77.99 87.04 0.166 0.763
30 0.1283 Turkey 1012.73 1286.70 30.04 20.23 42.47 87.72 1.088 0.926
31 0.1196 Norway 3766.78 7396.27 24.09 9.17 52.21 27.09 0.249 0.328
32 0.1152 Slovenia 2716.24 11094.26 45.52 20.89 62.96 90.83 0.075 0.206
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33 0.1128 Brazil 622.099 667.55 34.97 13.51 36.30 67.30 1.712 1.230
34 0.1043 Portugal 1503.64 4098.30 22.36 12.90 40.53 90.17 0.223 0.407
35 0.1012 Argentina 1749.37 877.58 25.84 16.41 45.05 52.43 0.986 0.331
36 0.0976 Russian Federation 503.997 1028.70 23.14 17.07 24.37 36.08 0.978 1.337
37 0.0940 Saudi Arabia 1157.32 2020.66 41.12 11.77 35.54 21.71 0.423 0.494
38 0.0823 Indonesia 302.264 395.68 37.81 26.40 29.05 60.09 1.002 0.878
39 0.0794 Kuwait 2224.27 6899.25 18.09 10.34 13.45 40.93 0.094 0.231
40 0.0774 Belarus 907.294 2361.97 18.76 32.95 39.01 89.22 0.120 0.208
41 0.0772 South Africa 567.274 991.15 21.24 14.93 45.66 68.32 0.387 0.452
42 0.0761 Luxembourg 3737.35 24557.20 4.97 6.59 38.04 85.76 0.025 0.110
43 0.0747 India 120.185 153.83 37.27 15.04 28.24 85.16 2.028 1.738
44 0.0726 Philippines 296.026 516.61 45.31 21.34 79.66 93.30 0.381 0.445
45 0.0721 Chile 972.374 1943.12 18.92 15.37 11.76 46.96 0.230 0.308
46 0.0675 Romania 341.552 2111.40 33.88 13.06 54.69 90.36 0.100 0.413
47 0.0674 Lithuania 964.003 5343.24 18.46 18.35 37.83 85.63 0.044 0.165
48 0.0673 New Zealand 1986.1 3213.92 13.86 12.83 21.34 46.36 0.118 0.128
49 0.0653 Greece 1289.68 1429.10 17.17 9.10 37.19 73.69 0.200 0.148
50 0.0603 Croatia 999.359 2356.28 31.77 16.19 49.46 90.42 0.063 0.099
51 0.0603 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 895.462 750.42 34.28 16.50 8.11 32.55 0.360 0.202
52 0.0583 Estonia 978.874 8360.44 25.66 15.47 42.28 86.22 0.018 0.102
53 0.0564 Ukraine 213.571 974.35 20.78 20.25 43.25 85.57 0.133 0.408
54 0.0540 Viet Nam 176.135 551.02 20.26 25.47 27.99 69.30 0.221 0.464
55 0.0523 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 361.2 378.50 40.70 16.44 23.91 33.55 0.371 0.260
56 0.0506 Costa Rica 1034.84 1420.96 16.58 20.07 58.94 73.29 0.067 0.061
57 0.0488 Qatar 1988.82 8817.29 17.44 2.78 28.15 15.88 0.024 0.086
58 0.0476 Tunisia 490.97 1272.14 9.32 17.36 45.02 82.59 0.072 0.126
59 0.0460 Bulgaria 398.788 1958.22 25.57 15.52 35.40 70.99 0.041 0.135
60 0.0460 Trinidad and Tobago 868.108 5480.32 39.38 8.39 17.70 73.95 0.016 0.068
61 0.0452 Malta 1257.27 8406.84 44.92 11.30 56.16 93.04 0.007 0.032
62 0.0450 Egypt 361.72 206.49 22.30 17.54 25.88 62.37 0.398 0.152
63 0.0437 Peru 448.575 623.75 14.49 14.01 5.21 51.19 0.179 0.167
64 0.0401 Colombia 405.257 268.72 20.71 12.95 35.97 32.60 0.268 0.119
65 0.0382 Iceland 4007.83 4001.09 14.18 11.41 45.58 26.82 0.017 0.011
66 0.0374 Morocco 239.737 425.92 21.61 12.93 38.26 77.64 0.107 0.128
67 0.0373 China, Hong Kong SAR 478.412 1093.80 32.58 1.41 53.74 54.84 0.049 0.075
68 0.0367 Latvia 480.598 3190.16 20.77 9.61 35.18 80.85 0.015 0.066
69 0.0361 Oman 941.115 1857.99 16.75 8.24 42.71 16.27 0.036 0.048
70 0.0347 Kazakhstan 346.39 767.39 6.84 13.48 39.96 21.13 0.076 0.112
71 0.0331 El Salvador 513.158 564.29 19.13 22.85 14.86 89.57 0.051 0.037
72 0.0328 Jordan 401.311 728.98 24.91 17.03 47.30 79.24 0.036 0.044
73 0.0326 Uruguay 1342.83 626.46 13.40 14.54 22.62 39.11 0.063 0.024
74 0.0315 Pakistan 116.878 99.77 24.57 17.52 9.95 82.40 0.280 0.160
75 0.0303 Lebanon 625.022 726.84 19.95 9.22 46.81 72.22 0.037 0.028
76 0.0262 Serbia 146.024 771.86 20.05 15.97 32.82 78.21 0.020 0.071
77 0.0256 Guatemala 223.879 408.98 16.25 12.03 20.33 69.50 0.045 0.054
78 0.0254 Bangladesh 86.7396 75.99 20.20 17.37 4.34 91.74 0.200 0.118
79 0.0240 Mauritius 803.997 1103.53 2.98 15.63 2.93 95.59 0.014 0.013
80 0.0235 Sri Lanka 190.646 297.35 12.11 13.81 9.48 70.10 0.052 0.054
3590_1212 CIP Report.indd   10-11
xi
CIP  
ranking 
2010
CIP  
index 
2010
Country MVApc MXpc MHVAsh  
%
MVAsh  
%
MHXsh  
%
MXsh  
%
ImWMVA  
%
ImWMT  
%
81 0.0233 Syrian Arab Republic 206.128 232.41 21.52 14.37 22.69 43.87 0.061 0.046
82 0.0220 Algeria 142.336 414.71 11.28 6.39 0.46 25.75 0.070 0.136
83 0.0219 Bosnia and Herzegovina 210.547 885.83 29.17 10.14 23.00 72.69 0.011 0.032
84 0.0214 The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia 388.821 835.51 14.60 17.69 18.08 63.35 0.011 0.019
85 0.0212 Swaziland 496.923 883.78 0.01 30.97 28.96 92.86 0.008 0.010
86 0.0206 Botswana 184.335 2252.13 21.59 4.28 4.84 93.70 0.005 0.041
87 0.0199 Ecuador 247.952 269.86 8.04 13.66 23.04 21.25 0.047 0.034
88 0.0186 Cyprus 918.488 640.88 12.32 6.58 60.43 75.21 0.011 0.005
89 0.0166 Côte d'Ivoire 99.0589 182.50 14.99 17.40 32.54 36.16 0.028 0.034
90 0.0160 Cambodia 100.73 239.29 0.26 19.82 7.94 65.17 0.021 0.034
91 0.0159 Honduras 279.673 143.70 7.16 19.89 27.79 40.40 0.029 0.012
92 0.0153 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 167.064 276.34 5.05 13.69 3.28 39.80 0.023 0.026
93 0.0152 Jamaica 260.663 418.83 18.77 7.10 5.51 92.58 0.010 0.011
94 0.0144 Albania 214.538 359.49 14.36 11.34 15.42 75.26 0.010 0.011
95 0.0143 Nigeria 24.5856 113.87 33.44 4.51 7.47 20.82 0.054 0.167
96 0.0127 Georgia 136.05 229.35 21.39 10.44 49.18 76.73 0.008 0.009
97 0.0121 Cameroon 140.167 64.71 11.01 19.70 11.45 32.80 0.038 0.012
98 0.0113 Armenia 203.595 201.12 5.81 14.83 24.80 69.20 0.008 0.006
99 0.0111 Paraguay 193.78 146.10 12.87 11.96 13.18 20.82 0.017 0.009
100 0.0108 Congo 67.2177 601.98 2.42 5.32 83.42 34.91 0.004 0.022
101 0.0100 Senegal 56.2691 115.95 17.66 10.74 14.05 71.42 0.010 0.014
102 0.0100 Kenya 46.7688 62.12 4.08 10.01 24.93 48.85 0.026 0.023
103 0.0095 Gabon 201.059 712.75 5.39 4.44 10.09 18.23 0.004 0.011
104 0.0095 Barbados 296.422 725.68 38.11 3.48 39.18 91.11 0.001 0.002
105 0.0088 Fiji 252.964 374.42 5.54 11.56 9.92 56.90 0.003 0.003
106 0.0085 United Republic of Tanzania 45.6784 43.72 1.18 10.02 13.58 48.54 0.028 0.018
107 0.0083 Azerbaijan 70.7655 257.54 6.34 2.89 17.23 10.49 0.008 0.021
108 0.0081 Suriname 307.66 693.60 11.64 9.88 9.38 15.93 0.002 0.003
109 0.0079 Mongolia 60.3637 451.58 5.30 7.67 1.91 62.93 0.002 0.012
110 0.0078 Panama 347.045 66.05 6.13 5.71 15.00 32.66 0.017 0.002
111 0.0077 Zambia 44.2736 111.49 21.08 10.01 14.33 19.55 0.008 0.013
112 0.0075 China, Macao SAR 832.347 264.97 3.55 2.25 7.06 43.47 0.006 0.001
113 0.0065 Belize 475.506 285.02 18.46 11.90 0.06 30.89 0.002 0.001
114 0.0062 Republic of Moldova 53.3502 155.36 5.55 9.32 13.09 61.57 0.003 0.005
115 0.0058 Tajikistan 84.8618 15.50 2.40 30.42 66.30 13.82 0.008 0.002
116 0.0055 Madagascar 28.4274 31.86 3.28 12.16 4.26 72.03 0.008 0.006
117 0.0045 Kyrgyzstan 42.4413 60.19 4.36 11.49 19.95 25.50 0.003 0.003
118 0.0043 Ghana 26.3711 26.25 0.80 7.45 24.99 12.49 0.009 0.006
119 0.0043 Nepal 18.1747 21.54 1.89 6.76 20.73 77.22 0.008 0.006
120 0.0040 Uganda 25.2921 11.78 11.07 6.82 15.16 34.83 0.012 0.004
121 0.0038 Yemen 33.192 23.94 3.89 5.65 6.12 9.45 0.011 0.005
122 0.0034 Mozambique 47.6064 7.61 10.74 11.86 9.28 7.84 0.015 0.002
123 0.0034 Saint Lucia 227.549 253.34 7.83 4.59 30.00 61.64 0.001 0.000
124 0.0032 Cape Verde 147.13 48.69 27.10 8.83 0.02 59.26 0.001 0.000
125 0.0031 Malawi 17.2107 19.57 12.51 9.48 14.64 27.64 0.004 0.003
126 0.0030 Sudan 37.3428 6.63 8.47 6.62 4.76 2.96 0.021 0.003
127 0.0030 Haiti 36.2575 6.19 5.26 9.87 3.80 82.97 0.005 0.001
128 0.0027 Niger 9.2339 20.65 24.77 5.26 12.86 67.44 0.002 0.003
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xii
CIP  
ranking 
2010
CIP  
index 
2010
Country MVApc MXpc MHVAsh  
%
MVAsh  
%
MHXsh  
%
MXsh  
%
ImWMVA  
%
ImWMT  
%
129 0.0022 Rwanda 21.7544 8.78 6.66 6.42 7.64 46.38 0.003 0.001
130 0.0019 Ethiopia 9.2491 2.51 9.41 4.61 31.91 9.84 0.011 0.002
131 0.0011 Central African Republic 15.2243 6.08 9.25 6.63 8.29 31.07 0.001 0.000
132 0.0006 Burundi 7.4443 1.95 1.54 7.36 23.95 15.73 0.001 0.000
133 0.0000 Eritrea 7.2731 0.47 7.05 5.59 14.67 34.57 0.001 0.000
133 0.0000 Gambia 15.5917 7.47 3.90 4.64 11.13 39.40 0.000 0.000
133 0.0000 Iraq 5.1947 3.71 24.68 0.68 25.12 0.27 0.002 0.001
The 2010 regional industrial competitiveness ranking
The regional distribution of the CIP ranking allows us to better focus our attention on the relative com-
petitiveness of nations in specific geographic areas. This is of particular interest for countries seeking to 
benchmark their ‘local’ industrial competitiveness and, in particular, to identify comparable countries in 
their regional area or continent and to benchmark their performance against the regional average 
performance.
Sixteen European countries occupy the top quintile of the CIP world ranking, followed by 13 economies 
positioned in the upper middle quintile. This latter group of countries includes the Russian Federation 
and a number of transition economies, some of which are new members of the European Union. The 
Russian Federation is positioned in the middle of the regional ranking followed primarily by transition 
economies such as Belarus, Romania, Croatia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Taken as a whole, Europe accounts for 22.4 percent of world manufacturing value added and 44 percent 
of world manufactures trade. 
The United States is the third most industrially competitive nation in the world CIP ranking and ranks 
first in the North America regional ranking, followed by Canada. In the Latin America and Caribbean 
region, the top five industrially competitive countries are Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela 
and 3.7 percent of world manufactures trade.
The East Asia and Pacific region hosts half of the top ten most industrially competitive economies in the 
world, namely Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, Taiwan Province, Singapore and China. Overall, the 
region’s top five economies account for 35 percent of world manufacturing value added and 28 of world 
manufactures trade. India is the top performer in the South and Central Asia region followed by Iran 
The top five performers in the Middle East and North Africa region are very diverse countries, including 
the highly industrialized Israel and emerging Turkey, followed by three ‘oil dependent economies’, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. In the world industrial landscape, the entire sub-Saharan Africa region accounts 
for less than 1 percent of both world manufacturing value added and world manufactures trade. The top 
performer, South Africa, accounts for half of these world market shares alone. Mauritius is the second 
most industrially competitive country in the region, while Nigeria and Algeria are the main oil net 
exporters.
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(Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
(Bolivarian Republic of). Taken together, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina account for 4.2 percent of world
 manufacturing value added 
xiii
Conclusion
The possibility for governments to realize specific macro policy goals hinges on their capacity to understand, 
monitor and benchmark their industrial competitive performances and, hence, on their capacity and 
 readiness to influence countries’ structural trajectories and underlying production and technological 
 capabilities dynamics.
The CIP index has been an extremely useful tool for UNIDO in moving from analyses of performance 
to policy recommendations, as well as in providing countries with a set of industrial diagnostic tools. The 
CIP index fulfils three main functions: 
(i) a focusing device for problems identification. Benchmarks are needed because it is difficult to 
assess national industrial performance on the basis of a priori norms. By comparing countries’ relative 
performance, it is possible to identify relative strengths and absolute weaknesses, which calls for appropriate 
and selective policy interventions. Wherever competitive performance can be improved, benchmarking is 
a useful tool.
(ii) an awareness raising tool for deepening countries’ appreciation of the main dimensions of industrial 
competitiveness, that is, their capacity to produce and export competitively, their technological deepening 
and upgrading and finally, their impact on global manufacturing production and exports. 
(iii) a policy tool for policy ownership. Given its non-normative character, the CIP index provides 
policymakers with information on the structural features of different economic systems. The CIP index 
does not make any implicit normative assumptions or prescriptions at the institutional level and leaves 
countries full ownership of their development model.
Industrial competitiveness benchmarks at the national level, such as the CIP index, should be seen as 
preliminary indicators of countries’ relative industrial competitive performance. Despite being a necessary 
tool, the CIP index is not sufficient for industrial policy design. In fact, in order to design an integrated 
set of selective industrial policies operating at different levels of the economic system, an industrial com-
petitiveness analysis based on the CIP index will have to be complemented by detailed country and activity 
analyses. 
Benchmarking can be conducted at more disaggregated levels such as sector, industries, production tasks, 
enterprises, institutions, government or government departments. Moreover, it can focus on more or less 
specific aspects, such as capital and labour costs, infrastructure, technology, innovation, skills or the envi-
ronment. The opportunity of relying on a multiple informational space and of analysing the relationship 
between inputs, outputs and mediating factors into a consistent causal structure are fundamental starting 
points for the design of industrial policies.
The industrial competitiveness analysis based on the CIP index provides the overall framework within 
which these analyses can be systematically developed and interdependences among policy measures can be 
uncovered. 
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Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed a proliferation of reports and indices, as well as academic and policy 
debates addressing national competitiveness and issues related to competitive industrial performance. This 
indicates that governments are increasingly keen on benchmarking their countries’ competitiveness as well 
as understanding its structural drivers. Policymakers from industrialized economies are seeking to retain 
their technological lead and to enter into new high-wage activities. On the other hand, middle-income 
economies are striving to catch up with advanced countries in terms of technological and production 
capabilities and to stay ahead of lower wage entrants. Finally, least developed countries are struggling to 
climb the technological ladder to trigger the process of structural change by diversifying into new export 
activities. Hence, all economies, regardless of their stage of development, aim to boost their competitive-
ness, especially of their manufacturing industries, to ultimately increase their country’s welfare1 (Lall, 2001b; 
Fagerberg et al., 2007). 
The UNIDO Industrial Development Reports (IDRs) – in particular the main benchmarking tool, the 
 Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index – have been providing governments in developing countries 
with an analytical framework and industrial diagnostics to better understand the evolving nature of industrial 
systems, to increase government awareness of industrial policies and to provide a foundation for their design 
and evaluation. The possibility of benchmarking and tracking countries’ performance in a comparative way 
over time is an important source for policymaking. The CIP index is also a relevant diagnostic tool for 
designing policies and questioning their effectiveness. Despite being a composite index, the CIP index 
offers governments the possibility to compare how countries perform over time in the various sub-indicators 
which make up the index (modular character). Thus, economies can be compared across a plurality of 
sub-indicators capturing their industrial structures and their technological and export performance.
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s (UNIDO) IDRs and their industrial diagnostics 
have also distinctly contributed to academic and policy debates in at least three critical ways. First, through 
their characteristic focus on learning processes in manufacturing and thus on technological capabilities as 
the ultimate determinant of competitive industrial performance and structural change dynamics. Secondly, 
UNIDO’s IDRs include a cross-country industrial performance benchmarking based on quantitative and 
a limited number of industrial performance indicators instead of relying on broad concepts of national 
competitiveness captured by a combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ data. Finally, more recently, IDRs have 
played a key role in addressing the problem of sustainable industrial competitiveness and energy efficiency 
(UNIDO, 2010b, 2011). 
Ten years after its initial publication, the Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index has become the 
main diagnostic tool used by UNIDO to benchmark and measure the industrial competitiveness of nations. 
Since the IDR 2002/3, UNIDO’s competitive industrial performance analysis has adopted a pragmatic 
position in the debate on the usefulness and methodological problems related to the adoption of composite 
indices (Lall, 2001b;  OECD, 2003; Grupp and Mogee, 2004; Munda and Nardo, 2005; OECD, 2008; 
Hoyland et al., 2009; Ravallion, 2010; Andreoni, 2011a). By relying on relatively few indicators and on 
‘hard’ output data only, the CIP index rankings are complemented by disaggregated information on the 
underlying scope and trends of each individual indicator. In its current form, the CIP index also allows 
capturing and comparing countries’ structural competitiveness trajectories over time. The present CIP report 
consists of four chapters and a statistical appendix. 
1  Reinert (1995) and Chang (2002) document the significance of competitiveness issues in public policy for at least 500 years. 
See the list of references for a comprehensive list of reports and special journal issues on these themes. 
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Chapter 1 unravels the main issues at the centre of the debate on competitiveness. The main approaches 
adopted by international organizations are briefly reviewed and compared. Thereby, we demonstrate how 
different approaches to competitiveness yield different empirical results, that is, different diagnostics whose 
explanatory power is intrinsically biased. Comparisons of different economies’ rankings can be obtained 
by adopting different competitiveness diagnostics, which allows us to illustrate the value added of the CIP 
index and its specific character. The CIP index today is a unique tool for assessing the industrial competi-
tiveness of nations and is based on hard data, placing particular emphasis on manufacturing industries.
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework the CIP index is based upon. The CIP index is a diagnostic 
tool encapsulating three fundamental concepts with strong theoretical foundations: first, the notion that 
being competitive in manufacturing plays a key role. Albeit in different forms, manufacturing industries 
remain the main engine of economies’ industrial competitiveness. Secondly, that becoming competitive 
implies conscious technological, organizational and institutional efforts. Learning and innovation in manu-
facturing industries and thus building technological capabilities are the fundamental drivers of development. 
Finally, structural economic dynamics reflect and account for an economy’s change in industrial competi-
tiveness over time. Thus, in order to understand (and guide) countries’ development trajectories, it is 
necessary to look at the transformation of their production structures at the sectoral and intersectoral level. 
Chapter 3 takes a retrospective look at the CIP index since its initial inclusion in the UNIDO Industrial 
Development Report 2002/3 Competing Through Innovation and Learning. Competitiveness indices are 
transforming continuously. In fact, they have to be adapted and revised according to the changing features 
of the phenomena they want to capture. The chapter retraces the different phases during which the CIP 
index has been revised, updated and validated over the last decade. 
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive analysis of the world industrial competitiveness ranking. The CIP 
index was computed in 2010 for 135 countries. The benchmarking exercise allows us to identify the rela-
tive industrial competitiveness of nations and to rank them accordingly. The analysis of the world ranking 
was performed by quintiles of the world ranking. The world industrial competitiveness ranking reveals a 
general pattern that meets our expecations: industrialized economies congregate near the top, transition 
and emerging industrial economies are found in the middle of the ranking, while least developed countries 
lie at the lower middle and lower end of the world ranking. The modular character of the CIP index 
allows us to decompose the effects of the different sub-indicators and to highlight national differences in 
selected structural economic variables such as manufacturing value added or manufactured exports per 
capita. The world industrial competitiveness analysis for 2010 is thus complemented by the ranking of 
the top 20 performers in the three sub-dimensions of industrial competitiveness.
Chapter 4 also presents the regional industrial competitiveness ranking for 2010. Here, economies have 
been grouped into world regions and ranked according to their industrial competitiveness. Because countries 
do not only want to compare their industrial competitiveness with that of their neighbours, but also with 
that of economies at the same stage of economic or industrial development, two sets of comparators were 
introduced. Economies were grouped according to their income level (taken as a proxy of economic 
development) and their level of industrial development using UNIDO’s classification. Within each group 
of comparators, countries were then ranked according to their level of industrial competitiveness. 
The world industrial competitiveness ranking provides a snapshot of the world industrial landscape for 
2010, but it does not reveal the trajectories that economies have followed to reach their respective posi-
tions in the ranking. Chapter 5 presents the results of a longitudinal analysis of world industrial competi-
tiveness. The CIP index was recalculated for all countries for which data were available over the last two 
decades (1990s – 2000s). Furthermore, dynamic indicators were computed to illustrate countries’ structural 
trajectories and the speed of change in structural economic variables. The longitudinal analysis of the world 
industrial competitiveness was conducted in intervals of five years for individual  economies and in intervals 
of ten years for regional, income and industrial development groups.
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Over the last two decades, the world industrial landscape has been reshaped by the emergence of new 
strong economies, very often referred to as the BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South 
Africa). While these countries have been climbing the world industrial competitiveness ranking and catch-
ing up with mature industrialized economies, least developed countries (LDCs) have been lagging behind. 
The last part of Chapter 5 presents several country case studies based on the disaggregated industrial 
diagnostics underlying the CIP index, focusing on the BRICS countries. 
The increasing use of benchmarking exercises and industrial diagnostic tools corresponds to governments’ 
strong need to assess their country’s relative industrial competitiveness. The informative power of these 
analyses is reinforced by three main factors. The first factor is the transparency of the industrial diagnostic 
tool, which is modular and based on a robust analytical framework and computing methodology. Secondly, 
country comparisons are meaningful to the extent that their relative performance is assessed against appro-
priate comparators. Finally, the industrial competitiveness analysis depends on governments’ awareness of 
the limits of the adopted tools as well as their use in the appropriate problem context. The report concludes 
with an outline of the CIP index for governments’ use in industrial policy design and monitoring 
processes.
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1 . Making Sense of Competitiveness 
and Competitive Industrial Performance
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21. Making SenSe of CoMpetitiveneSS  
Competitiveness is a concept that is widely used but difficult to define explicitly. While there is broad 
consensus about defining competitiveness at the firm level, there is an ongoing debate about the usefulness 
of this concept when applied to countries. This is why an analysis of the CIP index needs to first clearly 
define competitiveness and related concepts such as “comparative advantage” or “competitive industrial 
performance”, as well as their differences and main characteristics, e.g. macro- vs meso-micro, static vs 
dynamic, outcome-based vs process-based and one-dimensional vs multidimensional (Cantwell, 2005; 
Siggel, 2006; Aiginger, 2006; Andreoni, 2011a). 
1.1 The competitiveness debate: Boxing the compass
The concept of competitiveness is rooted in business school literature and has been widely applied in the 
analysis of companies’ strategic behaviour in the marketplace. Companies compete with each other for 
access to resources and the acquisition of market shares. They also adopt competitiveness strategies to 
increase their profitability and overall performance. Numerous attempts to apply the concept of competi-
tiveness in the analysis of country performances, often without a coherent analytical framework, have given 
this concept an ambiguous character and exposed its proponents to strong opposition2. For example, the 
common use of trade deficit and surplus to measure countries’ competitiveness might be ambiguous. In 
fact, a country’s trade deficit may depend on a weakness of its tradable goods sector (typically manufactur-
ing), but may also be the result of a large inflow of foreign investments, the latter being a sign of com-
petitive strength. On the other hand, a trade surplus might be a misleading indicator as it may either 
result from a strong export sector or from low levels of national economic activity.
In response to this ambiguous concept of competitiveness, some economists have used a broader definition, 
linking competitiveness to those structural factors that are responsible for any given economic system’s 
medium- and long-term performance (Krugman, 1996; Fagerberg, 1996 and 2002; Lall, 2001a and 2001b; 
Aiginger, 2006; De Grauwe, 2010). For example, Laura Tyson (1992:1) defines competitiveness as “the 
ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of international competition, while our citizens 
enjoy a standard of living that is both rising and sustainable”. This definition implies that an economy 
needs to produce tradable goods that are in sufficient demand in the domestic and international markets 
in order to be competitive. Such goods allow countries to maintain their trade in balance without resorting 
to currency depreciation or operating below full capacity utilization (Howes and Singh, 2000).
Broader definitions of competitiveness such as that reported above have been extremely controversial. Accord-
ing to Paul Krugman, “competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies. And 
the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous” (Krugman, 1994:44). The logic behind 
this argument is twofold. Firstly, while companies play a competitive zero-sum game in the marketplace, 
nations engage in a non-zero sum game in the international market3. This means that according to the 
principle of comparative advantage, every economy should benefit from taking part in the international 
market4. The concept of comparative advantage contends that even countries with no absolute international 
cost advantage in any industry may benefit from international trade simply by specializing in those industries 
in which their performance is least poor. Thus, according to Krugman, competitiveness is “only a poetic 
2  Definitions of competitiveness, also referred to as ‘competitive advantage’, which have been proposed over the last 30 years 
are summarized by Aiginger (2006:166) and in a technical table by Siggel (2006:144). 
3  In particular, Krugman stresses how “while competitiveness problems could arise in principle, as a practical, empirical matter, 
the major nations of the world are not to any significant degree in economic competition with each other” (Krugman 1994:35). 
4  Krugman’s critical anti-competitiveness argument is based on a particular application of the comparative advantage concept. 
This application can be found in standard neoclassical HOS trade models, and was later enriched by the new trade theory.
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way of saying productivity that has nothing to do with any actual conflict between countries”5 (Krugman, 
1996:18).
Secondly, in a general equilibrium setting, the rise or decline of ‘specific’ activities is not relevant as long 
as there is an optimal allocation of resources. In fact, the decline of certain industries might well be the 
result of a normal process of the reallocation of resources from specific activities to others, from old to 
new areas of comparative advantage. Thus, defining competitiveness as a ‘macroeconomic attribute’ is 
nonsense and economies’ focus on competitive gaps in particular production activities is misleading and 
dangerous.
As a number of scholars have noted (Kaldor, 1978; Fagerberg, 1996; Howes and Singh, 2000; Lall, 2001a), 
Paul Krugman’s critique emphasizes the fact that using competitiveness as a macro-concept directly chal-
lenges the neoclassical edifice and opens up the possibility of implementing selective policies for boosting 
national competitiveness. In fact, the idea according to which free trade optimizes resource allocations 
(through the equilibrating adjustments of exchange rates) depends on several strong and often unrealistic 
assumptions. These include perfect competition with efficient markets, homogenous products, no learning 
costs in technology acquisition, no technological lags and leads and no externalities or increasing returns. 
As soon as market failures, structural constraints and non-price competitiveness factors are included in the 
analysis, a valid case for using the concept of competitiveness can be made.6
A country’s possibility to boost its ‘competitive advantage’ is, of course, strictly connected (although distinct 
in form) to its ‘comparative advantage’.7 As restated in a recent debate between Ha-Joon Chang and Justin 
Lin, increasing competitiveness and industrial performance may result from two different dynamic patterns: 
the former based on a comparative advantage following strategy, the latter on a comparative advantage 
defying strategy. Advocates of the former suggest that “the optimal industrial structure is endogenous to 
the country’s endowment structure – in terms of its relative abundance of labour and skills, capital and 
natural resources” (Chang and Lin, 2009:3). Thus, Justin Lin concludes that countries’ competitive advan-
tage results from the effective exploitation of comparative advantage at each stage of development. In 
contrast, Ha-Joon Chang maintains that countries must depart from their comparative advantage and 
purposefully pursue technological capabilities building and production capacity expansion policies. This is 
the only way to upgrade a country’s industrial structure and increase its competitive industrial performance. 
In other words, this latter approach only views comparative advantage as a ‘base line’ in the process of 
industrial upgrading. How far countries should depart from this base line remains an open issue, the 
solution being very much context and historically dependent (Chang, Andreoni and Kuan, 2013). 
More recently, we have witnessed the emergence of a broader consensus on a general definition of com-
petitiveness understood as the ability of a country or location to create welfare. The existence of a link 
between competitiveness and a country’s welfare has been highlighted in such seminal contributions as 
Fagerberg (1988:355) in which competitiveness is defined as “the ability of a country to realise central 
5  However, as Reinert (1995:26) notes ‘[w]e can observe that high relative or absolute productivity levels do not necessarily 
lead to competitiveness. […] Being the most efficient in the wrong activities – the opposite of national competitiveness – lead to 
negative development”.
6  Schumpeter (1943:84) was among the first to stress how the true nature of capitalist competition is not price competition, 
but competition “from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organisation – com-
petition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs 
of the existing firms but at their foundations as their very lives”. See also Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Fagerberg et al., 
2007.
7  Siggel (2006) analyses the problems connected to the use of the concept of comparative advantage in a context where n 
goods are traded. It is important to note that the measurement of comparative advantage requires the use of monetary costs at 
equilibrium prices. Interestingly, Siggel shows why the RCA (revealed comparative advantage) is actually more of an indicator of 
competitiveness than comparative advantage. Advancements in new growth theory are also discussed, such as the inclusion into 
the traditional HOS trade model of economies of scale as sources of comparative advantage.
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economic policy goals, especially growth in income and employment, without running into balance of 
payment difficulties’’. The same notion also appears in the definition provided by the OECD (1992:237) 
according to which competitiveness is ”the degree to which, under free trade and fair market conditions, 
a country can produce goods and services which meet the test of foreign competition while simultaneously 
maintaining and expanding the real income of its people” (Cantwell, 2005; Siggel, 2006; Aiginger, 2006; 
Andreoni, 2011a).
The nature of the relationship between a country’s competitiveness and its welfare is anything but simple. 
Indeed, ongoing transformations that occur within and across a country continuously challenge its com-
petitiveness, which creates tensions because the country is required to deal with both internal (welfare) 
and external constraints in a sustainable manner. This latter dimension was highlighted in the OECD 
project on ‘Framework Conditions for Industrial Competitiveness’ (Hatzichronoglou, 1996), and fully 
articulated by Aiginger (1998:164) as follows: “Competitiveness of a nation is the ability to (i) sell enough 
products and services (to fulfill an external constraint); (ii) at factor incomes in line with the (current and 
changing) aspiration level of the country; and (iii) at macro-conditions of the economic, environmental, 
social system seen as satisfactory by the people.” 
Although a consensus is slowly emerging in the competitiveness debate, the differences among the main 
approaches still remain substantial as the following brief introduction illustrates:
 
•	 The	Real	Exchange	Rate	Approach
According to the real exchange rate approach, the level of competitiveness of a given economy has to be 
defined and measured by considering one specific dimension, namely the relative real exchange rate (RER) 
movements between countries. Specifically, a country becomes ‘less competitive’ as a result of an apprecia-
tion of its real exchange rate relative to its main competitors. Consequently, a country will run “a persistent 
(and unwelcome) current account deficit which would in due course require adjustment, usually via a 
mixture of deflation and depreciation” (Boltho, 1996:2).8 This approach was introduced by the International 
Monetary Fund and solely relies on monetary factors of competitiveness. Thus, although this approach is 
very useful in short run analyses, it does not provide any information about changes in structural drivers 
of competitiveness. 
•	 The	National	Competitiveness	Approach
The national competitiveness approach defines competitiveness as “the set of institutions, policies and fac-
tors that determine the level of productivity of one country” (WEF) and, in turn, its sustainable level of 
prosperity.9 The operationalization of this concept is mainly attributable to the work of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), the Institute of Management Development (IMD) and, to a certain extent, to the Doing 
Business Reports of the World Bank. Here, competitiveness is understood as a multi-dimensional concept 
including a large number of static and dynamic macroeconomic attributes.
This approach focuses on the ‘process assessment of competitiveness’, that is, on understanding how the 
above-mentioned interacting economic and non-economic attributes determine the ‘ability’ or ‘readiness’ 
of countries to compete. Expressions such as ‘business environment’ and ‘investment climate’ also capture 
8  See also Lipschitz and McDonald, 1991. 
9 See also Porter, 1990; Sala-i-Martin in De Grauwe, ed., 2010. 
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the same ex-ante concept of a given country’s ‘potential competitiveness’ (World Bank, 2010). As a result 
of the fact that competitiveness is defined according to a certain set of institutions, policies and factors, 
which are ex ante assumed to be ‘right’, this approach tends to propose a normative concept of competi-
tiveness and is highly deterministic.10 
•	 The	Engineering	Approach
The engineering approach regards competitiveness as an emergent property resulting from the ability of 
a country’s firms to imitate, adopt, shape and create technical and organizational ‘best practices’ in their 
activities. Hence, according to this approach, competitiveness is ultimately reflected in the capacity “to 
maximise productivity and factor incomes (wages and profits) on a sustained basis” (Hatzichronoglou, 
1996:19). Studies adopting this approach such as the Made in America Report by the MIT Commission 
on Productivity also rely on foreign trade indicators to monitor firms’ individual and aggregate competi-
tive performance.
•	 The	Structural	Competitiveness	Approach	
The structural competitiveness approach (also referred to by Sanjaya Lall as the manufacturing competitive-
ness approach) shares some of the premises underlying the engineering approach, but differs from it and 
the national competitiveness approach in that it is based on a narrower and more tractable meso-concept 
of competitiveness, that is, industrial competitiveness. Accordingly, industrial competitiveness is defined as 
“the capacity of countries to increase their presence in international and domestic markets whilst develop-
ing industrial sectors and activities with higher value added and technological content” (UNIDO 2002). 
Thus, “competitiveness in industrial activities means developing relative efficiency along with sustainable 
growth” (Lall 2001a:6). 
This implies that increasing industrial competitiveness requires a shift away from static sources of cost 
advantage to a focus on the diversification of industrial activities (moving up the technological ladder). 
This concept of industrial competitiveness has a multidimensional character and may be applied both in 
‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ analyses, depending on whether we are interested in the ‘process assessment’ or 
‘outcome assessment’ of the industrial competitiveness of nations. Specifically, this approach may focus 
both on the particular set of ‘structural drivers’ of industrial competitiveness (i.e. process) and on the 
resulting competitive industrial performance of countries (i.e. outcome). The measurement of industrial 
competitiveness tends to rely on observable realities. Moreover, the concept maintains a ‘stochastic’ char-
acter, that is, it conceives of the possibility of a plurality of industrial upgrading patterns (Lall, 2001a). 
The first operationalization of this approach can be found in the UNIDO IDR 2002/3 with the develop-
ment of a specific ‘outcome assessment’ tool (the CIP index) with a battery of industrial capabilities indica-
tors to capture structural drivers (see Chapter 3). As the CIP index is an indicator of industrial performance, 
it can only be used for cross-country ‘outcome assessments’ of manufacturing competitiveness at regular 
intervals. In other words, it informs us about competitive industrial performance in select years, and by 
comparing countries’ effective annual industrial performance, the index allows the assessment of countries’ 
industrial progress over time. However, the CIP index is not designed to capture industrial potential.
10  Qualitative indices are certainly useful, but there are problems when they are used as normative statements as the case of 
Finland, for example, illustrates. According to mainstream indices of institutional development and national competitiveness, 
Finland’s position in international rankings would have been very low in the 1960s given its relative closure to international markets, 
companies’ ownership control and massive presence of state-owned enterprises (the same story can be told for Republic of Korea 
or even the United States in a different historical era). This once again underlines that there is no unique or ‘right’ way of becoming 
competitive (Andreoni, 2012).
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1.2	The	distinctive	features	of	the	CIP	index	
Within the field of competitiveness benchmarking, the CIP index emerges as a simple, yet powerful and 
transparent tool for ranking countries according to their industrial competitiveness. There are eight sub-
indicators in total which make up the CIP index in its current form (two pairs are aggregated in two 
composite indicators called industrialization intensity and export quality). As summarized in Table 1, these 
eight sub-indicators are organized along three dimensions and are aggregated using a non-linear aggregation 
technique and equal weights.
 
Table 1: The CIP index
Indicators composing the new CIP index:
Indicator 1: MVApc: Manufacturing Value Added per capita
Indicator 2: MXpc: Manufactured Exports per capita
Indicator 3: MHVAsh: Medium- and High-tech Manufacturing Value Added share in in total manufacturing value added
Indicator 4: MVAsh: Manufacturing Value Added share in total GDP
Indicator 5: MHXsh: Medium- and High-tech manufactured Exports share in total manufactured exports 
Indicator 6: MXsh: Manufactured Exports share in total exports
Indicator 7: ImWMVA: Impact of a country on World Manufacturing Value Added
Indicator 8: ImWMT: Impact of a country on World Manufactures Trade
Five major distinctive features of the CIP index can be identified. These will be thoroughly discussed in 
the following chapters of the report with a focus on the theoretical roots and evolution of the CIP index. 
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Industrial	competitiveness	and	manufacturing	development
The CIP index builds on a meso-concept of competitiveness which assigns particular emphasis to countries’ 
manufacturing development. Accordingly, industrial competitiveness is defined as the capacity of countries 
to increase their presence in international and domestic markets whilst developing industrial sectors and activities 
with higher value added and technological content. At the very fundamental level, becoming industrially 
competitive is nothing more than learning to industrialize and to continuously transform the economy’s 
industrial structure (Lall, 1987). As Luigi Pasinetti points out, “The primary sources of international gains 
is international learning (not international trade), where firms in one country are challenged by lower-
priced products from abroad. They will either learn how to cut down costs or close down. Some of them, 
at best, may learn and survive. Furthermore, when a new product is invented in one country, the very 
first thing that all other countries will try to do is to learn how to make the product themselves” (Pasinetti, 
1981:259). Countries can learn from international markets and become more industrially competitive if 
they develop their technological capabilities, expand their production capacity and invest in their infra-
structure. Thus, increasing industrial competitiveness requires selective policy interventions through which 
comparative advantages are exploited while new competitive advantages are created (Chang, 1994, 2009; 
Lall, 2001; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009; Chang, Andreoni and Kuan, 2013).
A	separation	between	structural	economic	variables	and	institutional	conditions
The CIP index embraces a structural competitiveness approach according to which diagnostic tools should 
focus on capturing structural economic variables. The fact that countries’ institutional features are not 
measured within this approach does not imply that their relevance is being underestimated. Instead, by 
maintaining a separation between the assessment of structural economic variables (such as countries’ sectoral 
composition), on the one hand, and institutional features (such as labour market regulations), on the other, 
the CIP index does not close the gap of institutional possibilities. In other words, as Sanjaya Lall pointed 
out, “there are many roads to heaven as well as many heavens” (Lall, 2004:7). The CIP index does not 
make any implicit normative assumptions or prescriptions at the institutional level. On the contrary, many 
of the sub-indicators adopted in the WEF and IMD competitiveness ranking tend to align to a certain 
vision of market functioning and market-friendly institutional settings (Lall, 2001a) .
A	focus	on	countries’	performance	rather	than	their	potential	
The CIP index is a performance (or ‘outcome’) indicator, while the World Competitiveness Scoreboard 
(WCS) produced by the IMD and the new Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) produced by the WEF 
are potential (or ‘process’) indicators. Thus, the CIP index consists of output indicators only; by contrast, 
WEF and IMD focus on the ‘key drivers’ and ‘key factors’, respectively, that determine countries’ com-
petitiveness (similarly, the World Bank’s Doing Business Report attempts to capture the ‘business climate’ 
that influences countries’ competitiveness). Thus, while the CIP index directly measures actual industrial 
performance, the WCS and the new GCI (indirectly) capture overall output given certain potentialities in 
the inputs (the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports also use input indicators and assume that a positive 
correlation exists between them and economic performance). 
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An	exclusive	focus	on	quantitative	data,	transparency	and	modularity	
The CIP index only uses quantitative and transparent indicators. Although this does not mean that the 
index is free of value or qualitative judgements (which have been used to construct the technological clas-
sification or the aggregation technique), WEF and IMD use a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators. 
Perception-based indicators are extremely problematic for inter-country comparisons as responses are likely 
to reflect the contextual differences and cognitive schemes shaping respondents’ business perceptions. This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that qualitative and quantitative data are conflated in an overly com-
posite indicator.11 By contrast, the CIP index maintains a strong modular character and as such is suitable 
for disaggregated analysis.
A	focus	on	medium-long	term	country	transformations
Given its focus on industrial competitiveness and structural economic variables, the CIP index provides 
country rankings that tend to remain relatively stable over short periods of time. The reason for this is 
that processes of technological learning are cumulative and take time. The effects of learning are only 
reflected in industrial statistics and structural economic variables in the medium-long term and can be 
captured through detailed longitudinal studies, in particular by tracking changes of key dimensions over 
time. In this respect, the CIP index in its current form allows us to observe not only the absolute level 
of key indicators at any particular point in time, but also their rate of change. Perception-based indicators, 
on the contrary, tend to be extremely variable and may affect country rankings drastically, even for short 
time intervals. The overall reliability of the competitiveness assessment is thus negatively affected. 
1.3 Competitiveness is in the eye of the beholder
The different approaches to competitiveness discussed above produce different diagnostics for cross-country 
competitiveness benchmarking. The two main competitors of the CIP index in the field of competitiveness 
benchmarking are the new GCI produced by the WEF and the WCS by the IMD. These two institutions, 
WEF and IMD, used to jointly publish a competitiveness index in the World Competitiveness Report. 
Following the decision to go their separate ways in 1996, WEF places relatively greater emphasis on ‘soft’ 
data while IMD focuses on ‘hard’ data. While the WEF’s competitiveness analysis is widely cited in policy 
and academic debates, the IMD’s ranking is more widely used in business schools. 
World	Economic	Forum:	The	New	Global	Competitiveness	Index
Competitiveness indices promoted by the WEF have been widely publicized by mass media, although 
some scholars have stressed the lack of transparency of the benchmarking exercise and have expressed some 
doubts about the competitiveness rankings produced (Lall, 2001b; Godin, 2004). The WEF embraces what 
we call here the national competitiveness approach. Since 2005, countries’ national competitiveness has 
been assessed through a composite index called Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). This index underwent 
a major revision in the WEF 2008/9 Report. The majority of the individual indicators used in the various 
editions of the WEF Global Competitiveness Reports have been incorporated into the current GCI. How 
these sub-indicators are combined has drastically changed due to the adoption of a new ‘hierarchical model’ 
for the assessment of competitiveness and more rigorous statistical methodologies. 
To capture the institutions, policies and factors responsible for the overall level of productivity of a given 
11  For a discussion on these issues, see Andreoni, 2011a.
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country (i.e. its competitiveness), the WEF uses a ‘12 pillars’ schema (see Table 2). Each of these pillars 
captures one distinct determinant of national competitiveness and consists of sub-categories. For each of 
these sub-categories, a list of sub-indicators mixing qualitative and quantitative data, as well as input and 
output variables are considered. All these sub-indicators are included in the final composite index (GCI) 
in accordance with the pillar they belong to.12 
The relevance of each determinant is dependent on the country’s stage of development and is reflected in 
the weight of each pillar in the composite index. In the WEF classification, countries are divided into 
three categories based on stage of development: factor-driven, efficiency-driven and innovation-driven. The 
distinction is made based on GDP (gross domestic product) per capita and whether a country’s exports 
are factor-driven.13 Thus, it is assumed that countries need to focus on different sub-groups of pillars 
according to their stage of development.
 
Table 2: The World Economic Forum’s 12 pillars of competitiveness 
 
Source: WEF, 2012:8.
12  As some indicators traverse different pillars, the methodology adopted assigned half-weights to avoid double counting.
13  Exports are factor-driven when the share of exports of mineral goods in total exports is higher than 70 percent.
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Institute	for	Management	Development:	World	Competitiveness	Scoreboard
The IMD World Competitiveness Scoreboard (WCS) has been published without interruption since 1989. 
It aims to rank and analyse “how nations and enterprises manage the totality of their competences to 
achieve increased prosperity” (IMD, 2011:480). The analysis is carried out at the national level, because 
national environments shape the ability of firms to compete both domestically and internationally. To 
determine the overall competitiveness of nations, the WCS 2012 utilizes 4 competitiveness input factors, 
20 sub-factors and 329 criteria. Among the criteria, 247 criteria (quantitative data: 131 and perception 
data: 116) are taken into consideration to determine the overall competitiveness ranking, while 82 criteria 
are used as background information (Table 3). Irrespective of the number of individual factors they include, 
each of the 20 sub-factors is given a weight of 5 percent in the composite indicator through which the 
scoreboard is produced.
 
Table 3: The IMD competitiveness factors 
 
Source: IMD, 2011:480. 
The individual measures consist both of hard and soft data. The latter is perception-based information 
about countries’ competitiveness in areas such as management practices and labour relations. The percep-
tions of the business community are collected through an Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) conducted 
every year in each of the ranked economies. Differently from the WEF and UNIDO ranking, the IMD 
covers only 59 countries.
Countries’	movements	across	competitiveness	rankings
What makes these benchmarking exercises particularly relevant in the current policy debate is that govern-
ments include them in their goal statement, very often without realizing that the different composite 
indices by which these rankings are constructed cannot provide a neutral account of competitiveness. This 
is because the construction of a composite index relies on a sequence of subjective choices about the 
relevant dimensions to be included in the index, the focus on input or output measures, their proportional 
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relationships and weights. The more dimensions such as institutional and structural aspects and macroeco-
nomic conditions are included, the lower the transparency of the final composite index. Institutional aspects 
are intrinsically qualitative features whose assessment depends on subjective and perception-based evalua-
tions. Some structural aspects of economies, such as the technological complexity of their production base, 
rely on some form of technological classification of sectors.
According to the concept of competitiveness and empirics adopted, three completely different global sce-
narios emerge. Notably, given the particular emphasis the CIP index assigns to the manufacturing sector, 
countries specializing in agriculture, resource-based manufacturing (including mining) or in services perform 
much better in the WEF and IMD rankings than in the CIP index ranking. By contrast, newly industrial-
ized countries do comparatively better in UNIDO’s CIP index ranking because they are experiencing 
processes of industrial upgrading. Table 4 shows the high degree of diversity in the assessment of world 
competitiveness rankings on account of the three major differences pointed out above and the underlying 
distinctions in understanding competitiveness. 
Table 4: Countries’ movements across competitiveness rankings
UNIDO
2012/13 
Country WEF 
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-WEF
IMD
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-IMD
Ranking
difference
WEF-IMD
1 Japan 10 -9 27 -26 -17
2 Germany 6 -4 9 -7 -3
3 United States of America 7 -4 2 1 5
4 Republic of Korea 19 -15 22 -18 -3
5 China, Taiwan Province 13 -8 7 -2 6
6 Singapore 2 4 4 2 -2
7 China 29 -22 23 -16 6
8 Switzerland 1 7 3 5 -2
9 Belgium 17 -8 25 -16 -8
10 France 21 -11 29 -19 -8
11 Italy 42 -31 40 -29 2
12 Netherlands 5 7 11 1 -6
13 Sweden 4 9 5 8 -1
14 United Kingdom 8 6 18 -4 -10
15 Ireland 27 -12 20 -5 7
16 Austria 16 0 21 -5 -5
17 Canada 14 3 6 11 8
18 Finland 3 15 17 1 -14
19 Spain 36 -17 39 -20 -3
20 Czech Republic 39 -19 33 -13 6
21 Malaysia 25 -4 14 7 11
22 Mexico 53 -31 37 -15 16
23 Thailand 38 -15 30 -7 8
24 Denmark 12 12 13 11 -1
25 Poland 41 -16 34 -9 7
26 Israel 26 0 19 7 7
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UNIDO
2012/13 
Country WEF 
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-WEF
IMD
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-IMD
Ranking
difference
WEF-IMD
27 Slovakia 71 -44 47 -20 24
28 Australia 20 8 15 13 5
29 Hungary 60 -31 45 -16 15
30 Turkey 43 -13 38 -8 5
31 Norway 15 16 8 23 7
32 Slovenia 56 -24 51 -19 5
33 Brazil 48 -15 46 -13 2
34 Portugal 49 -15 41 -7 8
35 Argentina 94 -59 55 -20 39
36 Russian Federation 67 -31 48 -12 19
37 Saudi Arabia 18 19 NA
38 Indonesia 50 -12 42 -4 8
39 Kuwait 37 2 NA
40 Belarus NA NA
41 South Africa 52 -11 50 -9 2
42 Luxembourg 22 20 12 30 10
43 India 59 -16 35 8 24
44 Philippines 65 -21 43 1 22
45 Chile 33 12 28 17 5
46 Romania 78 -32 53 -7 25
47 Lithuania 45 2 36 11 9
48 New Zealand 23 25 24 24 -1
49 Greece 81 -32 58 -9 23
50 Croatia 96 -46 57 -7 39
51 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 126 -75 59 -8 67
52 Estonia 34 18 31 21 3
53 Ukraine 73 -20 NA
54 Viet Nam 75 -21 NA
55 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 -11 NA
56 Costa Rica 57 -1 NA
57 Qatar 11 46 10 47 1
58 Tunisia NA NA
59 Bulgaria 62 -3 54 5 8
60 Trinidad and Tobago 84 -24 NA
61 Malta 47 14 NA
62 Egypt 107 -45 NA
63 Peru 61 2 44 19 17
64 Colombia 69 -5 52 12 17
65 Iceland 30 35 26 39 4
66 Morocco 70 -4 NA
67 China, Hong Kong SAR 9 58 1 66 8
68 Latvia 55 13 NA
69 Oman 32 37 NA
70 Kazakhstan 51 19 NA
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UNIDO
2012/13 
Country WEF 
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-WEF
IMD
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-IMD
Ranking
difference
WEF-IMD
71 El Salvador 101 -30 NA
72 Jordan 64 8 49 23 15
73 Uruguay 74 -1 NA
74 Pakistan 124 -50 NA
75 Lebanon 91 -16 NA
76 Serbia 95 -19 NA
77 Guatemala 83 -6 NA
78 Bangladesh 118 -40 NA
79 Mauritius 54 25 NA
80 Sri Lanka 68 12 NA
81 Syrian Arab Republic NA NA
82 Algeria 110 -28 NA
83 Bosnia and Herzegovina 88 -5 NA
84 The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia 80 4 NA
85 Swaziland 135 -50 NA
86 Botswana 79 7 NA
87 Ecuador 86 1 NA
88 Cyprus 58 30 NA
89 Côte d'Ivoire 131 -42 NA
90 Cambodia 85 5 NA
91 Honduras 90 1 NA
92 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 104 -12 NA
93 Jamaica 97 -4 NA
94 Albania 89 5 NA
95 Nigeria 115 -20 NA
96 Georgia 77 19 NA
97 Cameroon 112 -15 NA
98 Armenia 82 16 NA
99 Paraguay 116 -17 NA
100 Congo NA NA
101 Senegal 117 -16 NA
102 Kenya 106 -4 NA
103 Gabon 99 4 NA
104 Barbados 44 60 NA
105 Fiji NA NA
106 United Republic of Tanzania 120 -14 NA
107 Azerbaijan 46 61 NA
108 Suriname 114 -6 NA
109 Mongolia 93 16 NA
110 Panama 40 70 NA
111 Zambia 102 9 NA
112 China, Macao SAR NA NA
113 Belize NA NA
114 Republic of Moldova 87 27 NA
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UNIDO
2012/13 
Country WEF 
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-WEF
IMD
2012/13
Ranking
difference
UNIDO-IMD
Ranking
difference
WEF-IMD
115 Tajikistan 100 15 NA
116 Madagascar 130 -14 NA
117 Kyrgyzstan 127 -10 NA
118 Ghana 103 15 NA
119 Nepal 125 -6 NA
120 Uganda 123 -3 NA
121 Yemen 140 -19 NA
122 Mozambique 138 -16 NA
123 Saint Lucia NA NA
124 Cape Verde 122 2 NA
125 Malawi 129 -4 NA
126 Sudan NA NA
127 Haiti 142 -15 NA
128 Niger NA NA
129 Rwanda 63 66 NA
130 Ethiopia 121 9 NA
131 Central African Republic NA NA
132 Burundi 144 -12 NA
133 Eritrea NA NA
133 Gambia 98 35 NA
133 Iraq NA NA
The World Economic Forum also includes the following countries: 24 United Arab Emirates; 28 Brunei; 31 Puerto Rico; 
35 Barein; 76 Seychelles; 92 Namibia; 105 Dominican Republic; 108 Nicaragua; 109 Guyana; 111 Liberia; 113 Lybia; 
119 Benin; 128 Mali; 132 Zimbabwe; 133 Burkina Faso; 134 Mauritania; 136 Timor-Leste; 137 Lesoto; 139 Chad; 141 
Guinea; 143 Sierra Leone.
Source: UNIDO Report 2012/13; WEF Report 2012/3; IMD Report 2012/3.
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Despite the multiplicity of competitiveness indices in the literature, little is known about their economics 
(Lall, 2000). How do they relate to theories of development and the broader political economy debate? 
How rigorously are the variables chosen? Answering such questions is necessary in order for competitive 
indices to fully establish themselves as reliable indicators of relative competitive performance and useful 
tools for policy advice. 
Over the last three decades, the political economy debate abandoned its focus on manufacturing as the 
main engine of technological dynamism and the source of wealth of nations. However, recent years have 
witnessed a renewed interest in manufacturing production. This has led analysts to declare and welcome 
a global ‘manufacturing renaissance’ emerging in different contexts with multiple focuses, observable in 
many white papers and research studies which have been re-examining the significance of manufacturing 
since 2000. Deindustrialization, loss of strategic manufacturing industries, increasing trade imbalances, 
decreasing technological dynamism and industrial competitiveness have been major concerns in advanced 
economies. Meanwhile, governments in developing countries have begun questioning the sustainability of 
a development model that is overly focused on natural resource extraction. Other governments, particularly 
of middle income countries, have been concerned about emerging strong economies capturing global 
market shares and dominating the global technological race to the detriment of smaller players (UNIDO, 
2009).
In developed countries, the ‘financial freefall’ of 2008-2009 further fuelled governments’ concern about 
the overall impact on their economies of an increasingly rapid process of de-industrialization. Since the 
onset of the crisis, there has been a substantial loss of jobs and a global redistribution of manufacturing 
production with overwhelming effects on social welfare (Andreoni and Upadhyaya, 2013) . Even middle 
income countries in the catch-up phase have witnessed a relative deceleration of their economies as a result 
of the contraction in global demand. Consequently, many governments have had to step in to rescue 
distressed manufacturing firms and to protect national champions, as well as to expand the money supply 
to counterbalance the credit crunch. The restructuring of the automotive industry and the subsequent 
efforts by various governments aimed at keeping production at home are striking examples of this renewed 
scope for public action.  
This renewed interest in and concern for manufacturing production opens the door for a profound recon-
sideration of the pro-services vision. According to this vision, the role of manufacturing is destined to lose 
relevance as economies progress. Moreover, for economies that currently find themselves in the ‘catch-up 
phase’, industrialization is not an obligatory rung on the ladder of development, since they can follow a 
service-led process of economic growth instead. This pro-services vision has dominated the political econ-
omy debate for nearly three decades, pushing out and excluding the proponents of public support for 
manufacturing development, given its ‘symbiotic’ relationship with the service industries, in particular 
production-related services. 
The competitive industrial performance analysis performed by UNIDO embraces a pro-manufacturing vision 
whereby development is understood as “a process that links micro learning dynamics, economy-wide 
accumulation of technological capabilities and industrial development” (Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 
2009:543). Modern manufacturing systems consist of complex interdependencies, often across a range of 
industries, which contribute a variety of components, materials, production sub-systems and production-
related services. The CIP index and the competitive industrial performance analysis offer a first snapshot 
of these complexities at the country level, providing a visualization of global trends and the current 
industrial competitiveness of nations.
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2.1 Development as industrialization
Does the wealth of nations, that is, their socio-economic development and technological power, mainly 
result from superior capacities in manufacturing (i.e. making commodities) or from pursuing other activi-
ties (i.e. providing services)? Furthermore, do different sectors and/or production tasks performed within 
each sector contribute to economic growth in specific ways or is the effect identical for all sectors and 
activities? Finally, to what extent can a sustained process of economic growth rely on the increasing relative 
expansion of the service sector?
During the second half of the twentieth century, the political economy debate addressing these questions 
has witnessed two major turning points. Until the late 1970s, the debate was dominated by people work-
ing in the field of classical economics who supported what we call here a pro-manufacturing vision. In the 
subsequent two decades of the twentieth century (1980s – 2000), a pro-services vision came to dominate 
and remained prevalent in the academic and policy debate until the recent financial crisis. 
These two opposite visions emerged in (and thus partially reflect) two different phases of the global process 
of structural change and manufacturing development that commenced after World War II. To better 
understand the context of the industry versus services debate, a snapshot of countries’ manufacturing 
development trajectories over the last half of the twentieth century will be provided. 
2.1.1 Manufacturing development: Some long-term stylized facts, 1950 - 2005
Eighteenth-century Great Britain was the first country that underwent a process of manufacturing develop-
ment. Only in the early nineteenth-century (after Great Britain had already achieved significant increases 
in productivity) did European countries such as Belgium, Switzerland and France, followed by the United 
States, enter their own different paths of manufacturing development. Subsequently, other latecomers (most 
notably Germany, Russia and Japan) joined the group of industrializing nations, while the developing 
world (both former colonies and non-colonies) remained oriented towards primary production (Gerschen-
kron, 1962; Maddison, 2007). This situation basically remained unchanged until World War II (with the 
exception of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa). This group took the opportunity to initiate its own 
manufacturing development process through import substitution because of the contraction of world trade 
during the Great Depression (1930s). After World War II, more countries began to enter the ‘catch-up 
phase’ thanks to the increasing advantages of backwardness, the greater opportunities for technology transfer 
and the industrial policies implemented by developing states. This allowed them to enter the global manu-
facturing development race (Wade, 1990; Chang, 1994, 2002; Amsden, 2001, 2007; Chang, Andreoni 
and Kuan, 2013). 
At first glance, three sets of stylized facts emerge as characteristic features of the last half of the twentieth 
century. Let us start from the most apparent stylized fact: a global process of structural change and quan-
titative redistribution of manufacturing across countries. With regard to the former, when the manufactur-
ing development process became a major global phenomenon in 1950, manufacturing constituted around 
30 percent of GDP in advanced economies while that figure amounted to around 12 percent in developing 
countries (see Table 5 and Figure 1). The industrial sector taken as a whole (including manufacturing) 
accounted for 20 percent of GDP, while agriculture as well as services made up 40 percent of GDP in 
developing countries. 
Among the economies in the ‘catch-up phase’, Latin America remained the most industrialized region until 
1975, when the manufacturing sector started contracting to the point that, in 2005, the share of manu-
facturing in GDP had reverted to 1950s levels and Latin American countries reduced their share in world 
manufacturing value added. The development path followed by manufacturing industries in Africa was, 
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on average, almost flat, reaching its peak in 1990 and decreasing again to 11 percent (i.e. a return to 
figures seen in 1950). In contrast, manufacturing in many Asian economies continued to increase through-
out the last half of the century with an impressive acceleration from 1965 to 1980. Finally,  the manu-
facturing share in the most advanced economies started decreasing in the late 1960s, from 30 percent to 
18 percent on average in less than a decade (Maddison, 2007; Szirmai, 2012). 
During the second half of the last century, several East Asian economies experienced a sustained catching 
up process responsible for the quantitative redistribution of world manufacturing value added share and 
world manufactures trade. By 2010, the three most successful economies in East Asia, namely China, the 
Republic of Korea and China, Taiwan Province taken together accounted for one fifth of world manufac-
turing value added share and world manufactures trade.
 
Figure 1: Worldwide manufacturing development paths (changes in the shares of manufacturing in 
GDP at current prices per country groups over the period 1950 – 2005)
 
Source: Based on Szirmai, 2012.
 
The quantitative redistribution of manufacturing, from advanced economies to a number of fast growing 
countries, has also been accompanied by a qualitative transformation within countries’ manufacturing sec-
tors. At different stages of development (measured in real GDP per capita, US dollars 2005), a country’s 
manufacturing sector is composed of different shares of resource-based, labour intensive and skill/capital 
intensive industries. A set of empirical regularities has been observed (see Figure 2): 
•	 Up	 to	 US$	 2.000,	 a	 country’s	 manufacturing	 sector	 tends	 to	 be	 composed	 of	 almost	 50	 percent	
resource-based industries, 20 percent labour intensive industries and 30 percent skill/capital intensive 
industries;
•	 Between	US$	2.000	and	US$	8.000,	 the	ratio	of	 labour	 intensive	and	skill/capital	 intensive	 indus-
tries tends to invert, while resource-based manufacturing industries remain unchanged; 
•	 Finally,	from	US$	8.000	onwards,	there	is	a	tendency	for	resource-based	industries	to	become	less	prevalent	
while there is an increase in skill/capital intensive industries (such as machinery production, automotive 
or chemicals) and a strong reduction in labour intensive industries (such as textiles and apparel).
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Figure 2: Qualitative transformations in the manufacturing sector (changes in the composition of 
total MVA for large economies)
Source: UNIDO, 2012a.
The third feature (as shown in Table 5) is that the degree of variance among manufacturing development 
paths is very high, with countries from the same regions or income groups experiencing completely dif-
ferent forms of industrialization. For example, the group of today’s advanced economies includes two 
different groups of countries. On the one hand are those such as Germany and Japan that have maintained 
a strong manufacturing base and, on the other, there are those such as the United States and United 
Kingdom that have increasingly relied on services. The manufacturing development trajectories of large 
world economies such as China and India or Brazil are also very different. Table 5 provides information 
on the share of manufacturing in GDP at current prices over the period 1950 – 2005 for 90 countries. 
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Table 5: Worldwide manufacturing development, 1950 – 2005 (shares of manufacturing in GDP at 
current prices, 90 countries)
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Table 5 (continued): Worldwide manufacturing development, 1950 – 2005 (shares of manufacturing 
in GDP at current prices, 90 countries)
Source: Szirmai, 2012.
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2.1.2 The pro-manufacturing vision
The term industrialization, (i.e manufacturing growth) was, for a long time, synonymous with development, 
particularly amongst classical development economists. Participation in the global industrialization race 
was regarded as sine qua non for countries that wished to achieve accelerated economic growth, increasing 
labour productivity and socio-economic welfare improvements. 
During the 1960s, the historical evidence available pointed towards the existence of a solid correlation 
between manufacturing development and economic growth. As shown in Table 5, countries with the 
highest shares of manufacturing in GDP were also the most developed economies. Classical development 
economists provided two sets of explanations for why manufacturing was the engine of economic growth. 
The first one focused on the (internal) ‘special properties’ of manufacturing and the second on the way 
in which these  spread to the rest of the economy, triggering a process of increasing returns and economic 
growth.14 The systematization of a pro-manufacturing vision was mainly attributable to the seminal work 
of Nicholas Kaldor and Albert Hirschman (amongst others). 
Building on the classical work on increasing returns by Allyn Young (1928) and the empirical regularities 
pointed out by Kuznets, Chenery and Syrquin, Nicholas Kaldor developed his three famous laws (Kaldor, 
1966, 1967, 1981. See also Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, 1986). These ascertain the existence of 
increasing returns within manufacturing and the reasons why manufacturing is the engine of aggregate 
growth. The first of these laws states that the faster the rate of manufacturing growth, the faster the rate 
of economic growth of the overall system. The second law (also known as Verdoorn’s law) asserts the 
existence of a strong positive causal relation between the rate of growth of manufacturing output and the 
rate of growth of manufacturing productivity.15 Finally, the third law determines that aggregate productivity 
growth is positively associated with the growth of employment in manufacturing (and negatively related 
with the growth of non-manufacturing employment). 
The ‘special properties’ (implicit in the second law) that allow manufacturing to trigger the overall growth 
of the economic system (through the realization of the first and third law) are threefold. Firstly, there are 
relatively broader opportunities for capital accumulation and intensification in manufacturing (in compari-
son to agriculture and services). Secondly, there are greater possibilities to exploit economies of scale induced 
by large-scale production and technical indivisibilities, both within and across industries. Finally, there are 
higher learning opportunities in manufacturing production through which embodied and disembodied 
technological progress is generated.
Given these special properties, specialization in manufacturing implies a double productivity gain (it allows 
countries to acquire a ‘structural change bonus’ and to avoid a ‘structural change burden’). The former 
results from transferring labour from agriculture to manufacturing, the latter relates to the so-called ‘Bau-
mol’s disease’ (an overall slowdown of productivity caused by an over-dependence on services, especially 
labour intensive services such as personal services).
The mechanisms through which manufacturing is able to extend its special properties to the rest of the 
economy were explicitly formulated by Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1958). In his ‘unbalanced growth 
model’, each sector is linked with the rest of the economic system by its direct and indirect intermediate 
14  The different sources of increasing returns identified in the classical work of Smith, Babbage, Young and Kaldor are discussed 
in Andreoni and Scazzieri (2013). See Toner (1999) for a review of Kaldor’s laws and their contributions to the Cumulative Cau-
sation Theory.
15  This law is implicit in the idea stated by A. Young (1928) that “the division of labour depends upon the extent of the 
market, but the extent of the market depends upon the division of labour”. This means that “an increase in the market triggers 
further specialisation which is a process that simultaneously increases the size of the market for specialist skills and activities” (Best, 
1999:107).
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purchase of productive inputs and sales of productive outputs – i.e. backward and backw. According to 
its system of linkages, each sector exercises ‘push’ and ‘pull’ forces on the rest of the economy. Unlike 
agriculture, the industrial sector is characterized by both strong backward and forward linkages and thus 
emerges as the main driver of development.16
However, sectors are not just linked through a set of physical relations of supply and demand. The embod-
ied and disembodied knowledge generated within the manufacturing sector connects within and across 
sectors through so-called spillover effects. This is why, according to Hirschman (1981:75), the development 
process is “essentially the record of how one thing leads to another” through an incremental unfolding of 
production and technological linkages stemming from manufacturing production. 
Economists embracing the pro-manufacturing vision have also stressed the importance of manufacturing 
in relation to other macroeconomic issues. Moreover, manufactured products have a high income elasticity 
of demand (as per capita income increases, demand decreases for agricultural products and increases for 
manufacturing products - the so-called Engel law of 1857). This opens up dynamic opportunities for the 
development of manufacturing production. Finally, flourishing production of manufacturing tradeables was 
considered a fundamental condition for avoiding balance of payments crises. This is the case in particular 
for countries which cannot rely on a high-value primary commodity export sector and whose income 
elasticity of demand is higher for their imports than the foreign income elasticity of demand for their 
exports (Prebisch, 1949).
The pro-manufacturing vision came under attack during the 1980s and was gradually abandoned in the 
following decade when the pro-services vision became dominant. 
 
2.1.3 The pro-services vision
During the 1980s, the development of a pro-services vision was triggered by the fact that the service sector 
appeared to be replacing manufacturing as the leader in the process of economic growth in both advanced 
and developing countries. Turning to the figures, we see that the most advanced economies have, on aver-
age, lost nearly half of their manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP since the 1960s as a result of 
an accelerated process of deindustrialization (see Figure 1). 
Moreover, in the developing world, a set of phenomena seemed to run contrary to the historical pattern 
of structural change which today’s advanced countries had followed (Palma, 2005; Dasgupta and Singh, 
2005). Firstly, in several developing economies, the fall in manufacturing employment (in both relative 
and absolute terms) provided evidence of a form of premature deindustrialization. Secondly, the related 
phenomenon of ‘jobless growth’ emerged, as even fast-growing economies such as India witnessed employ-
ment stagnation. Finally, services often grew at a faster long-term rate in the 1990s than manufacturing 
(this was particularly marked in countries like India), which suggested that services can actually substitute 
manufacturing as an engine of growth.
Theoretical explanations for the rising share of services associated with economic growth mainly concentrate 
on final expenditure patterns and prices (i.e. demand side factors). The basic intuition is that as people’s 
income increases, they begin to demand relatively more services. The falling demand for manufactured 
goods thus naturally (so the argument goes) leads to the shrinking of the manufacturing sector (Bell, 1973; 
Bhagwati, 1984a, 1984b; Baumol et al., 1985). 
16  The classical debate on agriculture vs manufacturing development is discussed in Andreoni, 2011b.
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Most fundamentally, the idea that productivity increases in service industries are limited came under 
sustained attack with the flourishing of modern services such as finance, engineering and distribution. The 
increasing application of ICT technologies has resulted in major productivity improvements in services 
and the marginal cost of providing services has collapsed, indicating the potential for scale effects. Those 
supporting the pro-services vision thus questioned the notion of ‘Baumol’s disease’. They also emphasized 
the possibilities tradable knowledge-based services such as engineering, consulting and banking open up.
Countries such as Australia, Canada, Luxembourg and the United States are used as successful examples 
of the huge potential contribution the service sector can have in both employment creation (high-skilled 
workers in finance, business services, education and health in particular) and in productivity growth. 
In terms of developing countries, the idea that industrialization was no longer synonymous with develop-
ment also took root and was exemplified by the Indian experience. It was suggested that developing 
countries are now undergoing a historically novel pattern of structural change that is determined by a new 
technological paradigm. Accordingly, services such as ICT, business support and finance are replacing or 
complementing manufacturing in a pro-growth way. Little emphasis is given to the fact that developing 
countries run the risk of premature deindustrialization. There is little concern that this might undermine 
their capacity to meet future changes in consumer demand or to accumulate/build production capacities 
and institutions. This was, of course, precisely what characterized the manufacturing-led pattern of growth 
(Cohen and Zysman, 1987; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004).
Although the pro-services vision remained dominant until recently, an increasing number of studies have 
stressed the importance of moving beyond these two polarized visions. Furthermore, an increasing number 
of scholars have highlighted important fallacies in the pro-services vision and the empirical evidence it offers. 
2.1.4 Beyond polarization: Sources of deindustrialization, statistical illusions 
and symbiotic interdependencies
The first issue we must address if we are to move the debate beyond the crude industry versus services 
dichotomy is the issue of deindustrialization. We must investigate whether deindustrialization (often defined 
as a decline in the share of manufacturing employment in a given country) is indeed caused by the grow-
ing irrelevance of manufacturing as advocates of the pro-services vision suggest. 
Robert Rowthorn et al. have carried out crucial studies on the rapid process of deindustrialization17 expe-
rienced by most industrialized countries (in particular, the EU and United Kingdom),18 and by many 
medium/high income developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. They see this process as the “natural 
consequence of the industrial dynamism in an already developed economy” while “the pattern of trade 
specialisation among the advanced economies explains the differences in the structure of employment 
among them” (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999:4). 
In other words, the main explanation for deindustrialization is to be found in the “systematic tendency of 
productivity in manufacturing to grow faster than in services” (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999:1-7). A 
recent study by Tregenna (2009:433) confirms this thesis by empirically demonstrating that the decline 
17  See Rowthorn et al., 1987, 1999, 2004. Deindustrialization is registered as a decline in manufacturing employment first in 
relative terms and then, at least in some countries, also in absolute terms. 
18  Most industrialized countries reached this phase of deindustrialization around the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 
the 1970s, while some high income developing countries (such as the rapidly industrializing countries of East Asia) entered this 
phase in the 1980s. The empirical analysis in Palma (2005) confirms the inverted U-type trajectory of manufacturing employment 
with respect to income per capita.
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in manufacturing employment is “associated primarily with falling labour intensity of manufacturing rather 
than an overall decline in the size or share of the manufacturing sector”. 
Secondly, just as the sources of deindustrialization seem to be attributed more to superior manufacturing 
productivity than to strong performance of services, the statistical illusion issue also undermines the pro-
services case. The decreasing relative importance of manufacturing measured as a share of a given country’s 
total employment seems to be the result of a ‘statistical illusion’. It occurs simply because a number of 
activities from design and data processing to transport, cleaning and security have been contracted out by 
manufacturing firms to specialist service providers.
Even if we ignore the underestimation of manufacturing employment shares resulting from the ‘splintering 
effect’, the reality is that many OECD countries have indeed experienced a steady (rather than drastic) 
decline in the share of manufacturing in total employment. Thus, in contrast to what the pro-services 
advocates suggest, deindustrialization is not a sudden process with declines in manufacturing output, 
productivity and demand. Rather, job losses have involved different industries and affected countries in 
different ways (with no exception for high-tech manufacturing) (Pilat et al., 2006).
During the period characterized by deindustrialization (1970 - 2004), manufacturing production and value 
added continued, in fact, to experience strong growth, and demand for manufacturing goods remained 
constant. Most tellingly, productivity growth in manufacturing remained high in many OECD countries 
while deindustrialization was occurring, and there is evidence that the manufacturing sector continued to 
drive the process of innovation and technological change. Although the growing investment in innovative 
services and the outsourcing of R&D to specialized labs (counted as ‘services’) have reduced business 
investment in manufacturing R&D, the latter sector still accounts for the bulk of spending on technologi-
cal innovation and development. 
Given the statistical illusions discussed above (the result of a blurring of the traditional distinction between 
services and manufacturing), measuring intersectoral interactions is extremely complex (Pilat and Wölfl, 
2005). The bundle of interactions that connects manufacturing and services is becoming increasingly dense 
given the outsourcing of services activities from manufacturing firms to service providers. The existence of 
strong intersectoral interactions and interdependencies was initially revealed by a set of input-output 
analyses performed by Se-Hark Park and Kenneth Chan (1989). The third point that moves the debate 
ahead, then, focuses our attention on the ‘symbiotic’ interdependencies between manufacturing and services. 
This leads to the consideration of a fundamental question which has very often been under-evaluated in 
the polarized debate between manufacturing and services (between ‘making’ or ‘doing’).19
The influential work of Se-Hark Park and Kenneth Chan addressed this issue by separately examining the 
linkages that exist between disaggregated groups of services and various manufacturing industries20 Their 
analysis, which included 26 countries selected from the UNIDO database, confirmed Hirschman’s intuition 
that the manufacturing sector has larger multiplier effects than the services sector. Specifically, it tends to 
generate a two- to threefold greater output impact on the economy because of the denser backward and 
forward linkages formed within and around the manufacturing sector.21 Moreover, Park and Chan’s data 
19  Francois and Reinert note (1996:2) “While emphasis in the services literature has been placed on final expenditure patterns 
and prices, some of the most striking aspects of service sector growth relate instead to the relationship of services to the production 
structure of economies, particularly the relationship of the service sector to manufacturing”.
20  Empirical studies have highlighted that, “as the industrial base broadens and becomes more integrated, both horizontally and 
vertically, the employment impact of industrial activities should also increase substantially” (Park and Chan, 1989:201). This scenario 
is consistent with the ‘macro-economic’ effects observed by A. Young (1928) and later discussed in Kaldor (see above). 
21  The input-output analysis conducted by Pilat and Wölfl (2005:36) reached the same conclusion that “Manufacturing industries 
interact much more strongly with other industries, both as providers and as users of intermediate inputs. Even though services 
now contribute as providers of intermediate input to the performance of other industries, their role remains more limited than 
that of the manufacturing sector.”
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revealed the ‘catalytic role’ industry could play in fostering employment opportunities in the services sector 
(the indirect employment effect). Their study explicitly stressed that “the evolution of the intersectoral rela-
tionship between services and manufacturing in the course of development is symbiotic, in the sense that 
the growth of the service sector depends not only on that of the manufacturing sector, but also structural 
change of the former is bound to affect that of the latter” (Park and Chan, 1989:212).
These results have recently been confirmed by Guerrieri and Meliciani (2005). Their analysis shows that 
a country’s capacity to develop its services sector depends on the specific structure of its manufacturing 
sector. That is because manufacturing industries require different producer services and tend to use them 
with different degrees of intensity. Their analysis also highlights how the cumulative expansion of services 
can follow both inter- and intra-sectoral patterns, as the same service producers are also intensive users of 
these producer services. 
The abovementioned studies certainly debunked some of the misperceptions underlying the pro-services 
vision. They also qualified and refined many of the intuitions supporting the original pro-manufacturing 
arguments upon which the CIP index’s focus, i.e. industrial competitiveness, is grounded.  
2.2 Driving industrial competitiveness: The technological capabilities 
perspective
Building on the tradition of classical economists, Nicholas Kaldor was among the first to understand that 
countries’ industrial performance is primarily determined by differences in technological capabilities when 
he claims that “in a growing world economy the growth of exports is mainly to be explained by the 
income elasticity of foreign countries for a country’s products; but it is a matter of the innovative ability 
and adaptive capacity of its manufactures whether this income elasticity will tend to be relatively large or 
small” (Kaldor, 1981:603). Similarly, for Sanjaya Lall, the main architect of the UNIDO IDR 2002/3 and 
of the first CIP index, “Competitiveness depends on many things. One vital determinant – ultimately 
perhaps the most important single determinant – is the skills of the workforce at all levels.” (Lall, 2001a:128; 
see also Lall, 1992; Fagerberg, 1988, 1996; Best, 1990). 
Since the early 1970s, a growing number of empirical studies, mainly carried out in large-scale Latin 
American and Asian industries, have shown that technology is a complex bundle of knowledge which can 
be embodied not only in machinery, but also in people, organizational arrangements, routines and proce-
dures22. These ‘vectors of technology’ are strictly interconnected and a basic improvement in one of them 
may therefore result in or require a major transformation of other vectors. For this reason, the very simple 
introduction of new machinery through technological diffusion always requires a creative process of prob-
lem-solving and adaptation-reconfiguration of the production process which, in turn, may lead to tech-
nological innovation. Although these studies initially focused on the technical aspects of technological 
capabilities, the organizational dimensions of learning and capability building entered the scene, leading 
to the development of a comprehensive and often articulated strand of literature called technological capa-
bilities literature. 
According to the technological capabilities perspective, the industrial competitiveness of any economic 
system crucially depends on a two-step learning process: industrial skills development through formal 
education/training and capabilities building through in-firm productive experiences. At the firm level, 
22  See Katz, 1987 and Lall, 1987. Until the late 1960s, “technology was identified almost exclusively with machinery (capital 
goods). Technological change was therefore seen either as development of new kinds of machinery (technological “innovation”) or 
as acquisition of installation of new machinery which had already been developed elsewhere (the “diffusion” of technology)” (Bell 
and Albu, 1999:1716).
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becoming efficient involves a vital learning process. As stressed in evolutionary economics, this process is 
collective, cumulative, uncertain and technology specific in nature; also, learning and production dynamics 
in firms are affected by externalities, problems of coordination in time and scale, accumulation of factors 
in concrete forms and agglomeration biases (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Andreoni, 2013). 
On the contrary, more orthodox approaches not only assume perfect factor mobility but, more importantly, 
rely on the idea that using technologies (machines, equipment, blueprints) does not imply any ‘real’ learn-
ing effort and that countries actually have the same abilities to master technologies. Even when learning 
appears as an explanatory variable in the new trade theory, it is treated as a form of predetermined (and 
passive) economies of scale over time. Thus, ultimately, there is no space for learning and production 
capabilities in these approaches. 
Martin Bell and Keith Pavitt provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for the analysis of technological 
capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995). In their work, technological capabilities are defined as the 
resources needed to generate and manage technological change (including skills, knowledge and experience 
and organizational systems). Specifically, technological capabilities refer to a firm’s ability to undertake 
in-house improvements across different technological functions such as process and production organiza-
tion, products, equipment and investments. These technological capabilities “needed to generate and man-
age technical change” very often “differ substantially from those needed to operate existing technical 
systems”. The latter, that is, the “resources used to produce industrial goods at a given level of efficiency 
and given input combinations” refer to what Bell and Pavitt call production capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 
1995:78). 
In Sanjaya Lall’s matrix of technological and organizational capabilities, as reported in Table 6, firm-level 
capabilities are categorized by technical functions (investment, production, technology and marketing) and 
are accumulated through the capacity of performing more and more complex activities (from simple routine 
to adaptive duplicative activities, up to innovative, risky activities). 
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Table 6: Technological and organizational capabilities within firms
Source: UNIDO, 2002:96-97.
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The accumulation and development of technological and organizational capabilities is not only the outcome 
of a given firm’s intended investment, but is also affected by a series of factors that are external to the 
firm. The development of capabilities at the firm level is affected by the presence of capabilities at the 
meso- and macro-levels. In fact, the discovery, acquisition, adaptation and re-configuration of technologies 
is based on a continuous collective learning process which takes place intra-firm but, more crucially, inter-
firm and within industrial clusters. This is nothing more than the meso- and macro-institutional framework 
into which firms are embedded and into which different agents such as public and private research insti-
tutes, universities, vocational-technical schools, technology information and productivity centres, technology 
extension agencies and industrial services providers, just to mention a few, produce, exchange and use 
knowledge (O’Sullivan, 2011). 
Box 1: Institutional support to technological efforts of firms
Table 7: Institutional support to technological efforts of firms
Source: UNIDO, 2002:118. 
In order to capture the intrinsic collective nature of learning dynamics, Sanjaya Lall refers to the existence 
of national technological capabilities that arise from an interplay between capabilities, incentives and institu-
tions. Embracing the OECD’s three-pronged approach, Lall (1992:170) stresses how “[o]ver the longer 
term, economic growth arises from the interplay of incentives and capabilities. The capabilities define the 
best that can be achieved; while the incentives guide the use of the capabilities and, indeed stimulate their 
expansion, renewal or disappearance. Both incentives and capabilities operate within an institutional frame-
work: institutions set rules of the game, as well as directly intervening in the play; they act to alter capabilities 
and change incentives; and they can modify behaviour by changing attitudes and expectations.” 
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Thus, production and technological capabilities building at the firm level is affected by the broader ‘national 
learning system’, in particular by three interlocking sets of factors constituting what Lall calls the “triangle 
of competitiveness” (Lall, 2001a:20). 
•	 incentives (macroeconomic environment, trade policy, domestic industrial policies and domestic 
demand); 
•	 factor markets (technical skills, finance and access to information);
•	 institutions (supporting education and training, standards, metrology, technical extension, R&D, 
long-term credit, etc.). 
From the perspective of technological capabilities building, industrial clusters acquire a greater importance 
as ‘knowledge systems’ more so than ‘production systems’. In other words, they are more crucial in a 
dynamic rather than static sense. Industrial clusters have generally been described and classified (horizontal 
vs vertical) on the basis of ‘the materials they use and the goods they produce, [but] it is knowledge stocks 
within firms and knowledge flows to them, between them and within them which underlie change in the 
types of goods they produce and the methods they use to produce them’ (Bell and Albu, 1999:1722). At 
the firm level, technological dynamism can only be achieved if the cluster is a knowledge system. For this 
reason, the internal characteristics of the cluster as a network for knowledge exchange and accumulation 
are crucial, although strongly context and technology dependent. At the cluster level, the acquisition of 
new knowledge is affected by the degree of openness of the cluster: the more the cluster is closed, the 
more it is destined to lock-in, for cognitive inbreeding or entropic death. 
However, openness to ‘global knowledge’ can be realized on the basis of different institutional and organi-
zational arrangements such as, for example, through different kinds of ‘gatekeepers’, namely public insti-
tutes, the private association of firms or private-public partnerships that arise from the local cluster 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; O’Sullivan 2011). Thus, the relationship between local industrial clusters 
and global value chains can be structured into different institutional frameworks and regulated on the 
basis of different corporate governance models. Being linked to global value chains represents a learning 
opportunity that enterprises in developing countries can exploit to upgrade their capabilities (Pietrobelli 
and Rabellotti, 2011).  
2.3 Industrial competitiveness: From learning in manufacturing to structural 
economic dynamics
Learning dynamics and thus technological capabilities development are ultimately reflected in countries’ 
structural change and their path of economic growth. In fact, economic growth and, broadly speaking, 
economic development always implies a process of structural change, the latter being best understood as 
the process of sectoral re-composition of an economic system. Structural change is a long-term process 
through which countries experience a transformation and diversification of their production and techno-
logical structures and, as a result, of their final and intermediate demand composition (Pasinetti, 1981, 
1993; Chenery et al., 1986; Landesmann and Scazzieri, 1990; Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2013). Changes in 
the relative importance of sectors’ production and shares of capital invested and labour employed, namely 
structural change, entail both: 
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•	 a	process	of	sectoral transition, whereby countries move across sectors, from low productivity activities 
with low value – such as agriculture or garment production – to medium and high productivity 
sectors – such as manufacturing or motor vehicle production (see Figure 2 above); 
•	 and	a	process	of	 sectoral deepening, through which countries move within sectors (in particular within 
manufacturing), from low to high value added sub-sectors, the latter being characterized by higher 
profits and wages as well as a broader scope for technological development and innovation.
An analysis at the sub-sectoral level confirms the existence of qualitative transformations within the manu-
facturing sector as countries’ GDP per capita increases. Now, as Lall notes, “there are many roads to heaven” 
(Lall, 2004:7) and the speed at which countries undergo qualitative transformations varies over time, 
depending on the pace of their respective technological change. However, while different manufacturing 
development trajectories are possible, some are more likely to occur at certain stages of development than 
others. Figure 3 illustrates how the shares of different manufacturing sub-sectors in GDP tend to change 
across large countries as they move from one stage of development to another, the latter measured by the 
real GDP per capita. Thus, for example, at early stages of economic development with a GDP per capita 
below	US$	 3.000,	 a	 country’s	manufacturing	 sector	mainly	 consists	 of	 four	 fast	 growing	 industries:	 food	
and	beverages,	textiles,	chemicals	and	chemical	products,	and	basic	metals.	Between	US$	3.000	and	7.000	
per capita, countries tend to experience a rapid diversification of their manufacturing sector involving a 
broad set of both labour intensive and resource-based activities, while the capital and skill intensive activi-
ties	 tend	 to	 increase	once	 the	US$	8.000	 threshold	has	been	 reached.
Figure 3: Change in share of manufacturing sub-sectors in GDP at selected per capita income levels 
for large countries
Source: Haraguchi and Rezonja, 2010.
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Since Rosenstein-Rodan’s path-breaking research in development studies, economists have adopted a struc-
turalist approach and have assigned particular emphasis to the transformative power of industrialization, 
both in terms of the economic system but also of institutions and society (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). 
Specifically, they have concentrated on the analysis of long-term structural change and on the identification 
of those structural bottlenecks impeding or slowing down industrialization. 
Latin American structuralism, encapsulated in the work of Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado, focused on 
the specific challenges developing countries face given an international ‘centre – periphery’ geography of 
power (Prebisch, 1949; Furtado, 1964). Problems connected to lack of foreign exchange, dualism in inter-
national trade, technology transfer and state intervention were all emphasized. This research was in line 
with the work of Albert Hirschman and, later, of two Cambridge economists, Nicholas Kaldor and Joan 
Robinson. In particular, as discussed above, Kaldor’s empirical investigations aimed at identifying those 
stylized facts of manufacturing development through which general principles of structural change were 
deduced. 
The development of a comprehensive approach to the analysis of structural change dynamics only really 
took shape with the second generation of post-Keynesian economists, in particular Richard Goodwin and 
Luigi Pasinetti, as well as the empirical work of Simon Kuznets and Hollis Chenery. At the most funda-
mental level, a structural economic dynamics approach starts from the recognition that economic growth 
is a sector-specific process (and not sector-neutral or activity-neutral as is the case in the more traditional 
neoclassical models such as Solow’s) (Kerr and Scazzieri, 2012; Syrquin, 2010). Thus, at any given point 
in time, the economic system has to be represented by a multi-sectoral model characterized by a particular 
compositional structure. This structure is inherently subject to change in a ‘truly dynamic sense’. This means 
that the structure of the economic system “evolves through time, with productivity and demand growing 
at different rates from sector to sector and independently of one another”(Pasinetti, 2012:555-557).
As a result of these compositional changes, the productivity potential of any given economic system within 
the structural economic dynamics approach will be different and subject to continuous change over time. 
However, at each given point in time, certain parts of the structure have to remain fixed in order for 
others to be able to change. In other words, structural economic dynamics follow a specific hierarchy of 
change determined by both the elements of the system and their interdependences.23 
Technological capabilities development is the fundamental trigger behind the structural economic dynamics 
of a multi-sectoral economic system. Countries’ structural transformations, their sectoral re-composition 
and technological upgrading are complex multi-layered processes on which their industrial competitiveness 
depends. What occurs when a technological impulse triggers structural change dynamics within and across 
sectors can be illustrated within a multi-sectoral representation of the economic system. As Richard Good-
win stressed, an “important innovation in energy, or transport, or automated control, will gradually lead 
to alteration of least-cost processes in many other sectors and thus will initiate technological change over 
a long period. This will persist over time, not only because any such improvement undergoes prolonged 
small improvements, but also because it usually needs extensive adaptation to a variety of uses” (Goodwin, 
1987:147)24. This explains why there is a very strong correlation between productivity increase in manu-
facturing and in other sectors. Among the bundle of intersectoral relationships, those linkages through 
which innovative technologies are developed, transferred, adjusted and adopted across sectors take centre 
stage. This is because these interdependencies (which are technological in nature) are the main drivers of 
23  In this respect, the principle of relative invariance postulates that “any given economic system subject to an impulse or force 
is allowed to change its original state by following an adjustment path that belongs to a limited set of feasible transformations. 
[...] The impulse from which the original state of the economy is modified may be purely exogenous but the actual process of 
transformation can be explained in terms of the dynamic characteristics of the existing structure” (Landesmann and Scazzieri, 
1990:96; see also Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2013). 
24  See also Rosenberg, 1983, 1994. Andreoni, 2011b, 2013 analyse processes of intersectoral learning.
3590_1212 CIP Report.indd   32-33
33
2. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIP INDEX
the processes of qualitative transformation and quantitative expansion of a country’s productive 
structure.
The CIP index builds on these theoretical foundations and contributes to the empirical analysis of the 
current global industrial landscape. Not only does the CIP index indirectly reflect technological capabilities 
dynamics within certain national boundaries, it also directly tracks countries’ relative changes in their 
structural economic variables and their effects on countries’ overall industrial competitiveness.
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3. THE UNIDO COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE INDEX: A RETROSPECTIVE
UNIDO has a longstanding tradition in benchmarking cross-country competitive industrial performances 
and in assessing structural drivers of competitiveness. In fact, when it was first published in the IDR 
2002/3, the CIP index was part of a broader package of industrial diagnostics – i.e. the Industrial Develop-
ment Scoreboard – in which the competitive industrial performance assessment was complemented by 
industrial capabilities indicators. Thus, the adoption of a multi-layered approach allowed for the matching 
of industrial competitiveness performance with industrial drivers. Industrial capability indicators result from 
the identification and measurement of five drivers of industrial performance, namely: skills, technological 
effort, inward FDI, royalty and technical payments abroad and modern infrastructure. By contrast, the 
last two IDRs 2009 and 2011 do not include any indicator for structural drivers of competitiveness. The 
IDR 2011 presents a second revised version of the CIP index and complements the analysis with process/
outcome indicators of energy intensity and sustainable industrialization. Criteria of sustainability in the 
assessment process tend to introduce a “bridge between the static and dynamic approaches, as well as 
between output evaluation and process evaluation” (Aiginger, 2006:167). 
In its first formulation in the IDR 2002/3, the CIP index was represented as a composite index obtained 
as an aggregation of equally weighted sub-indicators (scale adjusted and normalized). Notably, IDRs have 
always complemented the benchmarking exercise based on the CIP index with disaggregated analyses of 
the different patterns followed by its sub-indicators. Thus, despite being a composite index, the CIP index 
has maintained a strong modular character. The indicators that constitute the CIP index in its various 
formulations are detailed in section 3.1 (for the four sub-indicators index, CIP.4), section 3.2 (for the six 
sub-indicators index, CIP.6) and section 3.3 (for the eight sub-indicators index, CIP.8). Methodological 
issues arising from the weighting and aggregation techniques adopted, problems connected to the existence 
of tradeoffs due to the aggregation of the primary dimensions and issues of uncertainty in the rankings are 
discussed in the statistical appendix.
3.1 The ‘four-indicators’ CIP index (CIP.4): The capacity to produce and 
export manufactures dimension
Building on previous analyses of manufactured export patterns, the IDR 2002/3 ‘Competing Through 
Innovation and Learning’ provides the first country ranking by competitive industrial performance (Lall, 
2000, 2011a). The latter is constructed by aggregating four indicators of competitive industrial performance. 
This is why the first version of the CIP index is labeled here as CIP.4 index. The first two basic indicators 
of the CIP.4 index capture a country’s ‘capacity to produce and export manufactures’. The four indicators 
follow.
Indicator	1:	Manufacturing	Value	Added	per	capita	(MVApc)
MVApc captures the level of a country’s industrialization and is expressed in per capita to adjust for country 
size. The MVApc is the relative value of the total net manufacturing output to population size. Unlike 
gross output, MVA is free of double counting as the cost of intermediate consumption is excluded; also, 
it is measured at basic prices to avoid tax distortions. Provided that data is available, instead of assuming 
the total population as the producer of total net manufacturing output, it would be more accurate to 
consider MVA in relation to the total number of employees or, better yet, the total number of hours 
worked (UNIDO, 2010a:217). If industry were fully exposed to international competition, then MVApc 
alone would capture not only the ‘production efficiency’ element, but also the ‘competitive’ one. As domestic 
industries are not fully (and equally) exposed to international competition, export performance must be 
factored in. 
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Indicator	2:	Manufactured	Exports	per	capita	(MXpc)
MXpc captures the ability of a country to produce goods competitively and to implicitly keep up with 
technological changes. Like MVApc, MXpc is expressed in per capita to adjust for country size. Data on 
manufactured exports indicate prima facie international efficiency and reveal structural trends (Lall, 2001a). 
However, data on the MXpc of large economies are biased by the existence of large internal demand and 
incentives towards domestic markets. Also, data on re-exports are not available at regular intervals for all 
countries. 
The first two basic indicators present two main problems. Firstly, it is impossible to distinguish between 
industrial (or export) structures based on genuine technological capabilities and those based on low-tech 
assembly in high-tech industry (UNIDO, 2002). For example, a high-technology export from one country 
can either come from locally assembled imported components (with few local inputs) or from complex 
production processes implying high levels of production and technological capabilities. In other words, an 
exporter that simply assembles imported high-technology products appears as sophisticated as one that 
designs and produces them using local components, if both report the same export value. Secondly, the 
indicators MVApc and MXpc reveal very little about the kinds (and levels/quality) of technologies being 
deployed or about the nature of local production and technological capabilities – i.e. technological deepening 
(Lall, 2001a). 
While there is no immediate solution to the first problem, the second problem raised above was dealt 
with by disaggregating the MVA and MX (Manufactured Exports) data and examining their technological 
composition (Lall, 2000). The IDR 2002/3 followed this strategy and adopted the following two techno-
logical classifications for a decomposition analysis of the industrial (based on ISIC codes revision 2) and 
export structures (based on SITC code revision 2).25
Table 7: SITC rev. 2 Table 8: ISIC rev. 2
Source: UNIDO, 2002. 
Source: UNIDO, 2002.
25  Because reporting of data at the group (four-digit) level of ISIC is inadequate to allow the separation of medium- and high-
tech products, the category ‘high-tech manufacturing’ was not used: instead, medium- and high-tech products were combined in 
one category. The sectoral shares of value added were then calculated in relation to the total for all manufacturing sectors (UNIDO, 
2002). 
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Box 2: Lall’s technological classification of manufactured exports
 
Source: Lall, 2000:341.
Given these four categories – i.e. resource-based, low-tech, medium-tech and high-tech, the following two 
indicators were developed with the explicit aim of capturing a country’s degree of technological deepening 
and upgrading:  
Indicator	3:	Medium-	and	High-tech	MVA	share	in	total	manufacturing	(MHVAsh)	
MHVAsh captures the technological complexity of manufacturing. The higher the share of MHVA in 
MVA, the more technologically complex the industrial structure of a given country and its overall industrial 
competitiveness. Empirical analyses have shown that development generally entails a structural transition 
from resource-based and low-tech activities to medium- and high-tech activities. The more complex the 
production structures of a given country become, the higher the opportunities for learning and technologi-
cal innovation at the sectoral and intersectoral levels (Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, 1986. See also 
Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989).
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Indicator	4:	Medium-	and	High-tech	manufactured	Exports	share	in	total	manufactured	
exports	
MHXsh captures the technological content and complexity of exports. The share of medium- and high-
tech products in manufactured exports is considered jointly with the previous indicator, because MHXsh 
might differ substantially from MHVAsh in certain circumstances. For example, large import-substituting 
developing countries are characterized by a relatively more complex structure of MVA than of manufactured 
exports. 
Clearly, the adoption of one specific technological classification instead of others is discretional and sig-
nificantly affects the construction of the index and, in turn, the obtainable results. For example, Keith 
Pavitt famously proposed another classification that distinguishes between resource-based, labour intensive, 
scale intensive, differentiated and science-based manufactures (Pavitt, 1984; Lall, 2000, 2011). Moreover, 
only very detailed product categories allow capturing specific quality differences within given categories 
(resource-based, low-tech, medium-tech and high-tech) as well as information about the process involved in 
manufacturing a product in different locations. As a matter of fact, production processes of the same 
commodity are contextually different. This is the reason why many more recent contributions have per-
formed competitive industrial performance analyses starting from trade-based data on countries’ export 
baskets (Lall et al., 2006; Hausmann et al., 2007). Finally, the exclusion of resource-based manufactures 
and low-technology manufactures means that countries following a resource-based industrialization strategy, 
for example, will receive a lower overall ranking.
Given the modular character of the CIP index, the effect of each individual indicator on the final ranking 
can be analysed separately. Correlation analyses can also be performed. The UNIDO IDR 2002/3 revealed 
that the correlation between MVA per capita and the technological structure of MVA is the strongest. 
This is not surprising: increasing levels of industrialization require (and trigger) increasing accumulation 
of more/higher/different kinds of production capabilities. The same circular and cumulative process applies 
to manufactured exports: the higher the level of exports per capita, the more sophisticated the MVA 
structure, and the higher the level of industrialization, the larger the per capita exports.26 
The CIP.4 index captures the process of sectoral deepening, that is, a country’s movement from low to high 
value added industries within manufacturing. However, it overlooks the equally important process of sectoral 
transition, that is, the movement across sectors from low to medium and high productivity sectors (generally 
from agriculture to manufacturing). Thus, the first revision of the CIP index aimed at factoring in countries’ 
structural transition from agriculture towards manufacturing industries. This is a crucial step, especially if 
we want to assess the industrial performance of dual economies at early stages of industrialization.
3.2 The ‘six-indicators’ CIP (CIP.6): First revision  
The CIP.4 index underwent a process of revision in the IDR 2004 ‘Industrialization, Environment and the 
Millennium Development Goals in sub-Saharan Africa’.27 The CIP.4 index was adjusted to include two 
additional indicators in the ‘technological deepening and upgrading’ dimension: the share of MVA in GDP 
and the share of manufactured exports in total exports. Moreover, the database for calculating the CIP.6 
index was significantly improved. The revised CIP index (CIP.6) is structured as follows: two main 
26  Moreover, looking at the correlation coefficients of country level per capita manufactured exports with RCA (revealed 
 comparative advantage) by technological categories across the world, the hypothesis according to which most successful exporters 
specialize in medium-high-tech activities is confirmed (Lall, 2000).
27  In UNIDO (2007), the same CIP index was calculated for the years 1993, 1998, 2003. The IDR 2005 ‘Capability Building 
for Catching Up’ presented the six sub-indicators of the CIP.6 in a disaggregated form.
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dimensions, two basic indicators (those of the CIP.4) and two composite indicators simply calculated as 
the arithmetic average of their respective sub-indicators. 
First dimension: Capacity to produce and export manufactures dimension
Indicator 1: Manufacturing Value Added per capita (MVApc)
Indicator 2: Manufactured Exports per capita (MXpc)
Second dimension: Technological deepening and upgrading dimension
Composite	indicator:	Industrialization	intensity	(INDint)	
This composite indicator is obtained as the arithmetic average of the following two sub-indicators:
Indicator 3: Medium- and High-tech Manufacturing Value Added share in total manufacturing
Indicator 4:  Share of MVA in GDP (MVAsh) capturing manufacturing’s weight in the economy. 
The creation of this composite indicator responds to the need to capture the contribution of the manu-
facturing sector to total production as well as the technological complexity of manufacturing industries 
(see above). Clearly, an indicator of industrialization intensity as such captures (positively) the fact that 
country’s specialization in medium-high-tech activities is conducive to cumulative learning dynamics. How-
ever, this composite indicator still does not capture the sometimes very significant technological differences 
within each technological category. This problem is clearly a recurring one: it arises from the difficulty of 
identifying the most appropriate ‘unit of analysis/measurement’ – i.e. sectors, industries, resource-based, 
L-M-H-tech activities – provided certain data availability and the specific objective of the assessment.
Composite	indicator:	Manufactured	Exports	Quality	(MXQual)
This composite indicator is obtained as the arithmetic average of the following two sub-indicators: 
Indicator 5:  Medium- and High-tech manufactured Exports share in total manufactured exports 
(MHXsh)
Indicator 6:  Manufactured Exports share in total exports (MXsh) capturing manufacturing’s weight 
in export activity.
For those countries reporting combined sectors, the technological classification (medium-high-tech value 
added) was adjusted (ISIC rev.2 and rev.3 and SITC rev.2).28
The theoretical framework on which the CIP.6 index is based maintains the idea that at the very core, a 
country’s competitive industrial performance is determined by domestic learning dynamics.29 Even FDI 
and technological transfer are primarily considered a ‘domestic affair’. For the latter to be beneficial (e.g. 
to drive technological upgrading), domestic firms are required to undertake strategic learning efforts. This 
is why the CIP.6 index was initially designed to capture the industrial outcome of mainly ‘endogenous’ 
dynamics/factors. 
28  See the UNIDO Technical Note 2007 for a step-by-step description of the data adjustment procedure adopted.
29  The centrality assigned to technological deepening in manufacturing industries in comparison with the agricultural sector or 
services is justified by the fact that processes of technological deepening in agriculture (but also in services) tend to be ‘manufac-
turing driven’ (Andreoni, 2011b). In the case of services, significant technological change is mainly realized in the domain of 
production-related services.
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However, to capture the evolving nature of industrial systems, indicators need to be continuously updated 
in order to reflect the ‘current reality’ of international industrial systems. In this respect, a number of 
empirical studies (Bhattacharya et al., 2001; Lall and Albaladejo, 2004; Lall and Weiss, 2005; Gallagher 
et al., 2008; Kaplinsky et al., 2006, 2010), have suggested that countries’ industrial performance is pro-
gressively more affected by ‘exogenous’ factors, such as third-country competition, as a result of the increas-
ing integration/transformation of international markets and industrial systems. These empirical studies show 
how the emergence of new global large economies (or regional powers) affects the chances of industrial 
upgrading of less developed countries and challenges the consolidated positions of industrialized economies. 
Relationships between countries are redesigned along both competitive and complementary patterns. This 
means that the transformation of the international industrial scene affects countries as well as industries 
(and firms as their components) in different ways. As stressed by Lall and Albaladejo (2004:1442) with 
reference to the challenge China poses to East Asian manufactured exports: “The main issue is not so 
much as direct competition between China and its neighbors – this is clearly growing – but how the 
latter’s specialization changes in response”. Having factored in the exogenous factors – i.e. competitive 
threat – the problem is again to understand the internal industrial transformation of countries under threat. 
Of course, it is very difficult to disentangle the causational chains linking ‘exogenous factors’ and ‘endog-
enous’ dynamics of industrial transformation. In order to assess the impact of exogenous factors on coun-
tries’ industrial performance and progress, the abovementioned studies depend on world market share 
analysis. Market shares are considered the most immediate and common measure for capturing export 
threat or competitive impact.
3.3 The ‘eight-indicators’ CIP (CIP.8): Second revision
The IDR 2011 ‘Industrial Energy Efficiency for Sustainable Wealth Creation: Capturing Environmental, Eco-
nomic and Social Dividends’ proposes a second revision of the CIP index that includes both endogenous 
and exogenous factors/dynamics. The three fundamental dimensions considered are:
First dimension (endogenous): Capacity to produce and export manufactures
Indicator 1: Manufacturing Value Added per capita (MVApc)
Indicator 2: Manufactured Exports per capita (MXpc).
Second dimension (endogenous): Technological deepening and upgrading
Composite indicator: Industrialization intensity, INDint = [MHVAsh + MVAsh]/2
Composite indicator: Manufactured Exports Quality, MXQual = [MHXsh + MXsh]/2.
Third dimension (exogenous): World impact 
Indicator 7: Impact of a country on World Manufacturing Value Added (ImWMVA)
measured by a country’s share in world MVA, which indicates a country’s relative performance and impact 
in manufacturing.
Indicator 8: Impact of a country on world manufactures trade (ImWMT) 
measured by a country’s share in world manufactured exports. The latter shows a country’s competitive 
position relative to others in international markets. That is, gains in world market share reflects more 
competitiveness; losses signal deterioration.
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Although there is no clear-cut technique for analysing an ‘export threat’, the widely adopted measure of 
‘market share’ seems to provide sound results as documented by various studies. 
In sum, the revised version of the CIP index (CIP.8) encompasses three dimensions, captured by four 
indicators and two composite indicators (8 indicators in total). Although the number of indicators of the 
CIP.8 index has increased, the composite indicator maintains a modular character. Two positive implica-
tions arise. Firstly, according to the specific level/unit of analysis under consideration, the CIP.8 index can 
be used in a more or less aggregated form. Secondly, the aggregation of indicators does not yield results 
that are difficult to explain, as is typically the case with overly composite indicators. The standardization 
and aggregation methods are the same used for the CIP.6 index (arithmetic average with equal weights) 
while the technological classification is ISIC rev.3 and SITC rev.3 adjusted (see section 2.2). The fact that 
the CIP.8 index balances out size without penalizing large industrial countries with large domestic markets 
is noteworthy. Moreover, the consideration of the impact dimension introduces innovative heuristics in 
the analysis of competitive industrial interactions.30 
3.4 The CIP index: Third revision and validation
Throughout 2012, the CIP.8 index was validated and its aggregation methodology reviewed (Andreoni, 
2012). The statistical annex of the report presents the set of validation tests that were performed. Given 
the scope of the benchmarking exercise, data availability and country coverage, the three dimensions and 
the eight selected indicators remained the same in the CIP index. However, in order to overcome the well 
known aggregation problems affecting composite indices, the geometric mean was adopted (instead of 
more traditional linear aggregation techniques) while equal weights were retained.
Composite indicators are characterized by two fundamental aggregation problems. Firstly, when the impor-
tance of each component (i.e. its weight) is the result of an ex ante subjective evaluation, the same data 
set can provide completely different information. As Ravallion (2010:10) points out, it is “common practice 
[...] to identify a set of component variables, group these in some way and attach equal weight to these 
groups. However, little or no attention is given to the implied tradeoffs in the space of the primary dimen-
sions being aggregated, and whether they are defensible.” 
It is crucial to bear in mind that equal weighting does not mean ‘no weights’. Rather, it implicitly implies 
that the weights are equal, in other words, that all sub-indicators considered are ‘worth’ the same in the 
composite.31 Aside from being a courageous assumption, the equal weighting of the various sub-indicators 
is additionally problematic, because if sub-indicators have a high degree of correlation, various forms of 
miscounting may penetrate the index. For example, if two collinear indicators were included, the unique 
dimension they capture would be double counted in the composite index. This is why rules of thumb 
should be introduced to define a threshold beyond which the positive correlation is a clear symptom of 
double counting. Finally, although justifiable for comparability given certain informational goals, keeping 
weights unchanged across time and space is problematic when the composite indicator is used as a tool 
for defining best practices or setting priorities.
The second type of aggregation problem composite indicators face relates to the choice of aggregating 
different components under the implicit assumption that they are substitutable. In other words,  poor 
performance in one sub-indicator can be compensated for by high values in other sub-indicators. 
30  As effectively discussed in Lall and Albaladejo (2004:1444), the consideration of a “matrix of competitive interactions” allows 
the identification of possible competitive scenarios, like direct or partial export threat or, more interestingly, mutual withdrawal.
31  A broad set of alternative weighting methods are provided in the statistical methods literature such as factor analysis or 
principal component analysis to participatory methods that incorporate the various stakeholders involved in the process of perfor-
mance assessment and policy design (Munda, 2005). See also Munda and Nardo (2005) and OECD (2008).
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By contrast, geometric aggregation is better suited if we want to maintain a certain  degree of non-com-
pensability between individual sub-indicators (OECD, 2008). Moreover, while linear aggregation rewards 
base indicators proportionally to the weights (so compensability is constant), geometric aggregation rewards 
countries with higher scores (so compensability is lower for the composite indicators with low values). 
The policy implications of adopting different aggregation techniques are manifold (OECD, 2008). For 
example, a country with low scores on one indicator will need a much higher score on the others to 
improve its situation when geometric aggregation is used. Also, considering that “the marginal utility from 
an increase in low absolute score would be much higher than in a high absolute score under geometric 
aggregation” (OECD, 2008), a country would have greater incentive to politically address those dimensions 
with low scores if the composite index adopts a geometric rather than linear aggregation technique.
Given these considerations and the advantage the geometric mean offers in avoiding factor substitutability, 
the CIP index adopts a non-linear aggregation technique. The weighting schema remains one of simple 
equal weights, provided that disaggregated statistics included in each composite indicator are also shown 
and the transparency of the composite is maintained. 
Another important aspect in benchmarking industrial competitiveness is identification of the most appro-
priate country comparators. International comparisons are particularly difficult when countries involved are 
at different stages of development. Not only are countries at different stages of development endowed with 
different degrees of production and technological capabilities, but their capabilities are often of different 
types. This is because the technologies employed in production and the industries in which countries 
specialize differ from one another. These problems of country comparability suggest the need to benchmark 
countries which are at the same stage of development, in other words, those which tend to have similar 
production/technological structures. 
The selection of various country groups may result either from the adoption of cluster analysis techniques 
or simply by selecting groups of countries on the basis of development level indicators. The number of 
comparators is actually less important than the selection criteria adopted. As highlighted in the IDR 2005: 
there is no optimal number of comparators, and different countries may use them for different purposes. 
A large number of comparators from across the world may be used (assuming that the data is readily 
available) to assess performance for broad issues like MVA or export performance, technology structures 
or inward FDI. A smaller set may be used to assess other variables like skill formation, R&D or risk rat-
ings (UNIDO, 2005).
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Country	groupings	entail	three	main	functions:	
•	 setting	 up	 the	 modality	 of	 aggregation	 for	 monitoring	 the	 changes	 in	 overall	 patterns	 of	 growth	
and structure;
•	 allowing	international	comparison	specifies	the	leading	regions	and	country	groups	and	those	lagging	
behind;
•	 providing	a	foundation	for	statistical	analyses	using	basic	and	advanced	techniques	such	as	compu-
tation of mean value at the aggregated level, margin of variation, outlier detection and distribution 
pattern.
The CIP index aims to compare the broadest possible sample of countries and to adopt different country 
grouping criteria. 
In 2012, UNIDO developed a new country classification which groups countries according to their level 
of industrial development:
1. Industrialized countries
2. Emerging industrial economies 
3. Other developing countries 
4. Least developed countries.
The CIP report provides snapshots of countries’ industrial competitiveness, distinguishing both regional 
groups and a set of relevant comparators. Specifically, countries have been grouped by their income per 
capita level as a general proxy of development, and by their level of industrial development according to 
the new UNIDO country classification.
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4.1  The industrial competitiveness of nations: The CIP index 2010 ranking
The CIP index was computed in 2010 for 135 countries. The benchmarking exercise allows us to identify 
the relative industrial competitiveness of nations and to rank them accordingly. The analysis of the world 
ranking was performed by quintiles of the world ranking. The top, upper middle, middle, lower middle 
and bottom quintiles of the rankings are identified by different colours (see Table 9). Descriptive statistics 
for each quintile were also computed to emphasize the existence of inequalities within and across quintiles 
(see Table 10).  The world ranking reveals an articulate albeit familiar pattern. Among the most industri-32
ally competitive nations in the world, we find all high income industrialized countries and the large 
industrializing economy of China ranked seventh. The upper middle of the ranking is mainly populated by 
transition economies and emerging industrial powers mostly from Asia, but also from Latin America. The 
lower middle range as well as the bottom of the ranking primarily include low income or relatively small 
countries, with the exception of Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria.
 Almost all African economies congregate in the bottom quintile of the ranking, with the only exceptions
 being South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritius.  
Top	quintile	of	the	CIP	ranking
In 2010, the most industrially competitive nations (top quintile) included a quite a heterogeneous mix of 
economies. As expected, the top five positions are occupied by Japan, Germany, the United States, the 
Republic of Korea and China, Taiwan Province. While the first three countries have been top contenders 
since 1990, the latter two economies ranked fourteenth and tenth, respectively, in 1990. This is partially 
reflected in the sectoral composition of these economies, the latter two having an MVAsh equal to almost 
30 percent. On the other hand, differences in MVAsh are also explained by the varying structural trajec-
tories followed by Germany and Japan (which maintains a high MVAsh of nearly 20 percent) in contrast 
to the United States.  
Taken together, the top five countries account for almost half of the share of world manufacturing value 
added (ImWMVA is equal to 48.6 percent) and one-third of world manufactures trade (ImWMT is equal 
to 31.2 percent). The United States alone accounts for half of the top five’s world manufacturing value 
added, while Germany accounts for one-third of the top five’s world manufactures trade. The extremely 
high level of industrialization of these five economies is captured by a level of manufacturing value added 
which	 is	 almost	 double	 the	 average	MVApc	 of	 the	 top	 quintile	 of	 the	 ranking	 (the	mean	 is	US$	 5.823	
with a low standard deviation, see Table 10 for a comparison). 
Although these economies are all highly industrialized, the MXpc indicator denotes a high level of disper-
sion	(the	standard	deviation	is	around	US$	4.000	per	capita).	This	reveals	both	the	distinct	export	orienta-
tion of these economies and the different pulls of their own internal demand. The United States is by far 
the country with the biggest population and internal market (ranked third in the world with a population 
of more than 300 million) followed by Japan and Germany, while the Republic of Korea and China, 
Taiwan Province are relatively smaller economies. The average MXpc of these four latter economies is 
almost	US$	10.000	and	around	70	percent	of	their	exported	products	are	medium-	and	high-tech	(in	the	
case of Japan it is nearly 80 percent). The same figure for the United States is slightly lower, equal to 64 
percent in line with the average MHXpc of the top quintile in the ranking (see Table 9). 
32  The descriptive statistics detailed in the following country quintiles and group tables are the mean, median and standard 
deviation. The possibility of comparing the mean and median is particularly important when there is one or more countries that 
perform very differently from the others (outliers). In this situation, the mean will be biased while the median provides the typical 
value in the country distribution. Finally, the standard deviation describes how spread out country performance is. This information 
is particularly relevant if we want to understand to what extent countries’ performance in the quintiles and groups differs.
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The small ‘city state’ of Singapore is not included in the top five, although the country has the world’s 
highest manufacturing value added per capita (MVApc) and manufactured exports per capita (MXpc). 
Japan and Switzerland are the only comparable countries in terms of MVApc, while Belgium is the only 
comparable one in terms of MXpc. 
The highest ranking lower income country in the top quintile is China. Given its population size and its 
stage of development, China is the country with the lowest MVApc and MXpc in the top quintile, but 
second in terms of world manufacturing value added share (ImpWMVA) behind the United States and 
followed by Japan. As the ImWMT indicator reveals, China has followed an export-led development model 
which allowed the country to gain an 11 percent share in WMT (world manufactures trade). Within only 
15 years. Manufacturing industries constitute the main sector in the Chinese economy, accounting for 35 
percent of the economy’s overall GDP. Despite its stage of development, China shows remarkable perfor-
mances in both MHVAsh and MHXsh, just below the top quintile average (see Table 9). The other lower 
income countries in the top quintile are Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand. Given their stages of industrial 
development, these countries’ MVApc and MXpc values are below average. Taken together, they account 
for 3 percent of world manufacturing value added and 5 percent of world manufactures trade. 
The rest of the top quintile is populated by high income European industrialized countries (with few 
exceptions), a number of transition economies and Canada which alone accounts for 2 percent of world 
manufactures trade and 1.5 percent of world manufacturing value added. Overall, countries in the top 
quintile of the ranking account for 83 percent of world manufacturing value added and of world manu-
factures trade. 
 
Table 9: Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index, 2010
CIP  
ranking 
2010
CIP  
index 
2010
Country MVApc MXpc MHVAsh  
%
MVAsh  
%
MHXsh  
%
MXsh  
%
ImWMVA  
%
ImWMT  
%
1 0.5409 Japan 7993.99 5521.02 53.70 20.39 79.75 91.62 14.126 6.532
2 0.5176 Germany 4666.91 13397.43 56.76 18.57 72.34 86.81 5.317 10.219
3 0.4822 United States of America 5522.09 2736.13 51.52 14.85 64.74 76.76 24.036 7.974
4 0.4044 Republic of Korea 4782.7 9280.33 53.41 29.09 75.85 96.85 3.220 4.183
5 0.3649 China, Taiwan Province 6153.1 10825.16 61.88 29.87 72.40 96.01 1.968 2.318
6 0.3456 Singapore 8198.27 35709.08 73.41 24.47 68.99 89.76 0.521 1.519
7 0.3293 China 820.018 1123.62 40.70 34.16 60.52 96.25 15.329 14.063
8 0.3118 Switzerland 7168.38 23651.56 34.91 18.44 69.67 91.49 0.750 1.657
9 0.3114 Belgium 3793.78 34137.53 42.28 14.99 54.95 87.38 0.552 3.326
10 0.3095 France 2885.09 7237.36 45.41 12.16 65.77 88.42 2.494 4.189
11 0.2945 Italy 2847.72 6935.05 39.33 14.94 53.93 91.62 2.325 3.791
12 0.2896 Netherlands 3324.63 22081.02 40.07 12.48 55.01 73.97 0.759 3.374
13 0.2850 Sweden 6559.37 15375.64 46.96 20.04 57.69 89.70 0.838 1.316
14 0.2782 United Kingdom 3162.34 5247.64 41.99 11.44 63.22 79.54 2.691 2.989
15 0.2695 Ireland 6506.68 23959.50 64.07 23.11 53.84 91.65 0.407 1.004
16 0.2436 Austria 4869.48 14926.31 41.74 18.43 59.97 86.97 0.569 1.167
17 0.2345 Canada 3077.73 6667.54 37.35 11.88 55.72 62.14 1.437 2.084
18 0.2220 Finland 6795.27 12001.19 45.36 24.72 48.98 91.10 0.500 0.592
19 0.1979 Spain 1896.88 4571.87 34.28 12.01 57.40 83.74 1.183 1.910
20 0.1931 Czech Republic 2148.21 11816.28 44.62 28.15 67.94 90.99 0.302 1.113
21 0.1834 Malaysia 1426.92 5930.92 41.76 27.10 63.49 83.30 0.551 1.533
22 0.1776 Mexico 1007.93 2166.16 38.45 15.99 78.71 80.09 1.538 2.212
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23 0.1712 Thailand 1053.66 2517.15 46.16 36.61 61.82 83.93 0.949 1.518
24 0.1705 Denmark 3887.02 12839.14 30.51 12.46 51.88 72.81 0.294 0.651
25 0.1696 Poland 1489.98 3639.62 35.35 22.51 58.14 87.83 0.781 1.277
26 0.1647 Israel 3235.62 7728.48 55.61 13.83 55.79 96.21 0.325 0.520
27 0.1562 Slovakia 2303.72 11125.34 43.32 27.43 66.26 93.80 0.172 0.556
28 0.1438 Australia 2660.73 4520.90 23.01 10.10 20.00 46.72 0.786 0.894
29 0.1402 Hungary 1210.31 8291.96 53.47 21.08 77.99 87.04 0.166 0.763
30 0.1283 Turkey 1012.73 1286.70 30.04 20.23 42.47 87.72 1.088 0.926
31 0.1196 Norway 3766.78 7396.27 24.09 9.17 52.21 27.09 0.249 0.328
32 0.1152 Slovenia 2716.24 11094.26 45.52 20.89 62.96 90.83 0.075 0.206
33 0.1128 Brazil 622.099 667.55 34.97 13.51 36.30 67.30 1.712 1.230
34 0.1043 Portugal 1503.64 4098.30 22.36 12.90 40.53 90.17 0.223 0.407
35 0.1012 Argentina 1749.37 877.58 25.84 16.41 45.05 52.43 0.986 0.331
36 0.0976 Russian Federation 503.997 1028.70 23.14 17.07 24.37 36.08 0.978 1.337
37 0.0940 Saudi Arabia 1157.32 2020.66 41.12 11.77 35.54 21.71 0.423 0.494
38 0.0823 Indonesia 302.264 395.68 37.81 26.40 29.05 60.09 1.002 0.878
39 0.0794 Kuwait 2224.27 6899.25 18.09 10.34 13.45 40.93 0.094 0.231
40 0.0774 Belarus 907.294 2361.97 18.76 32.95 39.01 89.22 0.120 0.208
41 0.0772 South Africa 567.274 991.15 21.24 14.93 45.66 68.32 0.387 0.452
42 0.0761 Luxembourg 3737.35 24557.20 4.97 6.59 38.04 85.76 0.025 0.110
43 0.0747 India 120.185 153.83 37.27 15.04 28.24 85.16 2.028 1.738
44 0.0726 Philippines 296.026 516.61 45.31 21.34 79.66 93.30 0.381 0.445
45 0.0721 Chile 972.374 1943.12 18.92 15.37 11.76 46.96 0.230 0.308
46 0.0675 Romania 341.552 2111.40 33.88 13.06 54.69 90.36 0.100 0.413
47 0.0674 Lithuania 964.003 5343.24 18.46 18.35 37.83 85.63 0.044 0.165
48 0.0673 New Zealand 1986.1 3213.92 13.86 12.83 21.34 46.36 0.118 0.128
49 0.0653 Greece 1289.68 1429.10 17.17 9.10 37.19 73.69 0.200 0.148
50 0.0603 Croatia 999.359 2356.28 31.77 16.19 49.46 90.42 0.063 0.099
51 0.0603 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 895.462 750.42 34.28 16.50 8.11 32.55 0.360 0.202
52 0.0583 Estonia 978.874 8360.44 25.66 15.47 42.28 86.22 0.018 0.102
53 0.0564 Ukraine 213.571 974.35 20.78 20.25 43.25 85.57 0.133 0.408
54 0.0540 Viet Nam 176.135 551.02 20.26 25.47 27.99 69.30 0.221 0.464
55 0.0523 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 361.2 378.50 40.70 16.44 23.91 33.55 0.371 0.260
56 0.0506 Costa Rica 1034.84 1420.96 16.58 20.07 58.94 73.29 0.067 0.061
57 0.0488 Qatar 1988.82 8817.29 17.44 2.78 28.15 15.88 0.024 0.086
58 0.0476 Tunisia 490.97 1272.14 9.32 17.36 45.02 82.59 0.072 0.126
59 0.0460 Bulgaria 398.788 1958.22 25.57 15.52 35.40 70.99 0.041 0.135
60 0.0460 Trinidad and Tobago 868.108 5480.32 39.38 8.39 17.70 73.95 0.016 0.068
61 0.0452 Malta 1257.27 8406.84 44.92 11.30 56.16 93.04 0.007 0.032
62 0.0450 Egypt 361.72 206.49 22.30 17.54 25.88 62.37 0.398 0.152
63 0.0437 Peru 448.575 623.75 14.49 14.01 5.21 51.19 0.179 0.167
64 0.0401 Colombia 405.257 268.72 20.71 12.95 35.97 32.60 0.268 0.119
65 0.0382 Iceland 4007.83 4001.09 14.18 11.41 45.58 26.82 0.017 0.011
66 0.0374 Morocco 239.737 425.92 21.61 12.93 38.26 77.64 0.107 0.128
67 0.0373 China, Hong Kong SAR 478.412 1093.80 32.58 1.41 53.74 54.84 0.049 0.075
68 0.0367 Latvia 480.598 3190.16 20.77 9.61 35.18 80.85 0.015 0.066
69 0.0361 Oman 941.115 1857.99 16.75 8.24 42.71 16.27 0.036 0.048
70 0.0347 Kazakhstan 346.39 767.39 6.84 13.48 39.96 21.13 0.076 0.112
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71 0.0331 El Salvador 513.158 564.29 19.13 22.85 14.86 89.57 0.051 0.037
72 0.0328 Jordan 401.311 728.98 24.91 17.03 47.30 79.24 0.036 0.044
73 0.0326 Uruguay 1342.83 626.46 13.40 14.54 22.62 39.11 0.063 0.024
74 0.0315 Pakistan 116.878 99.77 24.57 17.52 9.95 82.40 0.280 0.160
75 0.0303 Lebanon 625.022 726.84 19.95 9.22 46.81 72.22 0.037 0.028
76 0.0262 Serbia 146.024 771.86 20.05 15.97 32.82 78.21 0.020 0.071
77 0.0256 Guatemala 223.879 408.98 16.25 12.03 20.33 69.50 0.045 0.054
78 0.0254 Bangladesh 86.7396 75.99 20.20 17.37 4.34 91.74 0.200 0.118
79 0.0240 Mauritius 803.997 1103.53 2.98 15.63 2.93 95.59 0.014 0.013
80 0.0235 Sri Lanka 190.646 297.35 12.11 13.81 9.48 70.10 0.052 0.054
81 0.0233 Syrian Arab Republic 206.128 232.41 21.52 14.37 22.69 43.87 0.061 0.046
82 0.0220 Algeria 142.336 414.71 11.28 6.39 0.46 25.75 0.070 0.136
83 0.0219 Bosnia and Herzegovina 210.547 885.83 29.17 10.14 23.00 72.69 0.011 0.032
84 0.0214 The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia 388.821 835.51 14.60 17.69 18.08 63.35 0.011 0.019
85 0.0212 Swaziland 496.923 883.78 0.01 30.97 28.96 92.86 0.008 0.010
86 0.0206 Botswana 184.335 2252.13 21.59 4.28 4.84 93.70 0.005 0.041
87 0.0199 Ecuador 247.952 269.86 8.04 13.66 23.04 21.25 0.047 0.034
88 0.0186 Cyprus 918.488 640.88 12.32 6.58 60.43 75.21 0.011 0.005
89 0.0166 Côte d'Ivoire 99.0589 182.50 14.99 17.40 32.54 36.16 0.028 0.034
90 0.0160 Cambodia 100.73 239.29 0.26 19.82 7.94 65.17 0.021 0.034
91 0.0159 Honduras 279.673 143.70 7.16 19.89 27.79 40.40 0.029 0.012
92 0.0153 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 167.064 276.34 5.05 13.69 3.28 39.80 0.023 0.026
93 0.0152 Jamaica 260.663 418.83 18.77 7.10 5.51 92.58 0.010 0.011
94 0.0144 Albania 214.538 359.49 14.36 11.34 15.42 75.26 0.010 0.011
95 0.0143 Nigeria 24.5856 113.87 33.44 4.51 7.47 20.82 0.054 0.167
96 0.0127 Georgia 136.05 229.35 21.39 10.44 49.18 76.73 0.008 0.009
97 0.0121 Cameroon 140.167 64.71 11.01 19.70 11.45 32.80 0.038 0.012
98 0.0113 Armenia 203.595 201.12 5.81 14.83 24.80 69.20 0.008 0.006
99 0.0111 Paraguay 193.78 146.10 12.87 11.96 13.18 20.82 0.017 0.009
100 0.0108 Congo 67.2177 601.98 2.42 5.32 83.42 34.91 0.004 0.022
101 0.0100 Senegal 56.2691 115.95 17.66 10.74 14.05 71.42 0.010 0.014
102 0.0100 Kenya 46.7688 62.12 4.08 10.01 24.93 48.85 0.026 0.023
103 0.0095 Gabon 201.059 712.75 5.39 4.44 10.09 18.23 0.004 0.011
104 0.0095 Barbados 296.422 725.68 38.11 3.48 39.18 91.11 0.001 0.002
105 0.0088 Fiji 252.964 374.42 5.54 11.56 9.92 56.90 0.003 0.003
106 0.0085 United Republic of Tanzania 45.6784 43.72 1.18 10.02 13.58 48.54 0.028 0.018
107 0.0083 Azerbaijan 70.7655 257.54 6.34 2.89 17.23 10.49 0.008 0.021
108 0.0081 Suriname 307.66 693.60 11.64 9.88 9.38 15.93 0.002 0.003
109 0.0079 Mongolia 60.3637 451.58 5.30 7.67 1.91 62.93 0.002 0.012
110 0.0078 Panama 347.045 66.05 6.13 5.71 15.00 32.66 0.017 0.002
111 0.0077 Zambia 44.2736 111.49 21.08 10.01 14.33 19.55 0.008 0.013
112 0.0075 China, Macao SAR 832.347 264.97 3.55 2.25 7.06 43.47 0.006 0.001
113 0.0065 Belize 475.506 285.02 18.46 11.90 0.06 30.89 0.002 0.001
114 0.0062 Republic of Moldova 53.3502 155.36 5.55 9.32 13.09 61.57 0.003 0.005
115 0.0058 Tajikistan 84.8618 15.50 2.40 30.42 66.30 13.82 0.008 0.002
116 0.0055 Madagascar 28.4274 31.86 3.28 12.16 4.26 72.03 0.008 0.006
117 0.0045 Kyrgyzstan 42.4413 60.19 4.36 11.49 19.95 25.50 0.003 0.003
118 0.0043 Ghana 26.3711 26.25 0.80 7.45 24.99 12.49 0.009 0.006
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119 0.0043 Nepal 18.1747 21.54 1.89 6.76 20.73 77.22 0.008 0.006
120 0.0040 Uganda 25.2921 11.78 11.07 6.82 15.16 34.83 0.012 0.004
121 0.0038 Yemen 33.192 23.94 3.89 5.65 6.12 9.45 0.011 0.005
122 0.0034 Mozambique 47.6064 7.61 10.74 11.86 9.28 7.84 0.015 0.002
123 0.0034 Saint Lucia 227.549 253.34 7.83 4.59 30.00 61.64 0.001 0.000
124 0.0032 Cape Verde 147.13 48.69 27.10 8.83 0.02 59.26 0.001 0.000
125 0.0031 Malawi 17.2107 19.57 12.51 9.48 14.64 27.64 0.004 0.003
126 0.0030 Sudan 37.3428 6.63 8.47 6.62 4.76 2.96 0.021 0.003
127 0.0030 Haiti 36.2575 6.19 5.26 9.87 3.80 82.97 0.005 0.001
128 0.0027 Niger 9.2339 20.65 24.77 5.26 12.86 67.44 0.002 0.003
129 0.0022 Rwanda 21.7544 8.78 6.66 6.42 7.64 46.38 0.003 0.001
130 0.0019 Ethiopia 9.2491 2.51 9.41 4.61 31.91 9.84 0.011 0.002
131 0.0011 Central African Republic 15.2243 6.08 9.25 6.63 8.29 31.07 0.001 0.000
132 0.0006 Burundi 7.4443 1.95 1.54 7.36 23.95 15.73 0.001 0.000
133 0.0000 Eritrea 7.2731 0.47 7.05 5.59 14.67 34.57 0.001 0.000
133 0.0000 Gambia 15.5917 7.47 3.90 4.64 11.13 39.40 0.000 0.000
133 0.0000 Iraq 5.1947 3.71 24.68 0.68 25.12 0.27 0.002 0.001
Upper	middle	quintile	of	the	CIP	ranking
With the exception of China, the United States and Japan, which are all positioned in the top quintile, 
the upper middle quintile includes some of the most populated countries in the world. These, listed by 
population size, are India, Indonesia, Brazil, Russian Federation, Philippines, Viet Nam, Turkey and South 
Africa. The other countries in the upper middle quintile are mainly transition economies (some of them 
members of the European Union). Finally, Australia and some top oil net exporters also congregate in this 
quintile. 
Within this very heterogeneous group of countries, India has the highest share in WMVA (world manu-
facturing value added), although it has the lowest MVApc and MXpc as a result of its population size. In 
this respect, the only comparable country is China whose MVApc and MXpc are, however, seven times 
higher than India’s. If we take these data together with other figures (for example, the MVAsh equal to 
15 percent), they confirm the fact that India’s sectoral composition is highly service dependent. However, 
its manufacturing structure is relatively more complex than the respective quintile’s country comparators 
(see Table 10). India registers an MHVAsh equal to 37 percent, a figure which is lower than that of the 
Philippines but slightly higher than Brazil’s and very similar to Indonesia’s. In terms of the technological 
composition of the export basket, the figures diverge. India’s export basket  only consists of 28 percent 
medium- and high-tech products (similar to Indonesia), while Brazil, South Africa and Philippines perform 
much better in that respect. 
The four BRICS economies in the upper middle quintile are ranked in the following order: Brazil, Russian 
Federation, South Africa and India. Taken together, they account for almost half of the WMVA share of 
the entire upper middle quintile (around 5 percent) and one-third of the WMT share of the entire upper 
middle quintile (around 5 percent). Despite the tremendous difference in population size (even excluding 
India, Brazil’s population is roughly one-fourth higher than that of the Russian Federation, and four times 
that of South Africa), the first three countries have comparable MVApc figures. The Russian Federation 
has the highest MXpc, but the lowest MHXpc and MXsh. This reveals that more than half of the Russian 
Federation’s export basket is composed of natural resources, while its remaining manufactured products 
are relatively low-tech. The Russian Federation is the second largest oil net exporter and oil producer in 
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the world. The same ‘natural resources’ effect is registered for other oil net exporters, namely Saudi A rabia, 
Norway, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Kuwait. Also, Brazil and South Africa underperform  
relatively to the MXsh median value in the upper middle quintile (see Table 9). Among the emerging 
industrial economies, Viet Nam most notably ranked 54 in 2010 and entered the upper middle quintile (the 
country ranked 72 in 2000).
The transition economies in the upper middle quintile are also quite diverse, from small traditional manu-
facturing economies which are members of the European Union (such as Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, 
Lithuania and Estonia) to relatively bigger countries such as Belarus and Ukraine. Some of them, like 
Hungary and Slovenia, are outliers in the upper middle quintile due to their export orientation and the 
technological complexity of their exports, while the other countries tend to perform below the quintile 
average. Overall, countries in the upper middle quintile of the ranking account for 12 percent of world 
manufacturing value added and 13 percent of world manufactures trade. 
Middle	quintile	of	the	CIP	ranking
Countries in the middle quintile of the CIP ranking are again quite heterogeneous. With the exception 
of four major highly populated countries, namely Iran (Islamic Republic of), Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh,
four biggest countries account for a population of almost 500 million people and whose MVApc is, on 
average,	 around	US$	250	per	 capita,	 far	 below	 the	 quintile	 average	which	 is	 nearly	US$	700	per	 capita.
Overall, the average MVApc and MXpc of the countries in the middle quintile are half of those registered 
in the upper middle group (see Table 10). 
Taken together, countries in the middle quintile account for 2.6 percent of world manufacturing value 
added and 2.3 percent of world manufactures trade. Although few countries such as Costa Rica, Qatar, 
Malta and Iceland show levels of MVApc and MXpc which are comparable to those of countries in the 
upper middle group, their global impact is very limited given their size. Overall, there is a wide dispersion 
within this quintile, in particular in terms of the export structures of the countries (see Table 9). For 
example, the MHXsh indicator is double the quintile average in economies such as Costa Rica, China, 
Hong Kong SAR and Malta (where it is around 55 percent) and may be as low as 3 percent as in the 
case of Mauritius, the only sub-Saharan country in the middle quintile.
Lower	middle	and	bottom	of	the	CIP	ranking
The lower two quintiles of the CIP ranking include the least industrialized countries in the world. Taken 
together, they account for 0.6 percent of world manufacturing value added and 0.7 percent of world 
manufactures trade. The great majority of these countries are on the African continent. The biggest country 
in the lower middle quintile in terms of population size is Nigeria with a population of roughly 160 
million. Nigeria and Algeria are among the main exporters of oil and natural gas in the world. Their 
manufactured exports structure is denoted by the MXsh indicator which is below (almost half of ) the 
lower middle quintile average (see Table 9). 
Overall, the level of industrialization of the lower middle quintile is less than one-third of that registered 
in the middle quintile, as indicated by the MVApc and MXpc average indicators. This figure becomes 
even	more	dramatic	if	we	consider	the	bottom	quintile	where	both	MVApc	and	MXpc	do	not	reach	US$	
100 on average. If we take the median instead of the mean into account, the average values for MVApc 
and MXpc reduce by one-third. Not surprisingly, the level of technological complexity captured by 
MHVAsh and MHXsh are, on average, around 10 percent and 17 percent, respectively, half of the value 
registered for countries in the middle quintile. Table 10 highlights the profound inequalities that exist 
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across different quintiles of the ranking, while Table 9 provides disaggregated indicators that make up the 
CIP index value. These disaggregated figures reveal major inequalities in industrial development across 
different countries in the world.
Table 10: Ranking of countries in the Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index, 2010
Quintiles MvApc Mxpc MHvAsh MvAsh MHxsh Mxsh ImWMvA ImWMT
Top 3984.350 11598.077 45.959 20.376 62.770 86.694 3.109 3.096 Mean
 3324.625 9280.327 43.319 18.571 61.820 88.417 0.838 1.910 median
 2191.209 9017.832 9.837 7.198 8.194 8.070 5.524 3.143 standard	deviation
 83.935 83.589 Total
Upper middle 1254.629 3858.957 27.484 16.419 38.683 68.034 0.452 0.497 Mean
 978.874 2020.658 24.085 15.470 38.038 73.689 0.223 0.407 median
 1011.965 5090.731 11.115 5.903 17.537 23.160 0.527 0.422 standard	deviation
 12.211 13.416 Total
Middle 695.046 1696.520 20.711 13.473 30.441 62.169 0.096 0.085 Mean
 448.575 728.978 20.048 14.011 32.817 70.994 0.051 0.068 median
 778.552 2312.415 9.521 4.679 16.133 24.446 0.109 0.057 standard	deviation
 2.602 2.297 Total
Lower middle 213.115 449.843 12.388 11.435 21.450 52.257 0.018 0.027 Mean
 193.780 276.342 11.278 10.442 15.421 48.847 0.011 0.014 median
 179.445 449.589 9.826 6.468 18.737 26.791 0.017 0.038 standard	deviation
 0.497 0.724 Total
Bottom 99.100 71.082 9.145 8.150 15.076 36.423 0.006 0.003 Mean
 33.192 20.650 6.658 6.825 13.088 32.657 0.004 0.002 median
 183.467 113.396 7.568 5.295 13.510 24.387 0.006 0.003 standard	deviation
0.165 0.084 Total
 
 
4.2 World top 20 performers in 2010
The prospect for a country to climb the CIP index world ranking and move from a lower to a higher 
quintile depends on its capacity to improve its relative performance in all three different competitiveness 
dimensions, each of them captured by different CIP sub-indicators. We often observe that countries which 
are able to improve in one competitiveness dimension also tend to improve in other dimensions over time, 
given the existence of a certain degree of interdependence and cumulativeness in the process of increasing 
industrial competitiveness. This explains why many of the top 20 performers are those countries we also 
find in the top quintile of the world ranking. But this is not always the case as shown in Table 11. Listing 
the top 20 performers for all indicators not only reveals countries’ comparative strengths, but also draws 
our attention to potential biases and the main features of the overall world ranking.
The capacity to produce and export manufactures is measured by the MVApc and the MXpc. As these 
indicators present per capita figures, large countries with a high population size and internal demand tend 
to underperform. Thus, it is not surprising that we find Singapore, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, 
Austria, Iceland, Denmark, Belgium and Netherlands among the top performers in MVApc. Among the 
top	20	performers,	 the	average	MVApc	 is	above	US$	5.000	per	capita,	a	 threshold	 reached	by	only	eight	
economies in the world. Remarkably, Japan is ranked second with an MVApc almost equal to Singapore’s 
and significantly higher than the median value. Among the other larger economies, the United States ranks 
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eighth, with an MVApc just above the top 20 performers’ average; the Republic of Korea and Germany 
follow. However, in contrast to the United States, Germany and the Republic of Korea are also among 
the top 20 performers in MXpc. 
The MXpc ranking is characterized by a quite significant dispersion with a standard deviation of roughly 
US$	8.400	per	capita.	Interestingly,	with	the	exception	of	Germany	and	the	Republic	of	Korea,	the	MXpc	
dimension is dominated by small highly industrialized economies capable of producing goods competitively 
and	 of	 keeping	 abreast	 of	 changing	 technologies.	 Among	 this	 group,	 the	 average	 is	 around	US$	 16.000	
per capita, although the distribution is highly skewed with Singapore (1st) registering a scope which is 
nearly nine times higher than Hungary’s (20th).
The technological deepening and upgrading dimension of competitiveness is measured by two composite 
indicators, namely by industrial intensity and manufactured exports quality. These composite indicators 
are obtained by adopting a linear aggregation technique (arithmetic mean). This implies that the INDint 
and MXQual rankings tend to be affected by factors’ compensability. For example, let’s take the INDint 
ranking. Here, China with a top world MVAsh equal to 34 percent and a relatively equal MHVAsh to 
40 percent ranks sixth in the composite INDint index. On the contrary, the United States ranks 20th as 
a result of its relatively low MVAsh equal to 15 percent and an MHVAsh equal to 51 percent (see Table 
9). The MVAsh indicator in this dimension favours emerging industrial economies such as Malaysia (9th), 
Indonesia (14th) and Philippines (15th), as well as transition economies in the upper middle of the world 
CIP ranking. The fact that the Republic of Korea (4th), Japan (12th) and Germany (13th) appear among 
the INDint top 20 performers is attributable to their willingness and capacity to maintain manufacturing 
production with a high technological content at home. 
The export quality composite indicators determine that Philippines is the top performer. This surprising 
result is mainly attributable to the fact that Philippines is a country ‘specialized’ in assembling components 
produced by countries such as Germany or Japan which own technologies, organize the entire production 
process, manage the business and sell the products. Thus, the export quality indicator tends to capture 
what countries export, but not how and to what extent they contribute to the production of the exported 
goods. The lack of an adequately disaggregated technological classification of exported goods makes this 
problem even more serious. Among the other top performers also affected by this distortive effect, Mexico 
ranks above Germany, China and France. Small European transition economies, namely Hungary, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, enter the top 20 ranking as well.
The world impact dimension is captured by the share of countries in world manufacturing production 
and manufactures trade. In both cases, although in different positions, the world top performers are the 
United States, China, Japan and Germany. While the United States ranks first with almost one-fourth of 
world manufacturing value added, China is the world top exporter of manufactured goods with a 14 
percent global share. Among high income countries, Germany is the only economy with a share of around 
10 percent of world manufactures trade. By contrast, Japan with a higher population and higher internal 
demand pull than Germany, accounts for 6.5 percent of WMT, despite producing 14 percent of WMVA. 
Taken together, the first four top performers have an impact on WMVA and WMT equal to 58 percent 
and 38 percent, respectively. 
With regard to the global impact dimension, the top four performers are followed by a group of relatively 
comparable countries, namely the Republic of Korea, France, Italy and United Kingdom. Their shares in 
WMVA and WMT range from 3 percent to 2 percent and from 4 percent to 3 percent, respectively. 
Among the other countries with a high world impact, India and the Russian Federation appear in both 
rankings, while Brazil is only listed in the top 20 in terms of ImWMVA. South Africa is not among the 
top 20 performers.
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If we consider the top 20 performers in terms of the world impact dimension, countries overall account 
for 85 percent of world manufacturing value added and 78 percent of world manufactures trade. These 
data confirm the high concentration of manufacturing production and exports across countries. 
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Table 11: Ranking of top 20 performers in three dimensions of competitiveness and according to six 
indicators, 2010
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4.3  Regional industrial competitiveness
The regional distribution of the CIP ranking allows us to better focus our attention on the relative com-
petitiveness of nations in specific geographic areas. This is interesting for countries seeking to benchmark 
their ‘local’ industrial competitiveness and, in particular, to identify comparable countries in their regional 
area or continent. Regional industrial competitiveness rankings also provide information about inequalities 
within and across regions in the world. This information is particularly relevant for understanding processes 
of regional economic integration, their achievements and current challenges.
Europe
In Europe, 16 countries belong to the top quintile of the CIP world ranking, followed by 13 economies 
positioned in the upper middle quintile. This latter group of countries includes the Russian Federation 
and a number of transition economies, some of which are new members of the European Union. The 
Russian Federation is positioned in the middle of the regional ranking, followed mainly by transition 
economies such as Belarus, Romania, Croatia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see 
Table 12).
 
Table 12: Regional industrial competitiveness in Europe and world ranking comparison 
EUROPE
CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country
1 2 Germany 20 34 Portugal
2 8 Switzerland 21 36 Russian Federation
3 9 Belgium 22 40 Belarus
4 10 France 23 42 Luxembourg
5 11 Italy 24 46 Romania
6 12 Netherlands 25 47 Lithuania
7 13 Sweden 26 49 Greece
8 14 United Kingdom 27 50 Croatia
9 15 Ireland 28 52 Estonia
10 16 Austria 29 53 Ukraine
11 18 Finland 30 59 Bulgaria
12 19 Spain 31 61 Malta
13 20 Czech Republic 32 65 Iceland
14 24 Denmark 33 68 Latvia
15 25 Poland 34 76 Serbia
16 27 Slovakia 35 83 Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 29 Hungary 36 84 The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia
18 31 Norway 37 94 Albania
19 32 Slovenia 38 114 Republic of Moldova
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Taken as a whole, Europe accounts for 22.4 percent of world manufacturing value added and 44 percent 
of world manufactures trade. As for the three main competitiveness dimensions, Europe consists of quite 
a heterogeneous group of countries. This is why there is a wide dispersion, denoted by the standard devia-
tion in the MVApc and MHVAsh figures. These figures tend to be sensibly lower when compared to the 
North America region. The manufactured exports per capita figure, by contrast, is double on average (see 
Table 20). 
Box 3: The European Union industrial competitiveness 
The European Union is among the most developed areas in the world with a population of 500 
million citizens distributed across 27 countries. The EU27 captures the world’s largest share of 
manufactures trade equal to 40.3 percent (which is almost seven times that of the United States 
and more than three times that of China). More than half of the manufactured exports are medium- 
and high-tech products, as are more than two-thirds of Germany’s exports. The European Union 
also produces 20 percent of WMVA (only below the United States with an ImpWMVA of 24 
percent) of which one-third are medium- and high-tech products. For example, the European Union 
hosts one-third of world production of machine tools (Germany and Italy combined account for 
two-thirds of the total production in the CECIMO region which includes the EU, EFTA and 
Turkey). Overall, the dispersion within the EU27 area tends to be lower than within the Europe 
region (see Table 13). 
Table 13: The European Union and its four major manufacturing countries  
European Union - EU27 MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
mean 2806.746 10575.123 36.625 16.167 53.992 83.630 0.754 1.495
median 2716.243 8360.444 40.071 14.988 54.950 87.040 0.294 0.651
standard	dev 1880.623 7934.007 13.420 5.796 11.596 13.009 1.185 2.151
Germany 4666.907 13397.430 56.759 18.571 72.335 86.813 5.317 10.219
France 2885.087 7237.361 45.413 12.158 65.769 88.417 2.494 4.189
Italy 2847.715 6935.053 39.331 14.942 53.933 91.618 2.325 3.791
United Kingdom 3162.344 5247.637 41.987 11.444 63.221 79.538 2.691 2.989
 
Among its member states, five major economies, namely Germany (1st), France (4th), Italy (5th) and the 
United Kingdom (8th) account for a population of around 270 million overall and these countries contribute 
half of world manufacturing value added (equal to 12.8 percent) and manufactures trade share (21.2 percent). 
Small highly dynamic countries such as Belgium and Netherlands are strongly interlinked with the main 
European industrial block and complement their highly competitive exports. As illustrated by the radar graphs 
below, although Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have represented the main bulk of the 
industrial power of the European Union over the last 20 years, their industrial structures differ profoundly. 
The following radar graphs plot the evolution of the eight structural economic variables for the four countries 
over the last 20 years. Germany and Italy have maintained broader manufacturing bases, as indicated by the 
MVAsh indicators. Together with France, the three countries have a strong export orientation, however, Italy 
shows a relatively less technologically advanced export basket. By contrast, for France and the United Kingdom, 
the MHXsh is above 60 percent, but still far below that of Germany (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Industrial transformations of the four major manufacturing countries of the European 
Union over time (normalized figures)
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Figure 4: Industrial transformations of the four major manufacturing countries of the European 
Union over time (normalized figures)
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North	America
The United States is the third most competitive industrial nation in the world CIP ranking behind Ger-
many	and	Japan.	In	the	United	States,	the	MVApc	reaches	roughly	US$	5.500	per	capita	with	a	population	
of around 315 million people. This figure is also reflected in the share of WMVA equal to 23.4 percent, 
more than three points higher than for the EU27. Fifty-one percent of total MVA is constituted of 
medium- and high-tech activities and 64 percent of manufactured exports are medium- and high-tech 
products. Canada is a much more export oriented economy, capturing 2 percent of WMT, while only 
accounting for 1.4 percent of WMVA of which 37 percent is in medium- and high-tech manufacturing 
products. Canada is also the ninth largest exporter of oil in the world. Overall, the region has the world’s 
highest	MVApc	 equal	 to	US$	4.300,	one-fourth	higher	 than	 the	 average	 value	of	 the	 top	quintile	of	 the	
world ranking (see Table 9).
Table 14: Regional industrial competitiveness in North America and world ranking comparison
 
NORTH
CIP Regional World ranking Country
1 3 United States of America
2 17 Canada
 
Latin	America	and	the	Carribean
In the Latin America and Carribean region, the top five industrially competitive countries are those in the 
top and upper middle quintile of the CIP world ranking (see Table 15). Brazil and Mexico are the two large 
emerging economies in the region with a population of around 195 million and 113 million, respectively. 
Mexico is the most industrially competitive country in the region with an MVApc that is almost double 
that of Brazil, although Argentina with its long industrial history accounts for nearly half of the region’s 
MVApc (see Table 15). Taken together, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina account for 4.2 percent of WMVA 
and 3.7 percent of WMT. Though the latter shares reach 5.6 percent and 4.9 percent, respec- tively, we 
observe a high concentration of manufacturing and high inequalities within the region as a whole. This is 
also confirmed by the very high standard deviation in MVApc and the overall low level of MHXsh (see Table 
20). Countries holding middle and lower positions in the regional ranking are small countries. Even 
countries such as Chile (4th) and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (5th), which rank just below the 
three major economies in the region, are highly dependent on exporting natural resources as the very low 
level of manufactured exports in total exports MXsh indicates (see Table 9).
 
Table 15: Regional industrial competitiveness in Latin America and the Carribean and world ranking 
comparison 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN
CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country
1 22 Mexico 13 87 Ecuador
2 33 Brazil 14 91 Honduras
3 35 Argentina 15 92 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
4 45 Chile 16 93 Jamaica
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN
CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country
5 51 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 17 99 Paraguay
6 56 Costa Rica 18 104 Barbados
7 60 Trinidad and Tobago 19 108 Suriname
8 63 Peru 20 110 Panama
9 64 Colombia 21 113 Belize
10 71 El Salvador 22 123 Saint Lucia
11 73 Uruguay 23 127 Haiti
12 77 Guatemala
East	Asia	and	the	Pacific
The only other region comparable to Europe and North America in terms of industrial and technological 
development is East Asia and the Pacific. This region hosts half of the top 10 most industrially competitive 
nations in the world (five are in the top seven positions), namely Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, 
Taiwan Province, Singapore and China (see Table 16). The next five economies in the ranking include 
two large countries, with Indonesia and Philippines accounting for 240 and 95 million people, respectively. 
Although	 the	MVApc	 is	 fairly	 low	 in	 both	 countries	 (around	US$	 300	 per	 capita),	 Indonesia,	 given	 its	
size, captures 1 percent of WMVA. The lower middle and bottom of the regional ranking includes both 
a catching-up economy, Viet Nam33, but also a country like Mongolia whose structural economic variables 
are comparable with sub-Saharan African countries’. This is why the standard deviation for this regional 
group is the highest among all regional groups (see Table 20).
 
Table 16: Regional industrial competitiveness in East Asia and the Pacific and world ranking 
 comparison 
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country
1 1 Japan 10 44 Philippines
2 4 Republic of Korea 11 48 New Zealand
3 5 China, Taiwan Province 12 54 Viet Nam
4 6 Singapore 13 67 China, Hong Kong SAR
5 7 China 14 90 Cambodia
6 21 Malaysia 15 105 Fiji
7 23 Thailand 16 109 Mongolia
8 28 Australia 17 112 China, Macao SAR
9 38 Indonesia
  
Taking	aside	China’s	huge	economy,	the	other	four	top	performers	show	an	MVApc	of	almost	US$	6.800,	
on average, and a share of medium- and high-tech activities in total MVA and total MX that ranks highest 
in the world. Overall, the top 5 countries in the region host 35 percent of WMVA and 28 percent of 
33  The Viet Nam Industrial Competitiveness Report 2011 produced by UNIDO provides an in-depth industrial competitiveness 
analysis for the country, describing in detail its industrial catching-up trajectory.
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WMT, China alone being the second highest ranking country in the world with a share in WMVA of 
15.4 percent (behind the United States and above Japan) and the highest ranking in terms of WMT with 
a share of 15.3 percent (followed by Germany). While Japan has lead the industrial competitiveness rank-
ing since 1990, the other three economies are relatively new entrants in the top position of the world 
ranking.34 The evolution of the main structural economic variables over the last 20 years has been plotted 
for those three economies (see radar graphs below). Both the Republic of Korea and Singapore have con-
sistently increased their capacity to produce and export (as revealed by the MVApc’s constant increases). 
The common trait is the strong performance of these three economies in MHVAsh and MHXsh, the latter 
indicators revealing their high levels of technological complexity and deepening.
Figure 5: Comparison of the industrial transformations of Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore 
over time (normalized figures)
 
34  The longitudinal analysis showing the CIP index ranking over the last 20 years is presented in Chapter 5.
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South	and	Central	Asia
In contrast to the other emerging large economies, India as the top performer of this region shows a 
considerably lower MVApc, less than one-fourth of China’s. However, despite its population size, second 
only to China, India captures 2.1 percent of WMVA and 1.6 percent of WMT. All other countries in 
the region are in the middle or bottom of the world industrial competitiveness ranking (see Table 17). 
Overall, the region shows aggregate figures which are comparable to sub-Saharan Africa’s (see Table 20). 
Notwithstanding, the region captures 3 percent of WMVA and 2.4 percent of WMT (four times and 
three times higher, respectively, than figures for the sub-Saharan Africa region).  
Table 17: Regional industrial competitiveness in South and Central Asia and world ranking 
comparison
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country
1 43 India
2 55 Iran (Islamic Republic of)
3 70 Kazakhstan
4 74 Pakistan
5 78 Bangladesh
6 80 Sri Lanka
7 115 Tajikistan
8 117 Kyrgyzstan
9 119 Nepal
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Middle	East	and	North	Africa
The top five performers in the Middle East and North Africa region include the highly industrialized Israel 
and the emerging industrial economy Turkey (see Table 18). The latter, which has a population of almost 
80	million,	 is	 the	only	 larger	 country	 in	 the	 region	with	an	MVApc	higher	 than	US$	1.000	 (Egypt	only	
represents one-third) and a certain export capacity in medium- and high-tech manufactures (around 40 
percent of the export basket, while it is only around 25 percent in the case of Egypt). The three ‘oil 
dependent economies’, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, follow Turkey in the regional ranking. Saudi 
Arabia is the strongest net oil exporter (and producer) in the world, while Kuwait ranks fourth and Qatar 
twelvth in the oil net export world ranking. Eight out of 20 countries in the region are ranked in the 
lower middle and bottom of the world industrial competitiveness ranking. Taken as a whole, the region 
accounts for almost 3 percent of WMVA and 3 percent of WMT (one-third of both these world shares 
are attributable to Turkey). Although these figures are similar to those of South and Central Asia, the per 
capita figures reveal profound differences if we factor in population size (see Table 20).
 
Table 18: Regional industrial competitiveness in Middle East and North Africa and world ranking 
comparison 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country
1 26 Israel 11 75 Lebanon
2 30 Turkey 12 81 Syrian Arab Republic
3 37 Saudi Arabia 13 82 Algeria
4 39 Kuwait 14 88 Cyprus
5 57 Qatar 15 96 Georgia
6 58 Tunisia 16 98 Armenia
7 62 Egypt 17 107 Azerbaijan
8 66 Morocco 18 121 Yemen
9 69 Oman 19 126 Sudan
10 72 Jordan 20 133 Iraq
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
In the world industrial landscape, the entire sub-Saharan Africa region accounts for less than 1 percent of 
both WMVA and WMT shares. Thirteen out of 25 countries are in the bottom quintile of the world 
industrial competitiveness ranking, while ten are in the lower middle quintile (see Table 19). The MVApc 
in	the	region	is	around	US$	125	on	average,	but	there	is	wide	dispersion	in	the	data.	The	MVApc	median	
value falls to one-third in comparison to the regional average, while the MXpc is more than five times 
higher (see Table 20). South Africa is by far the most competitive industrial nation in the region, as well 
as the biggest most competitive country on the entire continent. South Africa alone accounts for half of 
the MVA and WMT shares of the entire region.35 Mauritius is the second most industrially competitive 
country in the region and the only one ranking in the middle quintile. Not only are its structural economic 
35  The Tanzania Industrial Competitiveness Report produced by UNIDO in 2012 as well as the UNIDO Africa Investor Report 
2011 provide in-depth analysis of the region and offer complementary industrial diagnostics which are consistent with the industrial 
competitiveness analysis developed here.
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variables sensibly higher than the regional average, but it also outperforms others in the world middle 
quintile due to its capacity to manufacture products (MVApc). Among the other countries in the regional 
ranking, Nigeria and Algeria are the main oil net exporters.
 
Table 19: Regional industrial competitiveness in sub-Saharan Africa and world ranking comparison 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
CIP
Regional
World 
ranking
Country CIP 
Regional
World 
ranking
Country
1 41 South Africa 14 116 Madagascar
2 79 Mauritius 15 118 Ghana
3 85 Swaziland 16 120 Uganda
4 86 Botswana 17 122 Mozambique
5 89 Côte d’Ivoire 18 124 Cape Verde
6 95 Nigeria 19 125 Malawi
7 97 Cameroon 20 128 Niger
8 100 Congo 21 129 Rwanda
9 101 Senegal 22 130 Ethiopia
10 102 Kenya 23 131 Central African Republic
11 103 Gabon 24 132 Burundi
12 106 United Republic of Tanzania 25 133 Gambia
13 111 Zambia
 
Table 20: Statistics on country groups in the regional industrial competitiveness ranking 
Country 
group
MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
Europe
2384.101 8497.639 32.004 16.244 48.198 79.703 0.591 1.163 mean
1700.262 6139.144 32.829 15.495 52.045 86.515 0.186 0.411 median
2069.746 8224.810 14.171 5.947 16.137 16.895 1.042 1.903 standard 
deviation
22.466 44.211 total
North America
4299.910 4701.839 44.435 13.368 60.233 69.449 12.736 5.029 mean
4299.910 4701.839 44.435 13.368 60.233 69.449 12.736 5.029 median
1728.425 2779.927 10.025 2.098 6.379 10.336 15.980 4.165 standard 
deviation
25.472 10.058 total
Latin America and the Carribean
578.621 860.769 19.040 12.836 23.300 55.354 0.257 0.223 mean
426.916 594.017 17.518 13.588 19.013 51.812 0.046 0.036 median
434.754 1171.929 11.445 5.021 19.717 23.858 0.494 0.517 standard 
deviation
5.651 4.907 total
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Country 
group
MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
East Asia and the Pacific
2210.277 4854.676 32.853 20.031 43.614 72.753 2.309 2.035 mean
832.347 1123.620 37.814 21.339 53.737 69.297 0.521 0.878 median
2793.430 8603.095 22.199 10.703 28.750 19.537 4.753 3.552 standard 
deviation
39.253 34.599 total
South and Central Asia
151.946 207.785 16.703 15.814 24.763 55.624 0.336 0.273 mean
116.878 99.770 12.109 15.044 20.733 70.098 0.076 0.112 median
124.484 243.854 14.865 6.419 18.970 31.428 0.648 0.556 standard 
deviation
3.026 2.453 total
Middle East and North Africa
721.587 1699.052 19.643 10.487 31.608 48.335 0.142 0.151 mean
381.515 533.399 19.020 10.393 31.847 53.119 0.036 0.047 median
863.406 2716.690 12.398 5.516 17.430 32.647 0.258 0.236 standard 
deviation
2.843 3.015 total
Sub-Saharan Africa
124.044 280.720 11.037 9.891 18.009 43.003 0.026 0.032 mean
45.678 48.690 9.409 8.830 13.585 34.906 0.008 0.009 median
194.463 515.331 9.020 5.954 16.739 26.279 0.073 0.090 standard 
deviation
0.699 0.867 total
4.4  The industrial competitiveness of nations by income and industrial 
comparators
Countries are not only interested in benchmarking their ‘local’ industrial competitiveness, that is, their relative 
industrial performance within a certain regional area. World regions are highly aggregated entities characterized 
by wide dispersion in performance, even when we take traditionally industrialized areas such as Europe into 
consideration. In the global manufacturing landscape, countries identify a certain number of relevant comparators 
and track their relative performance and policies. On the one hand, countries might be interested in comparing 
their performance to that of countries which are at the same stage of economic development measured by their 
income per capita. These income comparators might, of course, be within or outside the regional borders. On 
the other hand, countries might be interested in comparing themselves with countries that have a similar industrial 
structure. The identification of industrial comparators may rely on different criteria. The following tables show 
the results of such comparisons.
The CIP ranking by income comparators reveals the different development models countries have followed, even 
within the high income OECD group, and how they have been affected by different de-industrialization processes. 
Not surprisingly, we find the top four world performers among the high income OECD group, followed by 
medium and small European countries and transition economies (see Table 21). Overall, they account for almost 
two-thirds of world manufacturing value added and world manufactures trade. This group outperforms all other 
income groups in all share and per capita indicators (see Table 26). The high income non-OECD countries include 
two East Asian economies, a number of oil dependent economies and a few other small countries (see Table 22).
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Table 21: Industrial competitiveness ranking by income comparators, high income OECD country group 
HIGH INCOME OECD
Income
ranking
World 
ranking
Country Income 
ranking
World 
ranking
Country
1 1 Japan 17 20 Czech Republic
2 2 Germany 18 24 Denmark
3 3 United States of America 19 25 Poland
4 4 Republic of Korea 20 26 Israel
5 8 Switzerland 21 27 Slovakia
6 9 Belgium 22 28 Australia
7 10 France 23 29 Hungary
8 11 Italy 24 31 Norway
9 12 Netherlands 25 32 Slovenia
10 13 Sweden 26 34 Portugal
11 14 United Kingdom 27 42 Luxembourg
12 15 Ireland 28 48 New Zealand
13 16 Austria 29 49 Greece
14 17 Canada 30 52 Estonia
15 18 Finland 31 65 Iceland
16 19 Spain
Table 22: Industrial competitiveness ranking by income comparators, high income non-OECD 
 country group 
HIGH INCOME NON-OECD
Income
ranking
World 
ranking
Country Income 
ranking
World 
ranking
Country
1 5 China, Taiwan Province 10 69 Oman
2 6 Singapore 11 88 Cyprus
3 37 Saudi Arabia 12 104 Barbados
4 39 Kuwait 13 112 China, Macao SAR
5 50 Croatia
6 57 Qatar
7 60 Trinidad and Tobago
8 61 Malta
9 67 China, Hong Kong SAR
The upper middle income group is led by China and by three other large economies: Brazil, Russian 
Federation and South Africa. Other large emerging industrial economies, namely Malaysia, Thailand, 
Turkey, Argentina and Belarus, are represented in the top 10. The subsequent countries are relatively 
smaller economies mainly concentrated in the middle quintile of the world industrial competitiveness 
ranking (see Table 23). Taken as a whole, the region accounts for one-fourth of world manufacturing value 
added and world manufactures trade (see Table 26).
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Table 23: Industrial competitiveness ranking by income comparators, upper middle income  
country group
UPPER MIDDLE INCOME WORLD
Income 
ranking
World 
ranking
Country Income 
ranking
World 
ranking
Country
1 7 China 20 64 Colombia
2 21 Malaysia 21 68 Latvia
3 22 Mexico 22 70 Kazakhstan
4 23 Thailand 23 72 Jordan
5 30 Turkey 24 73 Uruguay
6 33 Brazil 25 75 Lebanon
7 35 Argentina 26 76 Serbia
8 36 Russian Federation 27 79 Mauritius
9 40 Belarus 28 82 Algeria
10 41 South Africa 29 83 Bosnia and Herzegovina
11 45 Chile 30 84 The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia
12 46 Romania 31 86 Botswana
13 47 Lithuania 32 87 Ecuador
14 51 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 33 93 Jamaica
15 55 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 34 103 Gabon
16 56 Costa Rica 35 107 Azerbaijan
17 58 Tunisia 36 108 Suriname
18 59 Bulgaria 37 110 Panama
19 63 Peru 38 123 Saint Lucia
 
The lower middle income group is led by three large Asian economies, Indonesia, India and Philippines, 
followed by industrializing countries such as Ukraine and Viet Nam. The remaining part of the group 
includes a mix of economies in the middle and lower middle quintile of the world industrial competitive-
ness ranking. Many of them are located in the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa. The countries in the latter case tend to be oil net exporters such as Nigeria (see Table 24). 
Taken as a whole, they account for 5 percent of world manufacturing value added and world manufactures 
trade (see Table 26). Finally, the low income group includes Bangladesh at the top, followed by smaller 
economies in South and Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 25). Both aggregate and individual 
countries’ figures reveal an extremely low overall level of industrial development (see Table 9 and 26).
Table 24: Industrial competitiveness ranking by income comparators, lower middle income  
country group 
LOWER MIDDLE INCOME WORLD
Income World 
ranking
Country Income 
ranking
World 
ranking
Country
1 38 Indonesia 18 95 Nigeria
2 43 India 19 96 Georgia
3 44 Philippines 20 97 Cameroon
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LOWER MIDDLE INCOME WORLD
Income World 
ranking
Country Income 
ranking
World 
ranking
Country
4 53 Ukraine 21 98 Armenia
5 54 Viet Nam 22 99 Paraguay
6 62 Egypt 23 100 Congo
7 66 Morocco 24 101 Senegal
8 71 El Salvador 25 105 Fiji
9 74 Pakistan 26 109 Mongolia
10 77 Guatemala 27 111 Zambia
11 80 Sri Lanka 28 113 Belize
12 81 Syrian Arab Republic 29 114 Republic of Moldova
13 85 Swaziland 30 118 Ghana
14 89 Côte d’Ivoire 31 121 Yemen
15 91 Honduras 32 124 Cape Verde
16 92 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 33 126 Sudan
17 94 Albania 34 133 Iraq
Table 25: Industrial competitiveness ranking by income comparators, low income country group 
LOW INCOME WORLD
Income World 
ranking
Country Income 
ranking
World 
ranking
Country
1 78 Bangladesh 11 125 Malawi
2 90 Cambodia 12 127 Haiti
3 102 Kenya 13 128 Niger
4 106 United Republic of Tanzania 14 129 Rwanda
5 115 Tajikistan 15 130 Ethiopia
6 116 Madagascar 16 131 Central African Republic
7 117 Kyrgyzstan 17 132 Burundi
8 119 Nepal 18 133 Gambia
9 120 Uganda 19 133 Eritrea
10 122 Mozambique
Table 26: Statistics on country groups by income comparators 
Country 
group
MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
High income OECD
3637.9060 10704.4975 38.1553 16.4997 55.7089 79.7454 2.0954 2.0491 mean
3235.6190 8291.9550 41.7384 14.9417 55.7886 87.0401 0.5521 1.1134 median
1889.0927 7790.4618 14.3718 5.9848 14.4221 18.7728 4.8537 2.4640 standard 
deviation
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Country 
group
MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
64.9574 63.5230 total
High income non-OECD
2024.1012 6546.0155 33.1798 10.5438 41.9206 61.7391 0.2476 0.3830 mean
999.3594 2356.2810 32.5780 8.3858 42.7073 73.9550 0.0360 0.0752 median
2382.6740 9471.9438 19.9291 8.6087 20.9243 31.0153 0.5434 0.7130 standard 
deviation
3.2191 4.9787 total
Upper middle income world
597.8738 1315.7192 21.1488 15.0228 31.5391 61.0265 0.6794 0.6957 mean
464.5866 856.5439 19.9989 15.1503 33.9994 69.6595 0.0683 0.1224 median
400.9654 1270.5550 11.5582 7.7622 19.7609 26.7307 2.4806 2.2896 standard 
deviation
25.8170 26.4374 total
Lower middle income world
181.6157 283.3142 16.6459 13.8243 22.3973 53.4202 0.1488 0.1454 mean
171.5993 217.9206 16.9570 12.4785 17.8733 60.8281 0.0222 0.0137 median
134.9109 236.5627 11.1859 6.7728 19.3231 27.4702 0.3831 0.3374 standard 
deviation
5.0595 4.9452 total
Low income world
32.1789 31.5162 6.6444 9.9570 17.2793 41.6023 0.0087 0.0060 mean
23.5233 13.6438 4.8122 8.4227 14.1134 37.1117 0.0063 0.0024 median
26.1972 55.1576 5.8604 6.3019 14.3589 23.6495 0.0087 0.0093 standard 
deviation
0.1574 0.1078 total
Ranking countries according to their level of industrial development, the overall picture does not change 
dramatically, as countries’ industrial and economic development measured by per capita income are tightly 
interconnected (see Table 27). With the exception of China, the ranking by industrial comparators also 
reflects the world industrial competitiveness ranking, at least in the top quintile. The reason is that coun-
tries’ industrial comparators are identified according to sub-indicators of the CIP, that is, MVApc and 
ImWMVA. Taken as a whole, industrialized economies account for almost 70 percent of world manufac-
turing value added and world manufactures trade (see Table 31). 
Similarly, among the emerging industrial economies group (see Table 28), we find large countries such as 
China, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa and several transition economies that have been catching up in 
the last decades. Although their structural trajectories differ significantly, the countries are at a similar stage 
of industrial development as measured by MVApc and MXpc. Taken as a whole, emerging industrial 
economies account for almost 28 percent of world manufacturing value added and world manufactures 
trade (see Table 31).
The last two groups include other developing countries and least developed countries which are located 
at the bottom of the world industrial competitiveness ranking, the only exceptions being Philippines, Viet 
Nam and Bangladesh (see Table 20 and 30).
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Table 27: Industrial competitiveness ranking by industrial comparators, industrialized  
economies group 
Industrial 
development
World 
ranking
Country MVApc MXpc ImWMVA ImWMT
1 1 Japan 7993.985 5521.015 14.126 6.532
2 2 Germany 4666.907 13397.430 5.317 10.219
3 3 United States of America 5522.091 2736.134 24.036 7.974
4 4 Republic of Korea 4782.695 9280.327 3.220 4.183
5 5 China, Taiwan Province 6153.097 10825.160 1.968 2.318
6 6 Singapore 8198.274 35709.080 0.521 1.519
7 8 Switzerland 7168.375 23651.560 0.750 1.657
8 9 Belgium 3793.781 34137.530 0.552 3.326
9 10 France 2885.087 7237.361 2.494 4.189
10 11 Italy 2847.715 6935.053 2.325 3.791
11 12 Netherlands 3324.625 22081.020 0.759 3.374
12 13 Sweden 6559.365 15375.640 0.838 1.316
13 14 United Kingdom 3162.344 5247.637 2.691 2.989
14 15 Ireland 6506.683 23959.500 0.407 1.004
15 16 Austria 4869.479 14926.310 0.569 1.167
16 17 Canada 3077.729 6667.544 1.437 2.084
17 18 Finland 6795.266 12001.190 0.500 0.592
18 19 Spain 1896.882 4571.873 1.183 1.910
19 20 Czech Republic 2148.213 11816.280 0.302 1.113
20 21 Malaysia 1426.915 5930.921 0.551 1.533
21 24 Denmark 3887.018 12839.140 0.294 0.651
22 26 Israel 3235.619 7728.479 0.325 0.520
23 27 Slovakia 2303.721 11125.340 0.172 0.556
24 28 Australia 2660.727 4520.901 0.786 0.894
25 29 Hungary 1210.312 8291.955 0.166 0.763
26 31 Norway 3766.775 7396.271 0.249 0.328
27 32 Slovenia 2716.243 11094.260 0.075 0.206
28 34 Portugal 1503.641 4098.299 0.223 0.407
29 36 Russian Federation 503.997 1028.697 0.978 1.337
30 39 Kuwait 2224.274 6899.250 0.094 0.231
31 42 Luxembourg 3737.346 24557.200 0.025 0.110
32 47 Lithuania 964.003 5343.235 0.044 0.165
33 48 New Zealand 1986.101 3213.924 0.118 0.128
34 52 Estonia 978.874 8360.444 0.018 0.102
35 57 Qatar 1988.824 8817.292 0.024 0.086
36 61 Malta 1257.272 8406.836 0.007 0.032
37 65 Iceland 4007.826 4001.087 0.017 0.011
38 67 China, Hong Kong SAR 478.412 1093.803 0.049 0.075
39 112 China, Macao SAR 832.347 264.975 0.006 0.001
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Table 28: Industrial competitiveness ranking by industrial comparators, emerging industrial 
 economies group 
Industrial 
development
World 
ranking
Country MVApc MXpc ImWMVA ImWMT
1 7 China 820.0180 1123.6200 15.3289 14.0629
2 22 Mexico 1007.9250 2166.1570 1.5376 2.2124
3 23 Thailand 1053.6560 2517.1530 0.9491 1.5181
4 25 Poland 1489.9830 3639.6220 0.7811 1.2775
5 30 Turkey 1012.7340 1286.6960 1.0884 0.9259
6 33 Brazil 622.0987 667.5453 1.7121 1.2301
7 35 Argentina 1749.3670 877.5810 0.9857 0.3311
8 37 Saudi Arabia 1157.3230 2020.6580 0.4229 0.4943
9 38 Indonesia 302.2641 395.6795 1.0017 0.8779
10 40 Belarus 907.2939 2361.9730 0.1196 0.2084
11 41 South Africa 567.2742 991.1478 0.3866 0.4523
12 43 India 120.1849 153.8274 2.0283 1.7382
13 45 Chile 972.3740 1943.1180 0.2304 0.3083
14 46 Romania 341.5519 2111.4020 0.0999 0.4135
15 49 Greece 1289.6790 1429.0980 0.2001 0.1484
16 50 Croatia 999.3594 2356.2810 0.0626 0.0989
17 51 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 895.4624 750.4219 0.3597 0.2018
18 53 Ukraine 213.5706 974.3479 0.1334 0.4076
19 56 Costa Rica 1034.8420 1420.9560 0.0668 0.0614
20 58 Tunisia 490.9696 1272.1410 0.0724 0.1256
21 59 Bulgaria 398.7875 1958.2220 0.0412 0.1355
22 64 Colombia 405.2574 268.7242 0.2684 0.1192
23 68 Latvia 480.5979 3190.1600 0.0149 0.0663
24 69 Oman 941.1152 1857.9860 0.0360 0.0476
25 70 Kazakhstan 346.3900 767.3919 0.0755 0.1120
26 73 Uruguay 1342.8290 626.4600 0.0627 0.0236
27 76 Serbia 146.0240 771.8588 0.0200 0.0709
28 79 Mauritius 803.9971 1103.5250 0.0144 0.0132
29 84 The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia 388.8205 835.5067 0.0110 0.0191
30 88 Cyprus 918.4880 640.8757 0.0112 0.0052
31 108 Suriname 307.6595 693.6025 0.0020 0.0030
Table 29: Industrial competitiveness ranking by industrial comparators, least developed  
countries group 
 
Regional World 
ranking
Country MVApc MXpc ImWMVA ImWMT
1 78 Bangladesh 86.7396 75.9896 0.1999 0.1179
2 90 Cambodia 100.7296 239.2937 0.0212 0.0337
3 101 Senegal 56.2691 115.9478 0.0104 0.0143
4 106 United Republic of Tanzania 45.6784 43.7185 0.0275 0.0176
5 111 Zambia 44.2736 111.4939 0.0077 0.0130
6 116 Madagascar 28.4274 31.8613 0.0084 0.0063
7 119 Nepal 18.1747 21.5419 0.0075 0.0060
8 120 Uganda 25.2921 11.7830 0.0119 0.0037
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Regional World 
ranking
Country MVApc MXpc ImWMVA ImWMT
9 121 Yemen 33.1920 23.9383 0.0112 0.0054
10 122 Mozambique 47.6064 7.6077 0.0149 0.0016
11 125 Malawi 17.2107 19.5735 0.0036 0.0027
12 126 Sudan 37.3428 6.6349 0.0213 0.0030
13 127 Haiti 36.2575 6.1908 0.0050 0.0012
14 128 Niger 9.2339 20.6504 0.0020 0.0030
15 129 Rwanda 21.7544 8.7765 0.0032 0.0009
16 130 Ethiopia 9.2491 2.5134 0.0115 0.0021
17 131 Central African Republic 15.2243 6.0769 0.0010 0.0003
18 132 Burundi 7.4443 1.9461 0.0010 0.0002
19 133 Eritrea 7.2731 0.4694 0.0005 0.0000
Table 30: Industrial competitiveness ranking by industrial comparators, other developing  
economies group 
Industrial 
development
World 
ranking
Country MVApc MXpc ImWMVA ImWMT
1 44 Philippines 296.0264 516.6089 0.3808 0.4449
2 54 Viet Nam 176.1349 551.0216 0.2213 0.4636
3 55 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 361.2004 378.5034 0.3711 0.2603
4 60 Trinidad and Tobago 868.1077 5480.3210 0.0162 0.0684
5 62 Egypt 361.7198 206.4879 0.3979 0.1521
6 63 Peru 448.5753 623.7479 0.1793 0.1669
7 66 Morocco 239.7371 425.9229 0.1074 0.1277
8 71 El Salvador 513.1584 564.2864 0.0507 0.0373
9 72 Jordan 401.3109 728.9779 0.0358 0.0436
10 74 Pakistan 116.8777 99.7700 0.2802 0.1602
11 75 Lebanon 625.0215 726.8412 0.0365 0.0285
12 77 Guatemala 223.8785 408.9824 0.0445 0.0545
13 80 Sri Lanka 190.6457 297.3475 0.0516 0.0539
14 81 Syrian Arab Republic 206.1284 232.4145 0.0611 0.0461
15 82 Algeria 142.3358 414.7089 0.0697 0.1360
16 83 Bosnia and Herzegovina 210.5467 885.8250 0.0115 0.0323
17 85 Swaziland 496.9225 883.7827 0.0080 0.0099
18 86 Botswana 184.3349 2252.1340 0.0050 0.0407
19 87 Ecuador 247.9522 269.8627 0.0472 0.0344
20 89 Côte d’Ivoire 99.0589 182.4966 0.0279 0.0344
21 91 Honduras 279.6732 143.7003 0.0291 0.0119
22 92 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 167.0637 276.3419 0.0232 0.0257
23 93 Jamaica 260.6629 418.8261 0.0099 0.0107
24 94 Albania 214.5382 359.4858 0.0096 0.0108
25 95 Nigeria 24.5856 113.8676 0.0538 0.1669
26 96 Georgia 136.0500 229.3532 0.0081 0.0091
27 97 Cameroon 140.1665 64.7066 0.0381 0.0118
28 98 Armenia 203.5952 201.1246 0.0084 0.0056
29 99 Paraguay 193.7799 146.0973 0.0173 0.0087
10.07.13   10:44
74
4. THE COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE RANKING
Industrial 
development
World 
ranking
Country MVApc MXpc ImWMVA ImWMT
30 100 Congo 67.2177 601.9828 0.0037 0.0224
31 102 Kenya 46.7688 62.1223 0.0263 0.0234
32 103 Gabon 201.0594 712.7484 0.0039 0.0110
33 104 Barbados 296.4223 725.6843 0.0012 0.0020
34 105 Fiji 252.9642 374.4215 0.0030 0.0030
35 107 Azerbaijan 70.7655 257.5435 0.0085 0.0207
36 109 Mongolia 60.3637 451.5818 0.0023 0.0116
37 110 Panama 347.0450 66.0502 0.0168 0.0021
38 113 Belize 475.5055 285.0173 0.0020 0.0008
39 114 Republic of Moldova 53.3502 155.3619 0.0027 0.0053
40 115 Tajikistan 84.8618 15.5047 0.0083 0.0020
41 117 Kyrgyzstan 42.4413 60.1900 0.0032 0.0031
42 118 Ghana 26.3711 26.2513 0.0091 0.0061
43 123 Saint Lucia 227.5487 253.3440 0.0005 0.0004
44 124 Cape Verde 147.1301 48.6897 0.0012 0.0003
45 133 Iraq 5.1947 3.7097 0.0022 0.0013
Table 31: Statistics on country groups by industrial comparators 
Country 
name
MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
Industrialized economies
3436.483 10540.768 37.578 16.021 52.751 75.629 1.749 1.779 mean
3077.729 8291.955 41.738 14.942 55.723 86.813 0.500 1.004 median
2131.047 8396.134 16.442 7.285 17.978 22.842 4.378 2.289 standard 
deviation
68.219 69.394 total
Emerging industrial economies
758.964 1392.701 24.389 17.049 38.852 65.959 0.907 0.894 mean
820.018 1123.620 20.776 15.632 39.008 73.689 0.133 0.202 median
417.482 856.434 11.392 7.174 17.506 25.242 2.734 2.511 standard 
deviation
28.125 27.710 total
Other developing countries
260.776 608.138 17.791 13.720 24.356 58.781 0.082 0.085 mean
208.338 393.743 17.509 13.678 22.843 69.250 0.036 0.036 median
177.398 976.290 11.209 6.324 19.730 24.863 0.117 0.116 standard 
deviation
2.635 2.714 total
Least developed countries
83.422 105.661 10.080 8.899 15.340 41.676 0.013 0.009 average
42.441 26.251 6.658 7.449 13.585 34.827 0.005 0.003 median
111.476 162.369 9.059 5.500 13.063 27.296 0.034 0.021 standard 
deviation
0.431 0.292 total
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This chapter of the report presents a longitudinal analysis of world industrial competitiveness over the last 
two decades, 1990s – 2000s. The CIP index is primarily a static benchmarking tool, although it can also 
be used to provide a snapshot of countries’ competitive industrial performance at regular intervals. In 
previous Industrial Development Reports, longitudinal comparisons were performed with a limited number 
of countries and time intervals: in the IDR 2002/3, the CIP index (CIP.4 index format) was computed 
for 1998 and 1985, covering 87 and 76 countries, respectively; the IDR 2004 included the CIP index 
(CIP.6 index format) covering three decades, 1980, 1990 and 2000, including a sample of 93 countries 
(by adopting the same index format, the IDR 2009 expanded the benchmarking sample of countries to 
122 countries for both 2000 and 2005); finally, the IDR 2011 compared 118 with the current CIP.8 
format for 2005 and 2009.
5.1 Two decades of industrial competitiveness
Ranking countries across years using static indicators such as the CIP index entails two major problems. 
Firstly, given the relatively higher information requirements of the CIP index in comparison with its previ-
ous formats (CIP.4 and CIP.6 indices), the number of countries covered decreases drastically, from 135 in 
2010 to only 53 countries in 1990. Secondly, because the CIP index covers different numbers of countries 
in each base year, problems of comparison, in particular of countries’ movements in the rankings across 
the years, will emerge. We tried to address both methodological problems.
The first problem was partially resolved by recalculating the CIP index for all countries for which data 
were available over the last two decades and by comparing snapshots of world industrial competitiveness 
every five years. The country coverage for each five-year period is as follows:  
•	 1990 (coverage: 53 countries) – 1995 (coverage: 106 countries)
•	 1995 (coverage: 106 countries) – 2000  (coverage: 129 countries)
•	 2000 (coverage: 129 countries) – 2005 (coverage: 134 countries)  
•	 2005 (coverage: 134 countries) – 2010 (coverage: 135 countries). 
The top 20 performers in each industrial competitiveness dimension for the base years considered are 
presented in the tables of the report’s annex.
Drawing from this dataset, dynamic indicators have been computed to illustrate countries’ structural tra-
jectories and the speed of change in structural economic variables. Annual growth rates have been computed 
for the per capita figures, MVApc and MXpc; the sub-indicators have been calculated as share figures 
(MVAsh, MXsh, MHVAsh, MHXsh, ImWMVA and ImWMT) and we present cumulative changes over 
a span of five years. In the case of countries’ world share figures, that is, ImWMVA and ImWMT, the 
results are strongly affected by the change in country coverage over the period 1990 – 1995. The world 
industrial competitiveness rankings for the subsequent time periods are much more comparable, as countries 
tend to enter the ranking in the middle, lower middle and bottom quintiles. These countries are highlighted 
in colour in Table 32. 
The second problem arising in longitudinal analyses of world industrial competitiveness rankings is mainly 
attributable to the fact that countries entering the ranking over time affect the relative positioning of all 
other countries, independently from their performance in the sub-indicators of the CIP index. In order 
to avoid that countries climb the world ranking or, vice versa, drop several positions as a result of new 
entrants in the world industrial competition, a virtual ranking is provided which recounts movements in 
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the rankings, excluding the new entrants. The virtual world industrial competitiveness ranking is named 
CIP* and the net change in the world ranking is named Change*. 
The longitudinal analysis of world industrial competitiveness is also performed by regional groups, income 
groups and industrial development groups for a span of ten years, from 1990 to 2000 and from 2000 to 
2010. This part of the analysis aims at highlighting long-term structural trajectories of different country 
groups and indicating changes in the relationships among the structural economic variables composing 
the CIP index.
Before addressing the details of the longitudinal analysis and the identification of countries’ structural 
trajectories, Table 32 provides a first overview of the world industrial competitiveness rankings over the 
last two decades, from 1990 to 2000. Countries are listed according to the 2010 world industrial com-
petitiveness ranking and subdivided into quintiles. The same division by quintile is also used for the 2000 
period. The comparison between the 2010 CIP world ranking and the 2000 CIP world ranking for the 
top and upper middle quintile of the rankings allows us to highlight the winners and losers over the last 
decade. 
As shown in Table 33, the three fastest catching up economies in the industrial competitiveness ranking 
have been Viet Nam, China and India, which gained 18, 16 and 9 positions, respectively, in the world 
ranking. The other countries include a number of successful transition economies which are members of 
the European Union, namely Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Lithuania and Czech Republic. Although at a 
slower pace, Ukraine and the Russian Federation climbed 6 and 3 positions, respectively. Three countries 
from the Middle East and North Africa region also belong to this group, a rapidly industrializing country 
with a large population size, i.e. Turkey, and two major oil exporters and producers, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. Among the industrialized economies, while Japan, Germany and the United States maintain their 
positions, Switzerland and three East Asian economies have registered the most impressive jump in the 
ranking. The Republic of Korea, in particular, gained 8 positions within only 10 years (in fact, within 
only five years if we consider that it has maintained its fourth position in the world ranking since 2005).
While some countries have been gaining positions, others have dropped significantly in the industrial 
competitiveness ranking. Among the most important mature industrial economies, Canada and the United 
Kingdom are the two countries that have lost a lot of ground, 11 and 10 positions, respectively. The other 
two major European industrial economies, France and Italy, have also lost 5 and 4 positions, respectively. 
Among the largest emerging industrial economies, Philippines, Mexico and Brazil have fallen back in the 
industrial competitiveness ranking.
Given data availability, the identification of winners and losers for a longer time span can only be achieved 
for the top 20 countries. The analysis confirms the main results presented in Table 33 and shows the rapid 
and cumulative process of increasing industrial competitiveness experienced in particular by China, the 
Republic of Korea, the Czech Republic and China, Taiwan Province. These variations are also highlighted 
in Table 33.
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Table 32: The CIP index world ranking over 20 years, 1990 - 2010
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Table 33: Winners and losers in world competitive industrial performance rankings from 2000 to 
2010  for the top and upper middle quintiles 
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5.2 Catching up, forging ahead, falling behind
The computation of dynamic indicators is of critical importance if we want to explain why and how some 
countries have been catching up, forging ahead or falling behind. Also, this allows to explain the speed 
and intensity at which structural change dynamics have been taking place and have transformed the overall 
industrial competitiveness of nations. Starting from the period 1990-1995, the following sections retrace 
countries’ changes in structural economic variables.
Period	1990-1995
In the top and upper middle ranking during the period 1990-95 (see Table 34), Poland, China and 
Thailand registered two digit annual growth rates (AGR) of MVApc, followed by Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Republic of Korea, where the same figures were around 8 percent. Ireland and Singapore in the top 
quintile, as well as Chile and India in the upper middle quintile, also showed a sustained increase in their 
capacity to produce manufactures. Albeit to different degrees, the performances of these nine countries 
were mainly attributable to external demand, but also to their strong technological efforts which resulted 
in important transformations of their export basket composition. All the listed countries, with the excep-
tion of China for which data are not available, experienced a two digit AGR of their MXpc, from 10 
percent to 21 percent. With the exception of India and Chile, the export basket changed in favour of 
medium- and high-tech manufactures from 11 percent to 17 percent within five years. 
The country with the best export performance during this period was Mexico which reported an AGR of 
MXpc of almost 35 percent and a cumulative change in MHXsh of 30 percent. However, if we consider 
the other value added indicators, the domestic content of export production remained low and even 
decreased over the period. In the Latin America region, Argentina and Peru registered sustained increases 
in their industrial capacities, while in South Asia, Bangladesh showed an AGR of its MVApc of around 
5 percent. On the African continent, Uganda, Mauritius, Oman and Tunisia are those countries which 
experienced significant increases in the AGR of their MVApc. 
Given the significant change in country coverage, which doubled in five years, figures based on world 
manufacturing value added and world manufactures trade shares are less reliable. However, the results are 
quite clear for some of the larger economies. The Republic of Korea’s WMVA and WMT shares increased 
significantly, while all other traditional industrial economies experienced an overall negative development, 
partially due to the relatively slow growth of MVApc. 
 
Table 34: Catching up, forging ahead and falling behind, 1990 - 1995 
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1 1 1 0 0 Japan 0.04 8.61 -2.27 -1.18 1.10 -0.55 -1.764 -0.481
2 Germany -1.51 -3.48 -1.177
2 3 2 -1 0 United States of America 2.01 7.29 0.57 0.43 -0.09 2.27 1.298 -0.806
3 4 3 -1 0 United Kingdom -0.18 5.27 -3.08 -1.38 1.44 3.06 -0.452 -1.183
4 5 4 -1 0 Italy 1.44 6.33 -5.16 0.35 1.48 0.42 -0.080 -0.940
5 6 5 -1 0 France 0.81 5.60 1.68 0.07 3.29 -0.35 -0.122 -1.193
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6 7 6 -1 0 Switzerland -0.03 4.58 -4.36 0.67 1.99 1.91 -0.054 -0.457
8 8 7 0 1 Belgium 0.23 6.81 26.79 -0.92 2.84 -0.62 -0.055 -0.499
7 9 8 -2 -1 Canada 0.96 8.12 1.99 0.30 1.07 2.78 0.005 -0.093
11 10 9 1 2 Singapore 4.92 11.72 2.69 -1.06 16.34 0.29 0.088 0.340
9 11 10 -2 -1 Netherlands 1.33 6.00 -3.41 -0.20 4.59 1.85 -0.002 -0.565
10 12 11 -2 -1 China, Taiwan Province 3.22 9.36 5.18 -3.75 11.25 -0.22 0.123 0.059
14 13 12 1 2 Republic of Korea 7.19 12.75 5.50 0.42 17.65 -0.51 0.486 0.505
12 14 13 -2 -1 Sweden 3.24 4.25 3.33 2.30 0.76 -5.73 0.058 -0.468
15 15 14 0 1 Ireland 5.43 12.65 4.26 1.72 2.02 1.02 0.060 0.135
13 16 15 -3 -2 Austria 0.86 3.93 2.01 -0.35 1.13 -7.68 -0.011 -0.346
16 17 16 -1 0 Spain 0.33 9.67 -2.42 -0.74 5.74 -0.11 -0.117 0.009
18 18 17 0 1 Finland 1.67 8.05 -0.20 2.48 3.87 -0.49 0.002 -0.061
17 19 18 -2 -1 Denmark 1.71 6.10 -3.66 -0.20 -0.17 -1.73 0.000 -0.157
23 20 19 3 4 Malaysia 8.79 21.32 5.59 2.44 15.01 14.31 0.146 0.786
25 21 20 4 5 Mexico -0.64 34.49 -3.09 -0.31 11.87 30.39 -0.069 1.126
20 22 21 -2 -1 Israel -0.11 5.99 3.21 -2.37 1.85 0.69 0.020 -0.003
21 23 22 -2 -1 Australia -0.70 6.72 -1.55 -1.19 11.39 3.95 -0.065 -0.046
26 24 23 2 3 Thailand 10.83 20.32 9.99 4.40 14.50 6.82 0.280 0.480
19 25 24 -6 -5 Norway 0.13 -0.20 -7.61 -1.68 0.29 -7.38 -0.021 -0.225
26 China 14.73 0.14 4.61 2.372
22 27 25 -5 -3 Portugal -0.59 7.36 -1.01 -1.77 7.21 0.70 -0.041 -0.069
28 China, Hong Kong SAR -11.65 5.83 -5.60 -0.128
24 29 26 -5 -2 Brazil 0.97 6.92 1.63 -0.41 0.38 1.51 0.048 -0.055
30 Czech Republic -2.40 -5.96 -1.51 -0.055
31 Slovenia -4.34 0.30 -3.91 -0.025
27 32 27 -5 0 Turkey 2.62 11.32 1.49 1.19 2.99 9.43 0.101 0.070
33 Argentina 3.15 2.05 -1.79 0.105
28 34 28 -6 0 New Zealand 1.69 9.81 0.00 0.08 7.41 7.22 0.009 0.011
35 Slovakia -7.59 -5.49 -0.065
36 Poland 16.08 -6.49 6.93 0.191
37 South Africa -2.35 1.15 -0.64 -0.041
38 Hungary 0.34 -20.13 2.02 -0.012
33 39 29 -6 4 Indonesia 8.90 17.42 6.76 2.93 10.13 17.23 0.274 0.256
29 40 30 -11 -1 Greece -1.77 4.34 -0.85 -1.14 5.42 -3.51 -0.035 -0.049
41 Saudi Arabia 1.61 0.00 0.43 0.025
35 42 31 -7 4 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
1.05 28.16 8.71 -0.07 -17.07 34.74 0.021 0.139
34 43 32 -9 2 Chile 5.22 19.47 1.19 -1.50 -0.96 13.47 0.053 0.074
31 44 33 -13 -2 Malta 1.84 10.97 8.60 -2.62 12.93 2.12 0.000 0.004
45 Croatia -14.27 3.89 -8.53 -0.082
46 Philippines -0.27 4.47 -0.18 0.000
37 47 34 -10 3 Tunisia 3.80 10.24 7.29 1.51 -3.46 10.54 0.009 0.012
38 48 35 -10 3 India 4.73 10.04 6.21 1.26 1.31 0.77 0.226 0.068
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49 Colombia -4.23 0.61 -6.29 -0.081
32 50 36 -18 -4 Romania -4.96 6.21 3.57 -2.10 -11.19 -2.00 -0.043 -0.040
39 51 37 -12 2 Iceland -0.91 8.91 -0.81 -0.13 4.80 11.58 -0.002 0.000
30 52 38 -22 -8 China, Macao SAR -13.63 0.81 1.06 -10.33 2.14 -1.50 -0.010 -0.020
53 Lithuania -6.34 2.81 -0.017
36 54 39 -18 -3 Mauritius 3.64 3.50 -0.78 0.05 0.52 0.30 0.002 -0.010
55 Qatar -7.04 2.02 -3.06 -0.006
56 Estonia -2.76 1.77 -0.005
57 Uruguay -2.16 -4.16 -4.45 -0.011
58 Costa Rica 3.08 2.65 0.09 0.008
59 Morocco 0.78 2.41 1.20 0.002
42 60 40 -18 2 Kuwait 8.78 12.22 3.90 -2.31 3.58 -1.66 0.005 -0.002
41 61 41 -20 0 Pakistan 1.95 6.99 0.20 -0.09 0.70 6.23 0.020 -0.002
62 Trinidad and Tobago 0.87 17.55 0.07 0.000
63 Latvia -18.63 -12.25 -9.05 -0.036
64 Peru 3.44 -1.43 -0.09 0.022
65 Egypt 2.43 1.75 0.74 0.027
66 Kazakhstan -5.62 2.30 -0.028
40 67 42 -27 -2 Cyprus -0.87 -4.21 0.91 -2.36 10.32 -4.48 -0.001 -0.008
68 The f. Yugosl. Rep of 
Macedonia
-12.83 1.08 -9.37 -0.013
69 Jamaica -2.54 -26.92 -3.30 -0.004
43 70 43 -27 0 Jordan 0.58 7.76 1.43 -0.43 -8.05 12.56 0.003 0.004
71 El Salvador 3.59 -14.62 -0.56 0.008
44 72 44 -28 0 Sri Lanka 7.68 16.00 1.84 2.05 -0.06 17.37 0.010 0.029
73 Guatemala 0.59 0.00 -0.94 0.002
74 Oman 6.46 13.90 0.84 11.69 9.20 0.005 0.008
75 Algeria -4.85 0.23 -1.36 -0.022
46 76 45 -30 1 Bangladesh 5.82 14.99 -9.18 2.37 3.51 2.26 0.028 0.022
77 Barbados -1.18 17.52 -0.06 0.000
78 Côte d’Ivoire -0.08 -77.67 1.48 0.002
47 79 46 -32 1 Ecuador -1.65 17.66 -4.65 -1.63 13.22 6.03 -0.004 0.007
52 80 47 -28 5 Fiji 2.93 1.71 -1.34 0.83 -3.82 3.28 0.000 -0.002
81 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
1.84 0.37 0.07 0.002
82 Panama 3.87 -3.14 0.30 0.004
49 83 48 -34 1 Paraguay 0.05 14.06 0.00 -0.97 0.49 19.46 0.001 0.002
48 84 49 -36 -1 Kenya -0.62 6.95 -1.11 0.51 -11.01 -4.44 0.001 0.000
85 Suriname -7.34 1.85 -3.26 -0.001
86 Republic of Moldova -15.88 0.75 -0.008
45 87 50 -42 -5 Cameroon -4.97 -1.20 -0.93 -0.35 -12.52 9.02 -0.007 -0.005
88 Belize -0.51 13.21 -1.73 0.000
89 Honduras 0.84 -1.59 -0.04 0.002
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90 Kyrgyzstan -23.45 -5.38 -11.38 -0.009
91 Gabon -3.08 -11.85 -0.54 0.000
92 Nepal 10.75 -0.47 2.61 0.003
93 Saint Lucia -0.41 -0.73 0.000
94 Ghana 0.84 5.94 -0.27 0.001
95 Zambia -3.81 5.31 0.08 -0.001
96 Sudan 1.56 0.00 -0.30 0.001
97 Congo -4.74 0.00 -0.58 -0.001
51 98 51 -47 0 Madagascar -3.17 -1.53 0.00 0.03 -4.08 -3.11 -0.001 -0.001
99 Central African Republic -1.71 0.85 0.02 0.000
52 100 52 48 0 Malawi -0.69 1.90 3.71 -1.71 -4.19 1.51 0.000 -0.001
50 101 53 51 3 Haiti -12.62 -32.81 -8.63 -6.08 -12.43 -22.66 -0.007 -0.006
102 Mozambique -4.68 -0.91 -1.81 -0.001
103 Uganda 8.86 3.77 1.16 0.002
104 Burundi -6.24 -0.13 -0.74 0.000
105 Ethiopia -7.27 2.62 -1.60 -0.003
105 Gambia -2.84 8.04 -0.36 0.000
Period	1995-2000
The second half of the 1990s (see Table 35) was characterized by the strong emergence of Ireland with 
double digit AGRs in MVApc and MXpc, and the sustainment of small transition economies such as 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. While Poland had already 
experienced a strong catching up phase in the previous five years, the other transition economies inverted 
the negative trends of the first half of the 1990s and increasingly benefitted from their economic integra-
tion within the European Union. Among the high income European economies, the performance of 
Finland and Sweden was by far the best, only behind Ireland.
Among the top 10 performers, the United States took the lead, registering an AGR of MVApc over the 
year that was three times higher than Japan’s, also capturing 1 percent shares in WMVA and WMT. On 
the contrary, within only five years, Japan registered a contraction of its share in WMVA of 2.2 percent 
and of 1.7 percent in WMT. Although less acute, initial signs of a manufacturing contraction were evident 
in the very modest performance of the United Kingdom and Italy, while France, Belgium, Austria and 
Netherlands showed a robust AGR of their MVApc of around 3 percent. Germany registered a world 
record contraction of exports equal to 2 percent shares of WMT. The Republic of Korea maintained its 
record performance with an AGR of MVApc equal to that registered in the previous five years.
Among the large emerging economies, China had the most remarkable AGR of MVApc equal to 8.7 
percent, coupled with an AGR of MXpc of 10.5 percent. These performances resulted in an increase in 
China’s share in WMVA of 1 percent and capturing 1 percent of WMT in five years. Also, Mexico coupled 
its manufactured exports expansion phase, which started in the first half of the 1990s, with an AGR of 
MVApc of 6 percent. In Latin America, both Brazil and Argentina registered contractions in almost all 
dimensions, while Chile also slowed down. India and Indonesia registered a relatively slower AGR of 
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MVApc and MXpc. In the South East Asia region, Philippines had a spectacular AGR of MXpc of almost 
30 percent. However, this performance was not matched by the AGR of MVApc, which was only 1 percent 
(contrary to Viet Nam where the AGR of MVApc was almost 10 percent). This reveals Philippines’ unique 
form of integration in world global value chains. On the African continent, Egypt, Cameroon, Mozam-
bique, Uganda and Sudan are the economies registering a robust AGR of MVApc. For many of them, 
the contraction in MXsh revealed the impact of oil exports on MVApc figures.
 
Table 35: Catching up, forging ahead and falling behind, 1995 – 2000
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1 1 1 0 0 Japan 0.94 1.02 2.30 0.25 1.13 -1.51 -2.292 -1.719
3 2 2 1 1 United States of America 3.42 5.16 0.78 0.12 3.04 3.37 1.078 0.903
2 3 3 -1 -1 Germany 2.04 0.83 5.10 0.19 3.50 0.06 -0.499 -1.984
4 4 4 0 0 United Kingdom 0.99 2.20 0.23 -1.69 2.43 -5.38 -0.479 -0.539
6 5 5 1 1 France 2.92 1.18 -8.03 0.38 4.21 3.16 -0.063 -0.914
9 6 6 3 3 Canada 5.20 6.04 3.07 1.66 4.22 -2.42 0.254 0.433
5 7 7 -2 -2 Italy 1.03 0.67 -0.41 -0.69 1.77 -0.01 -0.460 -0.984
15 8 8 7 7 Ireland 10.34 12.30 10.64 2.35 4.01 6.87 0.153 0.476
8 9 9 -1 -1 Belgium 2.89 2.36 3.50 0.21 0.99 2.85 -0.018 -0.365
12 10 10 2 2 China, Taiwan Province 4.87 5.83 1.52 0.58 8.70 2.22 0.132 0.267
10 11 11 -1 -1 Singapore 3.70 -0.16 6.75 0.49 1.79 1.05 0.056 -0.153
13 12 12 1 1 Republic of Korea 7.10 6.10 5.38 3.89 1.64 1.38 0.426 0.337
14 13 13 1 1 Sweden 7.55 2.86 4.13 3.43 5.99 2.70 0.142 -0.147
7 14 14 -7 -7 Switzerland 0.64 -1.24 0.70 -0.94 3.18 -2.80 -0.107 -0.487
11 15 15 -4 -4 Netherlands 2.70 1.40 -0.65 -0.50 7.18 -6.30 -0.016 -0.444
18 16 16 2 2 Finland 8.42 2.33 9.22 3.85 9.60 0.99 0.103 -0.096
16 17 17 -1 -1 Austria 3.54 1.51 4.78 0.64 4.55 -1.50 0.002 -0.178
17 18 18 -1 -1 Spain 4.43 4.51 -0.71 0.61 0.93 0.58 0.096 0.021
21 19 19 2 2 Mexico 6.06 15.31 3.55 1.94 3.04 4.84 0.332 1.278
20 20 20 0 0 Malaysia 5.67 3.55 1.73 4.67 8.17 0.95 0.098 0.115
19 21 21 -2 -2 Denmark 1.27 0.53 3.82 -0.82 2.91 2.96 -0.039 -0.154
22 22 22 0 0 Israel 3.25 5.71 12.62 0.59 1.04 -8.58 0.033 0.084
26 23 23 3 3 China 8.74 10.56 4.90 1.60 10.12 2.84 1.652 1.276
24 24 24 0 0 Thailand 1.64 3.84 6.90 3.56 9.88 3.49 -0.033 0.013
23 25 25 -2 -2 Australia 0.79 3.39 0.00 -1.44 4.89 -0.49 -0.074 -0.004
30 26 26 4 4 Czech Republic 5.55 7.13 7.03 4.16 11.99 3.94 0.019 0.055
27 27 27 0 0 Portugal 3.90 0.15 6.61 0.07 9.09 -1.28 0.010 -0.109
25 28 28 -3 -3 Norway 0.78 0.29 2.52 -1.11 -2.54 -9.84 -0.032 -0.067
38 29 29 9 9 Hungary 8.99 20.30 26.09 3.88 27.76 8.59 0.035 0.261
30 Luxembourg 3.52 3.13 -0.59 0.002
29 31 30 -2 -1 Brazil -1.24 2.10 -16.17 -1.36 10.00 0.68 -0.303 -0.047
31 32 31 -1 0 Slovenia 5.34 0.86 3.00 1.24 5.48 0.36 0.007 -0.033
36 33 32 3 4 Poland 8.20 8.33 -0.61 1.95 11.11 7.73 0.093 0.085
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32 34 33 -2 -1 Turkey 2.44 3.67 -0.07 0.10 8.65 1.95 0.022 0.016
35 35 34 0 1 Slovakia 4.17 7.63 1.92 0.42 12.88 2.06 0.003 0.030
28 36 35 -8 -7 China, Hong Kong SAR -5.68 -6.15 6.11 -1.38 -7.37 -0.55 -0.047 -0.280
33 37 36 -4 -3 Argentina -0.21 2.38 1.34 -1.38 5.71 -2.82 -0.115 -0.016
46 38 37 8 9 Philippines 0.99 29.71 8.30 -0.50 34.16 43.93 -0.009 0.522
39 Russian Federation 3.07 1.73 1.13 -0.036
39 40 38 -1 1 Indonesia 1.33 6.38 6.97 2.67 12.04 4.40 -0.035 0.122
34 41 39 -7 -5 New Zealand 0.02 -0.40 0.00 -1.36 1.83 3.25 -0.019 -0.030
37 42 40 -5 -3 South Africa 0.64 0.94 -5.48 -0.27 7.83 13.07 -0.024 -0.038
41 43 41 -2 0 Saudi Arabia 3.20 1.84 0.00 1.44 -6.59 -5.12 0.033 -0.003
42 44 42 -2 0 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
3.14 2.52 11.07 3.62 -3.15 -10.89 0.027 -0.002
40 45 43 -5 -3 Greece 1.64 -0.42 0.31 -0.59 9.57 1.34 -0.015 -0.042
44 46 44 -2 0 Malta 4.78 4.11 10.55 0.57 4.46 1.08 0.001 0.000
43 47 45 -4 -2 Chile 0.59 2.72 0.00 -1.97 3.93 3.11 -0.020 -0.005
58 48 46 10 12 Costa Rica 5.24 29.71 0.93 2.96 38.34 37.31 0.011 0.058
45 49 47 -4 -2 Croatia 4.38 -0.37 0.00 0.20 4.86 -0.92 0.000 -0.028
60 50 48 10 12 Kuwait -5.49 53.54 -1.82 -0.89 -46.12 35.27 -0.010 0.143
56 51 49 5 7 Estonia 7.82 17.11 -1.82 0.54 15.20 0.71 0.002 0.028
48 52 50 -4 -2 India 2.77 5.24 -5.19 -0.81 -0.72 4.56 0.054 0.080
50 53 51 -3 -1 Romania 1.73 6.38 -6.00 1.52 -0.66 1.33 -0.010 0.010
53 54 52 -1 1 Lithuania 7.26 8.72 -3.63 1.59 -2.05 3.54 0.004 0.010
47 55 53 -8 -6 Tunisia 4.01 -0.53 2.95 -0.25 4.66 -2.53 0.005 -0.022
49 56 54 -7 -5 Colombia -3.01 3.87 -3.22 -1.95 7.43 0.87 -0.070 0.005
52 57 55 -5 -3 China, Macao SAR 2.22 0.58 2.49 1.51 -3.09 2.60 0.000 -0.006
51 58 56 -7 -5 Iceland 3.14 -1.27 5.82 -0.40 3.98 -2.57 0.000 -0.004
59 Ukraine 2.96 0.36 3.01 -0.007
62 60 57 2 5 Trinidad and Tobago 8.23 15.44 -13.01 1.14 0.71 13.42 0.002 0.027
55 61 58 -6 -3 Qatar 3.73 1.51 -8.54 -1.22 3.01 -14.68 0.003 0.000
59 62 59 -3 0 Morocco 1.28 10.57 -3.00 -0.91 3.95 8.27 -0.005 0.033
54 63 60 -9 -6 Mauritius 4.56 -1.76 -5.28 -0.10 -2.73 -0.36 0.001 -0.009
65 64 61 1 4 Egypt 6.26 10.04 10.54 2.40 5.25 17.10 0.061 0.021
65 Bulgaria -5.58 5.57 -6.26 -0.023
57 66 62 -9 -5 Uruguay -0.82 2.66 -2.93 -2.06 3.08 3.97 -0.010 -0.002
63 67 63 -4 0 Latvia 5.92 8.36 -9.19 -0.42 -10.36 -0.30 0.001 0.004
61 68 64 -7 -3 Pakistan 0.72 -0.11 4.80 -0.03 0.67 0.00 -0.004 -0.020
64 69 65 -5 -1 Peru 0.14 3.16 -0.69 -0.63 1.55 -0.17 -0.014 0.000
70 Swaziland 0.44 0.00 -3.75 -0.001
74 71 66 3 8 Oman 3.90 9.84 0.43 0.64 -4.27 -0.63 0.002 0.011
72 Viet Nam 9.57 3.31 0.030
72 73 67 -1 5 Sri Lanka 6.36 10.25 -0.60 1.39 1.62 3.28 0.006 0.009
71 74 68 -3 3 El Salvador 2.84 10.17 12.61 1.87 -6.38 -19.96 0.003 0.005
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68 75 69 -7 -1 The f. Yugosl. Rep of 
Macedonia
1.78 4.45 -9.13 -0.61 -20.84 11.56 -0.001 0.000
76 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 7.43 6.10 2.60 0.049
69 77 70 -8 -1 Jamaica -3.12 -2.05 16.83 -1.00 2.00 1.63 -0.005 -0.008
75 78 71 -3 4 Algeria -1.95 17.15 0.82 -1.36 -2.26 0.30 -0.015 0.058
66 79 72 -13 -6 Kazakhstan 5.12 -1.37 -6.12 1.03 -18.43 -22.16 0.000 -0.019
80 Botswana -0.15 10.99 -1.33 0.000
73 81 73 -8 0 Guatemala 0.18 4.42 0.00 -0.94 1.99 -0.03 -0.002 0.003
67 82 74 -15 -7 Cyprus -1.53 -5.11 0.95 -1.93 7.59 3.67 -0.003 -0.003
83 Lebanon -0.11 0.01 -0.004
76 84 75 -8 1 Bangladesh 3.51 8.81 5.35 0.25 -2.60 3.92 0.011 0.026
78 85 76 -7 2 Côte d’Ivoire 3.41 9.89 0.47 2.87 1.65 16.42 0.004 0.011
70 86 77 -16 -7 Jordan 2.78 -7.49 2.13 1.14 -9.02 8.40 0.001 -0.010
79 87 78 -8 1 Ecuador -0.90 7.00 -2.29 -0.21 -3.57 6.24 -0.006 0.004
77 88 79 -11 -2 Barbados 0.18 2.27 1.49 -0.77 -5.06 1.30 0.000 0.000
81 89 80 -8 1 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
0.66 4.71 0.69 -0.41 18.22 6.66 -0.001 0.002
89 90 81 -1 8 Honduras 2.26 27.11 -0.03 1.36 -3.38 23.92 0.001 0.005
80 91 82 -11 -2 Fiji 3.01 -2.84 2.87 1.01 -0.14 -9.90 0.000 -0.005
82 92 83 -10 -1 Panama -2.40 6.88 -0.54 -2.67 -1.97 5.04 -0.004 0.001
93 Cambodia 18.11 -0.06 7.17 0.005
83 94 84 -11 -1 Paraguay -2.19 -4.22 0.00 0.12 -2.30 -1.73 -0.004 -0.002
88 95 85 -7 3 Belize 3.08 0.77 0.00 -0.07 0.24 -6.06 0.000 0.000
96 Armenia 3.33 -10.67 -3.09 0.000
97 Syrian Arab Republic -36.95 0.00 -59.55 -0.214
98 Albania 8.17 0.03 1.01 0.001
99 Senegal 0.20 1.94 -0.78 0.000
91 100 86 -9 5 Gabon 2.77 3.84 0.00 0.78 -1.25 3.88 0.000 -0.001
87 101 87 -14 0 Cameroon 4.63 -11.50 -3.20 2.09 -1.10 -13.77 0.005 -0.006
84 102 88 -18 -4 Kenya -2.66 -9.60 -8.40 -1.19 -1.77 -9.27 -0.005 -0.010
103 Georgia 14.30 2.35 0.002
86 104 89 -18 -3 Republic of Moldova -3.87 -9.50 6.36 -2.04 -2.25 -4.67 -0.002 -0.008
105 Azerbaijan -16.75 -5.06 -12.51 -0.009
98 106 90 -8 7 Madagascar 1.12 32.53 -3.90 0.18 -1.78 36.61 0.000 0.007
92 107 91 -15 1 Nepal 3.87 4.45 2.58 0.64 6.31 -20.34 0.001 -0.001
90 108 92 -18 -2 Kyrgyzstan 10.42 -12.34 -8.46 4.65 12.55 -33.50 0.001 -0.004
95 109 93 -14 2 Zambia 1.28 17.02 0.00 0.46 -8.97 22.89 0.000 0.003
94 110 94 -16 0 Ghana 2.21 9.65 0.00 0.15 -0.47 8.59 0.000 0.001
111 Mongolia -7.90 -0.20 -4.50 -0.001
97 112 95 -15 1 Congo -5.09 0.00 7.20 -0.96 0.00 0.00 -0.001 0.000
101 113 96 -12 4 Haiti -1.31 16.86 0.25 -1.01 1.53 19.44 -0.001 0.001
114 United Republic of Tanzania 3.14 0.00 0.57 0.001
115 Niger 0.38 -7.12 0.39 7.81 -24.23 0.000 -0.001
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93 116 97 -23 -4 Saint Lucia -2.44 -15.14 -0.65 -1.07 5.29 3.66 0.000 -0.001
117 Cape Verde 3.97 0.01 0.000
102 118 98 -16 3 Mozambique 15.70 3.34 0.52 4.20 1.33 -9.19 0.004 0.000
85 119 99 -34 -14 Suriname 0.93 -49.90 0.00 0.16 32.24 -63.25 0.000 -0.008
100 120 100 -20 -1 Malawi -2.66 0.07 -13.28 -2.37 4.23 4.38 -0.001 0.000
99 121 101 -22 -3 Central African Republic -2.96 -0.78 0.00 -1.07 -15.95 30.05 0.000 0.000
122 Iraq 2.99 2.01 -0.18 0.000
123 Nigeria -2.49 -0.75 -0.55 -0.005
103 124 102 -21 0 Uganda 9.99 -7.67 -1.04 2.02 -17.08 1.40 0.003 0.000
125 Eritrea 1.85 -11.03 1.77 0.000
126 Rwanda -0.87 -1.20 0.000
105 127 103 -22 1 Ethiopia 0.99 -2.97 5.62 -0.17 0.38 -1.94 0.000 0.000
104 127 103 -23 0 Burundi -0.43 -23.39 0.00 0.85 -6.61 0.95 0.000 0.000
105 127 103 -22 1 Gambia -2.24 -16.74 0.00 -0.81 7.00 -21.15 0.000 0.000
96 Sudan 7.99 44.51 1.47 7.57 48.12 0.005 0.020
Period	2000-2005
The first half of the 2000s, although confirming some of the main patterns observed in the mid-1990s, 
also saw the emergence of new players from around the world (see Table 36). First, the unified Germany 
entered the ranking, immediately jumping to third position in 2000 and second position in 2005. This 
result was mainly driven by the country’s exceptional export performance, as registered by the double digit 
AGR of MXpc and the gain of 1.5 percent shares in WMT. By contrast, the other four major European 
industrial economies indicated the beginning of a manufacturing contraction in the mid-half of the 2000s. 
The AGR of MVApc of Italy and of the United Kingdom turned negative after semi-stagnation in the 
late 1990s, while France also stagnated, registering an AGR of MVApc equal to 0.6 percent. 
In the top quintile of the ranking, other relatively smaller European economies registered a double digit 
AGR of MXpc. The two most dynamic transition economies, Czech Republic and Hungary followed by 
Finland, registered the highest AGR of MVApc in Europe. All other transition economies in the upper 
middle quintile of the ranking continued their fast catching up process and export performance. 
The Republic of Korea entered the top 10 of the CIP world ranking for the first time, confirming the 
outstanding performances registered since 1990, and took fourth position in the world ranking. This result 
was driven by an exceptional AGR of MVApc, higher than 6 percent for the third quinquennial period, 
which resulted in an increase of 0.4 percent share in WMVA (while the capacity of capturing WMT share 
decresead compared to the previous decade). The other two successful East Asian economies, Singapore 
and China, Taiwan Province, also consolidated their positions among the top 10 most industrially com-
petitive countries. 
Despite the brilliant performances of Germany and the Republic of Korea, the most successful country 
by far in the first half of the 2000s was China. During this quinquennial period, China saw its MVApc 
grow at nearly 10 percent (AGR), while the annual growth rate of MXpc equal to 25 percent was the 
10.07.13   10:44
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world best performance (with the exclusion of a few African oil exporting economies). The resulting gains 
in both WMVA and WMT, by far the highest in the world and the best performance by China since 
1995, clearly show that the country entered a cumulative self-reinforcing process of industrialization. If 
we compare China’s structural trajectory with that of the United States, the change in their performances 
in WMT lie at two extremes. The United States’ modest annual increases in MVApc and MXpc did not 
allow the country to maintain its shares in WMT. At the end of the quinquennial period, the cumulate 
change in WMT was almost equal to 4 percent. Similarly, Japan registered a contraction in WMVA and 
WMT shares.
The shares lost were not, of course, all taken by China, given the relatively different export baskets and 
technological complexity of the United States and Japanese economies. However, it is remarkable how 
China managed to increase its share of medium- and high-tech products in total manufactured exports to 
12 percent within only five years. This reveals a fast process of technological deepening and diversification 
of the overall export basket.
Table 36: Catching up, forging ahead and falling behind, 2000-2005
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1 1 1 0 0 Japan 1.62 4.03 3.04 0.50 -3.04 -1.13 -1.097 -2.187
3 2 2 1 1 Germany 1.10 13.01 2.55 0.61 -0.45 3.60 -0.595 1.564
2 3 3 -1 -1 United States of America 1.72 1.14 -1.92 0.28 -2.65 -1.13 -0.369 -3.884
12 4 4 8 8 Republic of Korea 6.02 10.26 1.64 2.53 4.94 0.99 0.417 0.148
5 5 5 0 0 France 0.64 7.47 -0.88 -0.25 -0.86 0.42 -0.279 -0.411
9 6 6 3 3 Belgium 0.20 12.32 -0.28 -0.81 2.63 0.75 -0.079 0.468
4 7 7 -3 -3 United Kingdom -0.82 6.17 -0.90 -2.03 -2.35 1.32 -0.610 -0.651
7 8 8 -1 -1 Italy -1.06 8.47 -0.78 -1.46 0.64 -1.72 -0.608 -0.213
11 9 9 2 2 Singapore 2.69 7.91 2.52 0.30 -7.59 -0.29 0.024 -0.022
10 10 10 0 0 China, Taiwan Province 5.94 4.41 0.00 3.50 -1.11 -0.73 0.240 -0.618
8 11 11 -3 -3 Ireland 1.19 5.91 -5.08 -3.09 -0.47 0.58 -0.003 -0.133
13 12 12 1 1 Sweden 4.49 7.58 3.77 2.15 -3.10 -1.81 0.076 -0.134
14 13 13 1 1 Switzerland 1.43 10.10 0.00 0.51 -0.28 1.51 -0.043 0.052
15 14 14 1 1 Netherlands 0.32 11.04 4.27 -0.33 -0.97 4.02 -0.096 0.260
6 15 15 -9 -9 Canada -1.27 1.73 -6.17 -2.32 -4.57 -4.39 -0.339 -1.198
17 16 16 1 1 Austria 1.20 13.29 2.87 0.05 1.15 2.70 -0.041 0.215
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Among the large emerging economies, India registered the highest and most robust AGR of MVApc equal 
to 5.2 percent and MXpc of 17.8  percent during this quinquennial period. These were the highest AGRs for 
India since 1990. In the same regional area, the important manufacturing expansion registered in Pakistan 
and Iran (Islamic Republic of ) is also noteworthy, while Viet Nam emerged as the new booming manufac-
turing country with double digit AGRs of MVApc and MXpc. After five years of relative lower expansion, 
Indonesia picked up its pace again. For the first time, the Russian Federation showed a robust AGR of 
MVApc coupled with an AGR of MXpc equal to 18 percent. However, the decrease in MXsh in total exports 
also revealed the relative higher role played by oil and gas exports in total exports. On the contrary, Brazil and 
South Africa registered relatively modest performances.
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16 17 17 -1 -1 Finland 3.68 7.08 1.57 1.54 2.15 -0.52 0.022 -0.096
23 18 18 5 5 China 9.65 25.07 -1.27 0.93 12.18 3.18 2.732 4.609
18 19 19 -1 -1 Spain -0.42 9.50 -3.10 -1.69 -0.18 -0.15 -0.155 0.125
21 20 20 1 1 Denmark -1.01 10.94 2.46 -1.30 3.02 1.23 -0.065 0.051
20 21 21 -1 -1 Malaysia 2.61 4.54 -2.54 -0.16 -4.14 -4.05 0.040 -0.252
19 22 22 -3 -3 Mexico -0.58 3.04 -2.89 -1.35 -0.99 -4.95 -0.235 -0.713
26 23 23 3 3 Czech Republic 5.70 21.60 3.23 2.31 6.61 -1.43 0.031 0.368
24 24 24 0 0 Thailand 5.67 9.46 4.17 2.25 2.28 1.72 0.126 0.025
22 25 25 -3 -3 Israel -1.93 4.63 -3.22 -1.61 -5.49 1.04 -0.048 -0.074
29 26 26 3 3 Hungary 4.79 17.37 4.99 0.24 2.51 -0.69 0.012 0.198
25 27 27 -2 -2 Australia 0.33 9.89 -4.37 -0.92 -6.06 1.09 -0.061 0.036
33 28 28 5 5 Poland 5.48 23.26 0.81 1.89 6.62 -1.81 0.057 0.429
35 29 29 6 6 Slovakia 10.83 21.49 2.52 6.96 4.55 -1.20 0.048 0.151
28 30 30 -2 -2 Norway 1.74 9.73 -0.90 0.09 -1.85 -1.34 -0.008 0.009
34 31 31 3 3 Turkey 3.10 20.59 1.51 -0.03 8.79 1.87 0.068 0.355
32 32 32 0 0 Slovenia 4.57 14.90 5.39 1.17 5.64 -1.39 0.007 0.044
27 33 33 -6 -6 Portugal -0.74 6.63 -0.42 -0.73 0.51 -8.95 -0.046 -0.054
31 34 34 -3 -3 Brazil 1.47 13.60 -1.75 0.09 -0.10 -4.31 -0.012 0.234
30 35 35 -5 -5 Luxembourg 0.09 9.00 -1.94 -1.21 -3.41 -0.31 -0.003 0.001
39 36 36 3 3 Russian Federation 6.64 18.33 -8.47 0.00 -8.61 -1.28 0.140 0.347
37 37 37 0 0 Argentina 1.85 9.21 -2.42 0.71 -3.73 3.69 -0.008 0.006
43 38 38 5 5 Saudi Arabia 3.09 18.95 0.00 0.94 3.80 3.22 0.043 0.208
42 39 39 3 3 South Africa 1.96 10.87 -0.39 -0.62 7.59 -0.71 0.000 0.040
38 40 40 -2 -2 Philippines 1.80 -0.61 1.55 -0.76 0.04 -0.62 0.015 -0.247
40 41 41 -1 -1 Indonesia 3.61 3.72 -1.61 0.33 -1.22 -4.86 0.077 -0.176
41 42 42 -1 -1 New Zealand 0.91 8.28 -9.27 -1.19 -0.09 -1.41 -0.006 -0.001
47 43 43 4 4 Chile 2.57 19.59 -14.46 -0.41 -0.86 5.91 0.007 0.112
44 44 44 0 0 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
-0.81 10.57 0.00 -1.35 2.66 0.40 -0.036 0.031
45 45 45 0 0 Greece 2.08 10.46 -5.34 -0.79 8.45 2.61 -0.008 0.007
54 46 46 8 8 Lithuania 10.88 26.66 1.26 2.17 3.51 0.53 0.014 0.070
50 47 47 3 3 Kuwait 5.32 4.10 12.32 0.93 -0.79 -0.91 0.016 0.001
49 48 48 1 1 Croatia 3.34 13.84 0.00 -0.73 2.12 -2.25 0.002 0.018
51 49 49 2 2 Estonia 11.07 16.05 2.36 1.92 0.43 -3.69 0.007 0.021
53 50 50 3 3 Romania 6.63 22.81 3.21 0.26 7.30 1.88 0.013 0.139
36 51 51 -15 -15 China, Hong Kong SAR -6.24 -6.74 -9.93 -1.22 -1.49 -11.52 -0.033 -0.243
52 52 52 0 0 India 5.20 17.81 -1.785 -0.034 3.918 3.243 0.230 0.394
48 53 53 -5 -5 Costa Rica 1.28 4.03 -2.048 -0.905 -6.345 2.164 0.001 -0.013
59 54 54 5 5 Ukraine 12.62 20.25 0.282 3.271 -0.979 2.370 0.044 0.130
46 55 55 -9 -9 Malta -5.52 -0.08 -9.512 -5.199 -6.172 -5.607 -0.004 -0.016
60 56 56 4 4 Trinidad and Tobago 9.09 12.60 9.167 0.498 4.854 -13.885 0.004 0.010
55 57 57 -2 -2 Tunisia 1.92 11.10 -9.748 -1.167 6.583 -0.261 0.000 0.012
56 58 58 -2 -2 Colombia 2.72 10.72 -0.984 0.466 0.461 4.765 0.015 0.014
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65 59 59 6 6 Bulgaria 5.96 20.57 -3.648 -0.149 1.657 0.980 0.004 0.041
58 60 60 -2 -2 Iceland 0.02 9.56 3.087 -1.699 16.744 0.792 -0.002 0.001
61 61 61 0 0 Qatar 4.86 5.33 0.550 0.538 27.737 -6.450 0.007 0.001
67 62 62 5 5 Latvia 8.22 22.67 2.967 -0.382 7.746 -4.849 0.004 0.024
62 63 63 -1 -1 Morocco 2.30 8.16 2.582 -1.089 4.454 3.064 0.002 -0.002
72 64 64 8 8 Viet Nam 10.05 19.20 0.000 3.862 -0.017 7.237 0.049 0.086
69 65 65 4 4 Peru 3.65 24.90 -2.003 0.512 -2.376 11.182 0.012 0.055
74 66 66 8 8 El Salvador 0.83 27.23 0.000 0.080 -10.470 61.509 -0.002 0.022
64 67 67 -3 -3 Egypt 1.48 9.87 -7.151 -0.167 -7.635 -16.886 0.004 0.007
76 68 68 8 8 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 9.31 20.00 -1.617 3.245 8.216 2.188 0.094 0.035
68 69 69 -1 -1 Pakistan 7.98 10.25 -4.061 3.548 -2.215 1.912 0.067 0.019
79 70 70 9 9 Kazakhstan 8.88 24.35 1.733 -0.817 2.042 -1.509 0.018 0.040
66 71 71 -5 -5 Uruguay 2.45 4.84 -1.949 1.515 -8.691 -7.858 -0.001 -0.005
86 72 72 14 14 Jordan 7.73 27.79 -0.252 3.110 -12.097 3.466 0.009 0.021
83 73 73 10 10 Lebanon 2.54 22.13 0.000 0.007 6.048 7.364 0.001 0.009
63 74 74 -11 -11 Mauritius -1.55 -2.28 -0.165 -3.435 -1.262 -10.718 -0.003 -0.013
81 75 75 6 6 Guatemala -0.07 20.89 0.000 -0.372 -9.942 22.639 -0.001 0.022
70 76 76 -6 -6 Swaziland 0.16 5.08 0.000 -1.398 0.679 0.712 -0.001 -0.003
57 77 77 -20 -20 China, Macao SAR -7.77 -5.09 -4.558 -4.939 -2.067 -1.934 -0.003 -0.021
75 78 78 -3 -3 The f. Yugosl. Rep of 
Macedonia
-0.25 9.87 -0.464 -1.185 4.125 4.243 -0.002 0.000
79 Serbia -0.32 -5.675 -0.004
73 80 79 -7 -6 Sri Lanka 2.13 2.27 1.052 -0.987 0.946 -2.700 -0.001 -0.024
84 81 80 3 4 Bangladesh 4.83 9.35 0.000 1.005 0.651 1.082 0.024 0.008
80 82 81 -2 -1 Botswana 2.36 8.58 0.000 -0.333 0.235 -0.067 0.000 0.000
71 83 82 -12 -11 Oman 8.85 -7.60 6.578 1.853 -26.508 -9.406 0.007 -0.021
85 84 83 1 2 Côte d’Ivoire -4.12 15.89 0.000 -2.526 26.191 6.721 -0.009 0.015
77 85 84 -8 -7 Jamaica -1.97 3.39 0.000 -1.398 -1.007 4.041 -0.003 -0.006
78 86 85 -8 -7 Algeria 0.79 4.07 0.000 -0.829 -0.465 -10.025 -0.002 -0.022
87 Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.93 0.000 0.701 0.002
82 88 86 -6 -4 Cyprus -0.65 2.40 -7.167 -1.114 14.116 -2.118 -0.002 -0.002
87 89 87 -2 0 Ecuador 3.63 10.82 2.632 -0.352 2.694 -3.079 0.003 0.003
96 90 88 6 8 Armenia 8.89 35.76 -2.052 -3.454 8.089 11.049 0.002 0.006
97 91 89 6 8 Syrian Arab Republic 13.68 14.41 0.000 4.887 10.056 9.748 0.019 0.006
93 92 90 1 3 Cambodia 11.84 14.35 0.000 3.565 -0.299 -1.367 0.007 0.008
90 93 91 -3 -1 Honduras 3.74 7.13 0.000 1.150 8.498 7.147 0.004 0.000
94 Sudan 0.79 23.84 -0.927 -7.619 14.918 0.000 0.025
91 95 92 -4 -1 Fiji 0.71 0.91 -1.244 -0.623 3.309 1.369 0.000 -0.002
89 96 93 -7 -4 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
1.03 -0.14 0.146 -0.025 -18.160 -24.082 0.000 -0.005
103 97 94 6 9 Georgia 11.42 23.19 -0.741 1.218 9.000 0.230 0.002 0.004
102 98 95 4 7 Kenya 0.42 24.39 0.142 -0.281 0.037 20.835 0.000 0.014
88 99 96 -11 -8 Barbados -6.33 -0.44 0.000 -1.390 -1.528 -9.706 -0.001 -0.001
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99 100 97 -1 2 Senegal 0.42 19.06 -17.933 -0.951 10.656 15.315 0.000 0.005
101 101 98 0 3 Cameroon 2.89 15.91 9.190 1.511 -1.000 11.107 0.004 0.003
94 102 99 -8 -5 Paraguay -1.07 6.69 9.483 -1.212 7.441 -6.550 -0.002 0.000
105 103 100 2 5 Azerbaijan 9.98 21.90 2.081 -0.654 7.808 4.043 0.002 0.010
100 104 101 -4 -1 Gabon 3.34 10.52 0.000 0.674 5.121 -1.367 0.000 0.001
104 105 102 -1 2 Republic of Moldova 9.85 15.24 -0.473 0.892 0.197 6.420 0.001 0.001
92 106 103 -14 -11 Panama -3.06 -8.09 -0.599 -2.277 -1.072 -16.173 -0.004 -0.003
95 107 104 -12 -9 Belize 0.19 -3.12 0.000 -1.191 -0.243 -7.581 0.000 -0.001
98 108 105 -10 -7 Albania 3.74 -10.38 9.373 -0.546 23.986 -19.447 0.000 -0.003
109 109 106 0 3 Zambia 3.05 9.20 0.000 0.097 1.644 -5.533 0.001 0.000
111 110 107 1 4 Mongolia 7.96 12.49 2.170 0.803 1.209 -11.013 0.000 0.001
110 111 108 -1 2 Ghana 2.22 15.15 -12.127 -0.212 1.612 6.748 0.001 0.004
123 112 109 11 14 Nigeria 6.14 55.58 0.000 0.481 14.098 2.260 0.009 0.009
113 Tajikistan 9.19 0.00 0.536 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
107 114 110 -7 -3 Nepal -1.50 0.84 3.688 -1.143 -2.948 14.882 -0.001 -0.001
108 115 111 -7 -3 Kyrgyzstan -1.53 11.07 -4.317 -3.462 -24.265 11.863 -0.001 0.000
119 116 112 3 7 Suriname 12.29 34.23 0.000 3.290 -3.309 2.867 0.001 0.000
106 117 113 -11 -7 Madagascar -0.36 -2.87 -3.528 0.120 2.004 -3.895 0.000 -0.003
118 118 114 0 4 Mozambique 11.93 24.84 0.000 3.334 5.801 -4.756 0.006 0.001
112 119 115 -7 -3 Congo 9.72 0.00 2.742 1.626 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
114 120 116 -6 -2 United Republic of Tanzania 5.34 14.49 -8.247 0.430 2.518 -0.940 0.004 0.001
121 Yemen 1.00 -1.878 -0.045 0.000
113 122 117 -9 -4 Haiti -1.37 0.00 0.000 0.385 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
116 123 118 -7 -2 Saint Lucia 1.94 5.49 0.000 0.245 -0.752 15.623 0.000 0.000
115 124 119 -9 -4 Niger -0.03 6.23 -25.757 -0.136 5.913 1.795 0.000 0.000
124 125 120 -1 4 Uganda 2.79 27.59 0.000 -0.194 3.055 8.988 0.001 0.001
117 126 121 -9 -4 Cape Verde 3.85 -1.96 0.000 0.565 -4.076 -33.308 0.000 0.000
121 127 122 -6 -1 Central African Republic -2.02 5.98 0.000 0.185 -1.510 3.011 0.000 0.000
120 128 123 -8 -3 Malawi -7.91 10.17 -3.294 -3.685 7.415 6.980 -0.001 0.000
126 129 124 -3 2 Rwanda 5.48 34.08 0.000 0.143 1.981 24.735 0.001 0.000
127 130 125 -3 2 Ethiopia 2.23 3.94 -5.476 -0.359 0.890 -3.353 0.001 0.000
127 131 126 -4 1 Burundi 0.54 22.03 0.000 0.674 28.091 1.274 0.000 0.000
127 132 127 -5 0 Gambia -8.40 -18.02 1.154 -3.139 1.832 -6.600 0.000 0.000
122 132 127 -10 -5 Iraq -14.42 -19.25 -5.731 0.179 -39.002 40.168 0.000 0.000
125 132 127 -7 -2 Eritrea 0.61 -6.90 0.000 -0.276 4.100 -0.318 -0.002 -0.002
Period	2005-2010
The financial crisis that started in the United States in the middle of this quinquennial period (late 2007) 
had a massive impact on world industrial production, both on total output and on output distribution 
between mature industrial economies and developing countries. AGR data and the cumulative changes in 
all the CIP index’s sub-indicators reflect the structural break in the data caused by the financial crisis (see 
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Table 37). For the top large industrial economies in Europe and North America, but also Japan, the 
financial crisis seems to have accelerated and reinforced some of the structural trends registered since 1990. 
Although to different degrees, all these economies registered negative AGRs in their MVApc, up to -4 
percent (AGR) in the cases of Ireland, Canada and Spain, while Italy, France and the United Kingdom 
lost production capacity at around 3 percent (AGR) within five years. Overall, the United Kingdom lost 
most positions in the world ranking, namely 7, within only five years. By contrast, the larger three top 
leaders, Japan, Germany and the United States, contained their contraction in MVApc and maintained 
their positions in the world ranking.
The three strong East Asian economies confirmed their performance over the quinquennial period, although 
the speed at which their capacity to produce and export competitively (measured by AGR) slightly declined 
for the Republic of Korea and Singapore, while it slightly increased in the case of China, Taiwan Province. 
While the Republic of Korea maintained its fourth position in the world ranking, Singapore and China, 
Taiwan Province gained 3 and 5 positions, respectively. Similarly, the new members of the European Union 
registered very positive results in all sub-indicators. The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, in particular, 
experienced a sustained increase in MVA as well as processes of technological deepening, as testified by 
the changes in MHVAsh.
For the first time, China entered the top 10 of the world industrial competitiveness ranking and gained 
11 positions. The AGR of MVApc was even higher than that registered in the first half of the decade and 
reached 11 percent. China’s capacity to export also increased substantially and resulted in a cumulative 
gain of WMT shares of 4.7 perccent. Taken as a whole, China gained almost 10 percent shares of WMT 
within only one decade. Among the other large economies, India also registered good performances in 
MVApc and MXpc, while Brazil and South Africa showed modest results. 
Among the emerging industrial economies in the top and upper middle quintile were Viet Nam, Argentina, 
Thailand and Indonesia. Viet Nam is the country that gained most positions in the world ranking over 
the last two decades, half of them in the last quinquennial period. The annual growth rate of MVApc 
increased by 8 percent, the second world top result only after China, while Viet Nam’s MXpc was among 
the highest in the first two quintiles. This resulted in a substantial gain of WMT shares, which is particu-
larly significant if we consider the relatively smaller size of the country in comparison to other top per-
formers in the ImWMT indicator, that is, China and India. In Latin America, in contrast to the other 
major economies, Argentina confirmed a robust increase in its production and export capacity. The annual 
growth rate of MVApc was almost 5 percent, while MXpc almost doubled.
Table 37: Catching up, forging ahead and falling behind, 2005 - 2010
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1 1 1 0 0 Japan -1.95 4.80 -0.24 -2.27 -2.59 -2.24 -2.684 -0.669
2 2 2 0 0 Germany -1.51 4.44 0.26 -2.69 -0.19 -4.38 -0.885 -1.272
3 3 3 0 0 United States of America -1.31 3.46 3.45 -1.01 -8.06 -9.35 -2.315 -0.953
4 4 4 0 0 Republic of Korea 4.42 9.85 -0.74 1.33 0.51 -0.79 0.473 0.602
10 5 5 5 5 China, Taiwan Province 4.99 6.05 17.80 1.74 2.10 -0.66 0.337 -0.043
9 6 6 3 3 Singapore 3.86 5.75 -3.31 -1.57 -3.76 -4.04 0.083 0.012
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18 7 7 11 11 China 11.28 15.34 -0.91 1.12 2.85 1.41 5.931 4.744
13 8 8 5 5 Switzerland 1.68 7.36 0.00 0.08 2.50 -2.52 0.021 0.070
6 9 9 -3 -3 Belgium -0.82 3.76 -1.09 -1.37 -1.19 -0.95 -0.060 -0.479
5 10 10 -5 -5 France -2.78 2.64 0.93 -1.95 -0.26 -0.81 -0.525 -0.809
8 11 11 -3 -3 Italy -3.36 3.30 3.18 -2.33 -0.11 -1.10 -0.626 -0.668
14 12 12 2 2 Netherlands -0.53 6.44 -2.37 -1.08 -4.87 -1.48 -0.072 -0.029
12 13 13 -1 -1 Sweden -0.44 3.45 -5.99 -1.43 -3.53 -0.33 -0.065 -0.197
7 14 14 -7 -7 United Kingdom -3.09 -0.20 0.99 -1.89 -4.15 -3.52 -0.630 -1.127
11 15 15 -4 -4 Ireland -4.19 -0.39 4.49 -3.80 -3.53 -0.40 -0.090 -0.301
16 16 16 0 0 Austria 1.03 3.78 0.15 -0.11 -0.07 -0.37 -0.003 -0.159
15 17 17 -2 -2 Canada -4.91 -1.74 0.27 -3.66 -2.55 -7.44 -0.466 -0.945
17 18 18 -1 -1 Finland 0.90 0.40 1.35 0.12 -8.45 -3.49 -0.007 -0.204
19 19 19 0 0 Spain -4.43 3.58 4.63 -3.13 -3.61 -2.58 -0.355 -0.236
23 20 20 3 3 Czech Republic 3.84 10.84 2.27 1.53 3.84 -1.07 0.032 0.185
21 21 21 0 0 Malaysia 0.17 4.75 -5.62 -3.60 -8.81 -1.87 0.010 -0.022
22 22 22 0 0 Mexico -0.70 5.28 -1.22 -1.10 3.55 -1.43 -0.084 -0.039
24 23 23 1 1 Thailand 3.31 10.59 4.20 0.77 -0.06 -3.12 0.109 0.282
20 24 24 -4 -4 Denmark -0.39 2.03 -10.22 -0.13 -3.83 -3.52 -0.026 -0.161
28 25 25 3 3 Poland 9.23 12.69 7.93 4.15 3.72 2.24 0.236 0.291
25 26 26 -1 -1 Israel 2.13 7.53 1.16 -0.22 17.04 12.11 0.035 0.057
29 27 27 2 2 Slovakia 3.27 15.13 7.22 -1.55 10.47 0.77 0.015 0.174
27 28 28 -1 -1 Australia 0.41 14.54 0.52 -0.76 -14.01 2.69 -0.003 0.294
26 29 29 -3 -3 Hungary 0.36 8.26 0.36 0.77 2.15 -3.27 -0.012 0.038
31 30 30 1 1 Turkey 2.06 7.15 0.77 0.19 1.74 -2.74 0.094 0.069
30 31 31 -1 -1 Norway -0.25 5.75 -4.40 -0.25 6.11 2.08 -0.014 -0.007
32 32 32 0 0 Slovenia -0.76 6.13 3.76 -2.78 3.03 -1.22 -0.009 -0.007
34 33 33 1 1 Brazil 0.93 7.79 1.87 -1.49 -11.86 -5.02 0.059 0.125
33 34 34 -1 -1 Portugal -2.36 5.52 -2.11 -1.74 -3.21 3.56 -0.043 -0.018
37 35 35 2 2 Argentina 4.67 8.98 0.00 -0.80 12.61 -2.73 0.182 0.046
36 36 36 0 0 Russian Federation 1.12 10.11 0.69 -2.55 -3.20 -1.81 -0.044 0.157
38 37 37 1 1 Saudi Arabia 2.58 3.86 -1.37 1.17 11.98 -0.49 0.064 -0.015
41 38 38 3 3 Indonesia 3.20 10.17 4.89 -1.68 -4.12 -4.26 0.132 0.167
47 39 39 8 8 Kuwait 7.96 9.97 -1.20 2.50 5.03 1.09 0.033 0.069
40 Belarus 9.01 9.75 0.91 3.65 -1.74 0.034 0.021
39 41 40 -2 -1 South Africa 0.38 7.91 -1.88 -1.71 -1.91 -0.76 -0.011 0.034
35 42 41 -7 -6 Luxembourg -4.48 0.15 -10.88 -2.28 -1.09 -1.78 -0.007 -0.034
52 43 42 9 10 India 8.22 14.89 -1.97 0.79 5.64 -1.70 0.660 0.614
40 44 43 -4 -3 Philippines 0.81 2.07 6.45 -2.37 -1.82 -2.29 0.023 -0.064
43 45 44 -2 -1 Chile -0.08 6.84 17.14 -1.84 -1.18 -7.22 -0.007 0.015
50 46 45 4 5 Romania 2.85 11.82 9.65 -0.06 21.01 -3.82 0.004 0.077
46 47 46 -1 0 Lithuania 0.52 10.95 2.04 -0.99 2.18 -4.55 -0.003 0.025
42 48 47 -6 -5 New Zealand -1.72 4.91 0.90 -1.43 -5.20 -3.50 -0.015 -0.006
45 49 48 -4 -3 Greece 0.69 3.34 1.25 0.07 0.81 -3.52 -0.006 -0.025
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48 50 49 -2 -1 Croatia 1.10 6.27 0.00 0.08 5.05 0.23 -0.002 -0.003
44 51 50 -7 -6 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
0.95 -0.61 0.00 -0.68 -6.73 -4.77 0.020 -0.065
49 52 51 -3 -2 Estonia -2.39 9.60 6.77 -2.23 -5.51 0.03 -0.004 0.011
54 53 52 1 2 Ukraine 2.46 8.89 -1.81 0.66 6.36 -1.68 0.001 0.022
64 54 53 10 11 Viet Nam 8.33 21.76 0.00 3.04 6.55 15.35 0.072 0.238
68 55 54 13 14 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2.94 30.57 1.07 0.12 -2.43 22.02 0.048 0.171
53 56 55 -3 -2 Costa Rica 0.74 2.72 -0.14 -2.08 -1.30 -1.92 0.002 -0.008
61 57 56 4 5 Qatar 0.03 26.18 -4.64 -3.19 -32.06 7.22 0.001 0.058
57 58 57 -1 0 Tunisia 3.77 7.55 -0.51 0.28 13.61 -2.53 0.011 0.010
59 59 58 0 1 Bulgaria 3.78 10.80 1.42 0.29 6.93 -6.37 0.003 0.018
56 60 59 -4 -3 Trinidad and Tobago 4.89 3.72 3.07 0.83 -2.98 11.09 0.003 -0.009
55 61 60 -6 -5 Malta -3.40 8.68 9.62 -3.33 -18.76 1.18 -0.002 0.003
67 62 61 5 6 Egypt 4.47 19.71 -6.21 -0.29 14.11 4.90 0.082 0.073
65 63 62 2 3 Peru 4.59 15.22 1.56 -0.93 -0.11 2.25 0.034 0.059
58 64 63 -6 -5 Colombia 0.46 4.13 0.00 -1.89 -1.97 -13.95 0.003 -0.008
60 65 64 -5 -4 Iceland 2.20 0.32 0.00 1.50 2.95 -10.86 0.001 -0.004
63 66 65 -3 -2 Morocco 1.43 8.02 -0.49 -1.50 10.64 -1.31 0.006 0.014
51 67 66 -16 -15 China, Hong Kong SAR -4.50 -14.15 3.01 -0.64 18.12 -27.70 -0.014 -0.138
62 68 67 -6 -5 Latvia -4.37 9.67 6.13 -2.30 11.96 -6.45 -0.006 0.007
83 69 68 14 15 Oman 6.52 29.26 0.91 0.96 12.63 8.75 0.010 0.031
70 70 69 0 1 Kazakhstan 2.33 12.33 -0.02 -2.19 13.02 -2.31 0.006 0.028
66 71 70 -5 -4 El Salvador 0.13 3.72 0.00 -0.30 -0.01 -1.63 0.000 -0.003
72 72 71 0 1 Jordan 3.11 7.73 2.77 0.47 18.24 1.93 0.007 0.008
71 73 72 -2 -1 Uruguay 6.68 5.59 2.73 0.50 5.24 -7.53 0.015 0.003
69 74 73 -5 -4 Pakistan 2.61 2.21 -0.67 0.30 1.87 -6.35 0.038 -0.022
73 75 74 -2 -1 Lebanon 1.09 13.49 9.12 -2.20 13.38 -10.19 0.001 0.008
79 76 75 3 4 Serbia 2.08 15.18 -3.75 -0.65 7.57 -5.59 0.001 0.023
75 77 76 -2 -1 Guatemala -0.14 6.29 -6.67 -0.77 0.90 -1.71 0.002 0.005
81 78 77 3 4 Bangladesh 6.65 5.99 0.00 1.67 0.36 -1.59 0.056 0.006
74 79 78 -5 -4 Mauritius 1.84 0.16 0.14 -1.47 -0.69 8.53 0.001 -0.004
80 80 79 0 1 Sri Lanka 5.49 4.22 1.62 -0.26 1.68 -4.95 0.010 -0.006
91 81 80 10 11 Syrian Arab Republic 6.86 21.52 0.00 2.83 6.20 18.17 0.019 0.025
86 82 81 4 5 Algeria 1.56 11.68 0.00 0.17 -1.29 8.70 0.005 0.035
87 83 82 4 5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.03 13.84 0.00 0.94 -5.09 -3.24 0.002 0.009
78 84 83 -6 -5 The f. Yugosl. Rep of 
Macedonia
4.97 -1.29 0.52 1.56 -2.10 -25.46 0.002 -0.004
76 85 84 -9 -8 Swaziland 1.50 -2.57 0.00 -0.13 14.65 -1.20 0.000 -0.005
82 86 85 -4 -3 Botswana 2.91 -0.57 0.00 0.25 0.49 -2.31 0.001 -0.014
89 87 86 2 3 Ecuador 3.30 12.26 -0.41 0.40 4.42 1.22 0.006 0.009
88 88 87 0 1 Cyprus -2.63 8.52 8.12 -1.45 13.99 5.66 -0.002 0.001
84 89 88 -5 -4 Côte d’Ivoire -1.59 -3.00 0.00 -1.75 -3.85 -18.32 -0.002 -0.016
92 90 89 2 3 Cambodia 4.69 7.50 0.00 0.24 6.93 -11.91 0.005 0.004
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93 91 90 2 3 Honduras -0.24 10.86 0.00 -1.79 6.48 -6.23 0.000 0.004
96 92 91 4 5 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
3.49 23.13 0.00 0.47 -4.53 7.75 0.004 0.014
85 93 92 -8 -7 Jamaica -2.61 -4.53 0.00 -0.95 2.48 -2.73 -0.002 -0.008
108 94 93 14 15 Albania 7.96 51.58 -2.62 1.72 -15.12 3.18 0.003 0.009
112 95 94 17 18 Nigeria 6.61 91.32 0.00 0.43 -67.40 18.34 0.016 0.156
97 96 95 1 2 Georgia 7.43 7.92 2.81 0.67 8.50 -4.24 0.002 0.000
101 97 96 4 5 Cameroon -0.13 12.78 0.00 -1.07 6.35 6.94 0.001 0.004
90 98 97 -8 -7 Armenia -0.39 -3.17 -1.66 -3.59 -10.75 -19.30 -0.001 -0.004
102 99 98 3 4 Paraguay 0.02 14.53 0.00 -2.28 -0.19 -5.63 0.000 0.003
119 100 99 19 20 Congo 3.87 62.54 -10.73 0.22 77.12 21.31 0.001 0.019
100 101 100 -1 0 Senegal -1.23 6.03 5.25 -1.22 -17.52 2.18 0.000 0.001
98 102 101 -4 -3 Kenya 1.80 2.15 -5.50 -0.02 9.79 -9.29 0.004 -0.002
104 103 102 1 2 Gabon 1.33 1.80 0.00 0.04 2.14 1.63 0.000 0.000
99 104 103 -5 -4 Barbados -2.61 3.72 0.00 -0.39 8.74 7.69 0.000 0.000
95 105 104 -10 -9 Fiji -1.01 -3.46 -1.76 -0.05 4.57 -17.39 0.000 -0.002
120 106 105 14 15 United Republic of Tanzania 5.92 42.24 -2.52 0.81 3.73 29.78 0.008 0.014
103 107 106 -4 -3 Azerbaijan 5.12 3.63 -5.57 -1.75 -4.72 -30.91 0.002 -0.003
116 108 107 8 9 Suriname 0.58 46.49 0.00 -1.60 -19.60 10.92 0.000 0.002
110 109 108 1 2 Mongolia 5.93 16.29 0.60 0.17 -1.18 11.44 0.001 0.005
106 110 109 -4 -3 Panama 1.70 0.23 0.00 -1.48 3.74 10.77 0.001 -0.001
109 111 110 -2 -1 Zambia 3.87 19.33 0.00 -0.27 6.72 -9.68 0.001 0.006
77 112 111 -35 -34 China, Macao SAR 1.62 -41.02 0.00 -1.14 5.03 -54.46 0.001 -0.021
107 113 112 -6 -5 Belize 7.81 -7.53 0.00 3.59 0.04 -26.65 0.001 -0.001
105 114 113 -9 -8 Republic of Moldova -5.50 -0.76 -1.34 -5.81 2.20 -17.00 -0.001 -0.003
113 115 114 -2 -1 Tajikistan 4.92 0.00 -0.13 -0.96 0.00 0.00 0.002 0.000
117 116 115 1 2 Madagascar 1.73 6.13 0.67 0.95 0.17 12.68 0.001 0.001
115 117 116 -2 -1 Kyrgyzstan -1.77 4.51 2.18 -3.15 -2.46 -14.37 0.000 0.000
111 118 117 -7 -6 Ghana 1.18 -11.33 0.00 -1.36 16.88 -22.79 0.001 -0.008
114 119 118 -5 -4 Nepal -0.29 -0.26 -10.23 -0.94 11.55 -9.79 0.000 -0.004
125 120 119 5 6 Uganda 4.36 23.33 0.00 -0.08 -0.90 17.72 0.003 0.002
121 121 120 0 1 Yemen 3.08 1.70 0.59 0.47 3.47 0.90 0.002 -0.001
118 122 121 -4 -3 Mozambique 1.74 -5.47 0.00 -2.12 -18.44 -4.02 0.002 -0.001
123 123 122 0 1 Saint Lucia 0.65 12.34 0.00 0.03 14.75 3.98 0.000 0.000
126 124 123 2 3 Cape Verde 2.14 18.68 -3.50 -1.02 -0.73 -0.04 0.000 0.000
128 125 124 3 4 Malawi 8.32 15.58 6.37 1.55 -4.10 2.31 0.001 0.001
94 126 125 -32 -31 Sudan 3.30 -42.21 0.00 -0.68 4.71 -84.22 0.004 -0.046
122 127 126 -5 -4 Haiti -1.10 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
124 128 127 -4 -3 Niger -3.39 6.01 0.00 -1.40 -1.34 9.03 0.000 0.000
129 129 128 0 1 Rwanda 2.42 13.85 0.00 -0.69 2.72 7.31 0.001 0.000
130 130 129 0 1 Ethiopia 6.39 18.92 3.15 -0.19 30.29 0.65 0.003 0.001
127 131 130 -4 -3 Central African Republic 0.71 -22.30 0.00 -0.11 6.43 -50.16 0.000 -0.001
131 132 131 -1 0 Burundi -2.47 12.08 0.00 -1.03 -8.61 8.13 0.000 0.000
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132 133 132 -1 0 Iraq 3.71 20.32 0.00 0.04 -54.88 0.06 0.000 0.001
132 133 132 -1 0 Eritrea -8.77 0.00 -2.80 -1.65 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
132 133 132 -1 0 Gambia 0.78 29.47 0.00 -0.32 -7.83 -25.79 0.000 0.000
5.3 Structural trajectories of industrial competitiveness 
Over the last two decades, the world manufacturing landscape has transformed quite significantly. The 
longitudinal analysis highlights countries’ individual industrial competitive performances within regions 
and within different quintiles of the CIP world ranking. The particularly successful performances of China, 
Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea, China, Taiwan Province and Singapore, but also to a lesser extent of 
India and a few new members of the European Union have been contrasted with the generalized loss of 
industrial competitiveness in traditional industrialized high income countries in Europe and North America. 
Among them, Germany is the only economy that did not lose any positions and actually gained one over 
the last two decades. 
The longitudinal analysis at the country level is complemented by the consideration of country groups’ 
structural trajectories over a longer period of time. In order to highlight differences in industrial competi-
tiveness performance across different regions as well as across country groups, we considered a ten-year 
period. A number of structural trajectories for different country groups were plotted, taking the average 
value into account, which the same country groups registered in five structural economic variables. These 
are: 
•	 MVApc as the main indicator of industrial development
•	 MHVAsh and MHXsh as the main indicators for capturing the technological evolution of indus-
tries (qualitative transformations)
•	 ImWMVA and ImWMT which proxy the quantitative redistribution of manufacturing shares in 
the world (quantitative transformations).
If we look at the technological evolution of industry by regional country groups (see Figures 6, 7 and 8), 
a number of structural trajectories emerge:
•	 The North America region, which includes the United States and Canada, registered an expansion-
ary cycle throughout the 1990s, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. The main feature of the 
structural trajectory followed by the region is the overall technological advancements in both pro-
duced goods (46.6 percent were MHT) and in the export basket (69.1 percent were MHT). The 
sustained capacity to add value to manufactured goods was reflected in the MVApc almost equal to 
US$	4.800	at	the	end	of	the	first	decade	(it	was	US$	3.600	in	1990),	and	the	important	gains	in	
WMVA and WMT. The second decade inverted this positive trend. The region entered a phase of 
manufacturing contraction whose effect was remarkable for the WMT shares which went from 17 
percent to 10 percent (it was 16 percent in 1990). The technological complexity of exports decreased 
and	MVApc	contracted	to	around	US$	500.
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•	 Taken as a whole, Europe’s structural performance remained almost unchanged throughout the two 
decades. According to the longitudinal analysis, the manufacturing loss of traditional industrial 
economies at the country level was counterbalanced by the very dynamic small European countries, 
especially by a few transition economies.
Figure 6: The technological evolution of industry across regional country groups, 1990 – 2000 – 2010
Note: Bubble size indicates the average regional MVApc, 1990 – 2000 – 2010  
Figure 7: The technological evolution of industry across regional country groups, 1990 – 2000 – 2010
 
Note: Bubble size indicates the average regional MVApc, 1990 – 2000 – 2010 
10.07.13   10:44
102
5. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS OVER 20 YEARS (1990-2010)
Figure 8: The impact of regional countries in world manufacturing value added and in world 
 manufactures trade
•	 The East Asia and Pacific region has been the engine of world industrial development growth  over 
the	last	two	decades.	The	average	MVApc	increased	by	one	half,	moving	from	roughly	US$	1.500	
to 2.200 per capita, while the overall technological structures upgraded significantly to the point 
that the MHVAsh figures managed to catch up with the Europe region in 2010. This is a remark-
able achievement considering that the region includes China, a country at a relatively lower stage of 
development and with a massive population size. The quantitative transformations in WMVA and 
WMT shares do not only reflect China’s outstanding performance, but also the fast catching up 
processes of a few other economies in both the top and upper middle quintile of the ranking. 
•	 The Latin America region did not show any significant technological transformation, although the 
MVApc increased over the period. The only transformation was a quantitative increase in WMT 
which was not matched by any increases in WMVA shares, given the relatively slow speed in MVApc 
increases. 
•	 The South and Central Asia region’s structural trajectory essentially reflects India’s performance, both 
in qualitative and quantitative terms. Although the trajectory followed by the region suggests a certain 
strong ‘vertical tendency’ in the MHXsh for the first decade, there is no sign of technological upgrad-
ing at the level of MHVAsh. Overall, MVApc witnessed some growth, but given the high population 
density in the region, the per capita figures are quite modest. 
•	 The Middle East and North Africa region, on the contrary, shows a small increase in MVApc, but no 
signs of any significant diversification of the economies which mainly remain oil exporters. Few coun-
tries in the region, Turkey and Israel, in particular, are exceptions.
•	 The sub-Saharan Africa region shows a clear structural trajectory over the last two decades. After one 
decade of technological contraction, the region registered some signs of improvements in terms of the 
complexity of its export basket. However, the fact that the MHVAsh indicator decreased by one-third 
within 20 years reveals an overall reduction of the region’s capacity to capture manufacturing value. 
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Some of the world regions considered tend to be quite heterogeneous. Thus, average performances in the 
five structural indicators considered might be obscured by many compensatory effects. To deal with these 
problems, we plot the same structural trajectories for more homogenous country groups.
If we look at the technological evolution of an industry by income or industrial country group, that is, 
groups of countries at a similar stage of economic or industrial development, a different set of trajectories 
emerges (see Figures 9, 10 and 11; see also Table 38):
•	 High income economies’ structural trajectories are characterized by two opposite dynamics. On the one 
hand, MHXsh and MHVAsh registered a positive cumulative change of 8 percent and 3 percent, respec-
tively, over the last two decades. On the other hand, taken as a whole, high income OECD countries lost 
around 16 percent of WMVA and 10 percent of WMT. High income non-OECD economies, on the 
contrary, mainly driven by China, Taiwan Province and Singapore, entered a sustained path of techno-
logical deepening and upgrading, registered by an overall increase in MHVAsh of 7 percent.
•	 The structural trajectories experienced by the group of upper middle income economies was driven by 
China, especially in terms of quantitative improvements. Within only two decades, upper middle 
income countries taken as a whole doubled their share in WMVA and increased their share in WMT 
sixfold, jumping to 25.8 percent and 26.4 percent, respectively. If we match these results with those 
obtained by the group of high income OECD countries, we obtain a clear sign of industrial convergence 
(see Figure 10). If the quantitative transformations have a clear positive and constant sign over the last 
two decades, the qualitative transformations that the technological structures have undergone over the 
last 20 years seem less clear and affected by countries’ compensations.
•	 The group of lower middle income economies followed a clear export-led expansionary trajectory (espe-
cially in the first decade) registered by the fourfold increase in the shares of WMT and the increasing 
complexity of the export basket, registered by MHTsh, which reached 22 percent in 2010, exactly 
 double that in 1990. Finally, while the quantitative transformations among the low income countries 
were positive but relatively insignificant, a clear sign of reduction of MHVAsh matched by a slight 
improvement in the technological complexity of exports was registered.
 
Figure 9: The technological evolution of industry across income comparators for country groups, 1990 – 
2000 – 2010
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Figure 10: The impact of country groups by income comparators in world manufacturing value added 
and in world manufactures trade
Table 38: Country income groups’ structural trajectories 
Country income groups’ structural 
trajectories
Quantitative 
transformations
Qualitative transformations
Country group Year ImWMVA ImWMT MHVAsh MHXsh
High Income OECD 1990 80.636 73.825 35.052 47.797
2000 76.950 75.002 37.709 55.454
2010 64.957 63.523 38.155 55.709
High Income Non-OECD 1990 2.220 4.161 26.206 42.537
2000 2.408 5.742 30.719 39.575
2010 3.219 4.979 33.180 41.921
Upper Middle Income 1990 13.177 4.208 22.674 32.048
2000 16.357 15.302 21.039 28.367
2010 25.817 26.437 21.149 31.539
Lower Middle Income 1990 3.162 1.357 17.676 11.137
2000 3.468 3.443 17.794 19.962
2010 5.059 4.945 16.646 22.397
Low Income 1990 0.217 0.089 11.751 12.845
2000 0.233 0.176 10.970 15.523
2010 0.357 0.226 7.358 16.598
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Finally, if we take groups of countries at different stages of industrial development into consideration, two 
patters emerge (see Figure 11):
•	 Firstly, emerging industrial economies (excluding China) significantly increased their export perfor-
mance during the 1990s, while this trend has decelerated in the last decade. The medium- and 
high-tech component of MVA registered almost the same value as 1990, around 25 percent of total 
MVA. On the contrary, during the same period, industrialized economies experienced an increase 
in MVApc and in the technological complexity of produced manufactures.
•	 Secondly, by comparing the performances of China with the group of emerging industrial econo-
mies over the last decade, it is clearly observable that China’s technological transformation as well 
as its MVApc expansion proceeded much faster. For the other emerging industrial economies, the 
increase in medium- and high-tech products in total manufactured exports was not immediately 
matched by an increase of MHVAsh. However, China’s MHVAsh in 2000 was almost double that 
shown on average by the other emerging industrial economies.  
 
Figure 11: The technological evolution of industry across industrial comparators for country groups,  
1990 – 2000 – 2010 
Note: Bubble size indicates the average regional MVApc, 1990 – 2000 – 2010 
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5.4 The BRICS’ competitiveness models: A comparison among large emerg-
ing economies
Over the last 20 years or so, a group of economies known today as the BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, 
India, China and South Africa) have emerged as new strong economies in the international manufacturing 
landscape. By 2010, the BRICS countries accounted for a quarter of world total GDP in purchasing power 
parity, one-fifth of world manufacturing value added and almost one-fifth of world manufactures trade 
(see Table 39; see also UNIDO, 2012). 
The BRICS countries share many common features such as their large geographical size, large population, 
fast economic growth and industrial capabilities accumulation, their role as significant sources of regional 
demand and production as well as their role as regional economic leaders in their respective areas (Brazil 
in Latin America, China in East Asia, India in South Asia and South Africa in Africa). Despite these 
similarities, these countries differ substantially with respect to their income levels, their degree of openness, 
their industrial and trade structures as well as their technological deepening. In fact, the structural trajec-
tories experienced by these economies have differed profoundly in scope and speed over the last 20 years 
(see Table 39). 
Different models of industrial competitiveness have emerged among this country group (see Figures 12, 
13, 14, 15 and 16). At first glance, while the manufacturing sector has been the main engine of growth 
and of structural transformation in China, services have played a relatively more important role in India 
and, more recently, in Brazil. On the contrary, the Russian Federation, South Africa and to a lesser extent 
Brazil have increasingly made use of their abundant natural resources to drive their economic growth. As 
a result of these different structural trajectories, the countries have achieved important results in terms of 
structural economic change and poverty reduction, although not all to the same degree (UNIDO, 2012; 
European Commission, 2009; Szirmai, Naudé and Alcorta, 2013).
The most rapid economic growth has been observed in those countries whose competitiveness model was 
based on expansion and deepening of the manufacturing sector. China experienced the deepest structural 
transformation and, in turn, the highest growth rates and highest increases in MVApc and MXpc despite 
its population size. Over the last 15 years, manufacturing has accounted for one-third of the overall 
economy and the share of medium- and high-tech activities in total manufacturing have remained above 
40 percent, the latter being a clear sign of substantial technological efforts. Also, China experienced a shift 
from an export basket dominated by labour intensive and low-tech products (such as food and textiles) 
towards more medium- and high-tech products accounting for more than half of total manufactured 
exports (including metal products, machinery and electrical equipment).
The massive expansion of the manufacturing base was mainly absorbed and stimulated by external demand. 
However, China’s growth recovery following the 2008 financial crisis was increasingly triggered by domestic 
consumption, investments and productivity growth. As a result of this fast and deep industrialization 
process, China gained 10 percent of WMVA share and 11 percent of WMT share within only 15 years 
(see Figure 12).
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Figure 12: China’s industrial competitiveness model over time (normalized figures)
Contrary to China, manufacturing industries in the Indian economy have played a relatively less important 
role (see Figure 13). This is reflected in the quite modest performance in the main structural economic 
variables reported in Table 39. Services have been the main driver of Indian growth and a big part of its 
exports (in particular, IT services). This notwithstanding, India’s export basket increasingly included more 
technologically complex products such as chemicals and other manufactures. The MHX share increased 
from 19 percent to 28 percent, while the MHVA share remained the second highest over the last 15 years, 
only behind China.
Figure 13: India’s industrial competitiveness model over time (normalized figures)
 
10.07.13   10:44
108
5. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS OVER 20 YEARS (1990-2010)
Table 39: BRICS’ competitiveness models: A comparison over 15 years 
Country MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
1995         
Brazil 587.738 218.541 51.022 16.275 38.253 75.948 1.968 0.918
Russian Federation (1996) 289.403 235.967 32.832 18.651 37.615 39.617 0.866 0.872
India 54.833 26.221 46.217 15.097 19.396 79.060 1.084 0.650
China 199.363 108.867 37.978 30.522 35.368 88.813 5.015 3.434
South Africa 489.104 385.800 28.995 17.528 32.156 56.729 0.421 0.416
media 324.088 195.079 39.409 19.615 32.557 68.033 1.871 1.258
median 289.403 218.541 37.978 17.528 35.368 75.948 1.084 0.872
Total       9.354 6.289
2000         
Brazil 552.163 242.523 34.852 14.916 48.257 76.631 1.665 0.871
Russian Federation 345.577 273.875 30.926 19.617 36.186 39.164 0.882 0.833
India 62.848 33.854 41.029 14.289 18.680 83.618 1.139 0.730
China 303.113 179.853 42.877 32.119 45.491 91.655 6.666 4.710
South Africa 505.011 404.321 23.516 17.254 39.982 69.798 0.397 0.379
media 353.742 226.885 34.640 19.639 37.719 72.173 2.150 1.504
median 345.577 242.523 34.852 17.254 39.982 76.631 1.139 0.833
Total       10.749 7.522
2005         
Brazil 593.939 458.808 33.101 15.003 48.158 72.320 1.653 1.105
Russian Federation 476.630 635.455 22.453 19.620 27.574 37.886 1.022 1.180
India 80.985 76.840 39.244 14.254 22.598 86.861 1.369 1.124
China 480.448 550.373 41.611 33.048 57.672 94.839 9.398 9.319
South Africa 556.506 677.224 23.125 16.636 47.570 69.088 0.397 0.419
media 437.701 479.740 31.907 19.712 40.714 72.199 2.768 2.629
median 480.448 550.373 33.101 16.636 47.570 72.320 1.369 1.124
Total       13.839 13.146
2010         
Brazil 622.099 667.545 34.972 13.512 36.295 67.304 1.712 1.230
Russian Federation 503.997 1028.697 23.141 17.073 24.372 36.077 0.978 1.337
India 120.185 153.827 37.275 15.044 28.241 85.159 2.028 1.738
China 820.018 1123.620 40.696 34.165 60.522 96.249 15.329 14.063
South Africa 567.274 991.148 21.241 14.930 45.655 68.325 0.387 0.452
media 526.715 792.968 31.465 18.945 39.017 70.623 4.087 3.764
median 567.274 991.148 34.972 15.044 36.295 68.325 1.712 1.337
Total       20.434 18.820
Compared to its Asian competitors, Brazil has not experienced a constant and sustained process of manu-
facturing development (see Figure 14). Also, the rapid economic growth experienced in recent years has 
mainly been driven by other sectors than manufacturing. Despite the relatively modest increases in MVApc 
and MXpc, Brazil experienced a significant technological contraction in terms of medium- and high-tech 
activities in total MVA and in total MX. Brazil has been successful in exporting natural resources as well 
as certain categories of manufactured products. A growth in petroleum and chemical sub-sectors as well 
as transport equipment, machinery and electrical equipment has been registered.
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Figure 14: Brazil’s industrial competitiveness model over time (normalized figures)
 
The Russian Federation has experienced an overall process of deindustrialization over the last 15 years, 
characterized by an increasing reliance on primary resource extraction and export, mainly of oil and gas 
(see Figure 15). In 2009, the share of mining and utilities in the Russian Federation (but also in South 
Africa) was equal to 12 percent of GDP (UNIDO, 2012). As a result, the Russian manufacturing export 
basket has increasingly consisted of refined petroleum products. However, manufacturing still plays an 
important role in boosting technological activities and providing more stable employment (see Table 39). 
A similar model has been followed by South Africa where manufacturing growth has been quite moderate 
and the country has primarily relied on commodity and resource exports (see Figure 16). However, contrary 
to the Russian Federation, South Africa registered an increase in MHX shares driven by exports of transport 
equipment, machinery and electrical equipment. Thus, high skill sectors are gaining greater importance, 
although the service sector has become dominant. 
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Figure 15: Russian Federation’s industrial competitiveness model over time (normalized figures)
Figure 16: South Africa’s industrial competitiveness model over time (normalized figures)
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CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, industrial policies have gradually re-entered the policy debate of development 
economists and policymakers in both developed and developing countries. This process has been described 
by Dani Rodrik as a process of normalizing industrial policies’ (Rodrik, 2008). On the one hand, industrial 
policies are back on the government agenda of developed economies, especially as a result of their difficul-
ties in finding new paths to sustained growth. On the other hand, developing economies are increasingly 
looking at the possibility of implementing industrial policies as a way of driving structural change and 
catch-up processes. 
While the main focus of the debate throughout the 1990s was the theoretical and historical evidence in 
support of and against industrial policies, this has now changed. More recently, academics and international 
actors such as UNIDO have begun focusing on the specific problems connected with the design, imple-
mentation and evaluation of context-specific policies for manufacturing development. In other words, the 
debate around industrial policies is increasingly moving from the ‘why’ to the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ of 
effective industrial policy design and implementation. 
The possibility for governments to achieve a certain set of macro policy goals resides in their capacity to 
understand, monitor and benchmark their industrial competitive performance and, thus, in their capacity 
and willingness to influence countries’ structural trajectories and underlying production and technological 
capabilities dynamics.
The CIP index has been an extremely useful tool for UNIDO in moving from analysis of performances 
to policy recommendations as well as in providing countries with a package of industrial diagnostics. The 
CIP index performs three main functions. It works as: 
(i) a focusing device for problem identification. Benchmarks are needed because it is difficult to 
assess national industrial performance on the basis of a priori norms. By comparing countries’ relative 
performances, it is possible to indentify relative strengths and absolute weaknesses which call for appropri-
ate and selective policy interventions. Wherever competitive performance can be improved, benchmarking 
is a useful tool.
(ii) an awareness raising tool for deepening countries’ appreciation of the main dimensions of industrial 
competitiveness, that is, their capacity to produce and export competitively, their technological deepening 
and upgrading and finally, their impact on global manufacturing production and export. 
(iii) a policy tool for policy ownership. Given its non-normative character, the CIP index provides 
policymakers information on the structural features of different economic systems. The CIP index does 
not make any implicit normative assumptions or prescriptions at the institutional level and leaves countries 
full ownership of their development model.
Industrial competitiveness benchmarks at the national level such as the CIP index should be seen as pre-
liminary indicators of countries’ relative industrial competitive performance. Despite being a useful tool, 
the CIP index is not sufficient for industrial policy design. In fact, in order to design an integrated set of 
selective industrial policies operating at different levels of the economic system, the industrial competitive-
ness analysis based on the CIP index will have to be complemented by detailed analyses by country and 
activity. 
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CONCLUSION
Benchmarking can be conducted at more disaggregated levels such as sector, industries, production tasks, 
enterprises, institutions, government or government department. Also, it can focus on more or less specific 
matters, such as capital and labour costs, infrastructure, technology, innovation, skills or the environment. 
The opportunity of relying on a multiple informational space and of analysing the relationship between 
input, output and mediating factors into a consistent causal structure are recognized as fundamental start-
ing points for the design of industrial policies.
The industrial competitiveness analysis based on the CIP index provides the overall framework within 
which these analyses can be systematically developed and interdependences among policy measures may 
be revealed. 
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TABLES ANNEX: Top 20 performers over 20 years, 1990 - 2010 
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Table 40: Top 20 performers in Manufacturing Value Added per capita (MVApc) over 20 years, 1990 - 2010
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Table 41: Top 20 performers in Manufactured Exports per capita (MXpc) over 20 years, 1990 - 2010  
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Table 42: Top 20 performers in Medium- and High-tech Manufacturing Value Added share (MHVAsh)  
over 20 years, 1990 - 2010
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Table 43: Top 20 performers in Manufacturing Value Added share in total GDP (MVAsh)  
over 20 years, 1990 - 2010
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Table 44: Top 20 performers in Industrialization intensity (INDint) over 20 years, 1990 - 2010
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Table 45: Top 20 performers in Medium- and High-tech manufactured Exports share in total 
 manufactured exports (MHXsh) over 20 years, 1990 - 2010 
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Table 46: Top 20 performers in Manufactured Exports share in total exports (MXsh) over 20 years, 
1990 - 2010 
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Table 47: Top 20 performers in Manufactured Exports Quality (MXQual) over 20 years, 1990 - 2010 
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Table 48: Top 20 performers in World MVA share (ImWMVA) over 20 years, 1990 - 2010
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Table 49: Top 20 performers in World Manufactures Trade share (ImWMT) over 20 years, 1990 - 2010
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Technical Annex: Data Source, Technological Classifications and Missing Value 
Treatment
Value	Added	Data
Total manufacturing value added (MVA) or manufacturing output.
Data source: UNIDO database.
Value added of branches within the manufacturing sector.
Source: UNIDO Industrial Statistics database.
To compute the share of MHT activities in MVA, we used the OECD technological classification accord-
ing to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Third Revision (ISIC 
Rev. 3).
Technology classification of manufacturing value added according to ISIC Rev. 3
Type of activity ISIC division, major groups or groups
Resource based manufacturing 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 36, 37
Low-technology manufacturing 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 351
Medium- and high-technology manufacturing 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 (excl. 351)
Note that medium- and high-tech (MHT) products were combined in one category. The sectoral shares 
of value added were then calculated in relation to the total for manufacturing sub-sectors.
International	Trade	Data
Data source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE database). 
The technological classification of trade is based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), 
Revision 3.
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Technology classification of exports according to SITC Rev. 3
Type of export SITC sections
Resource based exports
016, 017, 023, 024, 035, 037, 046, 047, 048, 056, 058, 
059, 061, 062, 073, 098, 111, 112, 122, 232, 247, 248, 
251, 264, 265, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 
289, 322, 334, 335, 342, 344, 345, 411, 421, 422, 431, 
511, 514, 515, 516, 522, 523, 524, 531, 532, 551, 592, 
621, 625, 629, 633, 634, 635, 641, 661, 662, 663, 664, 
667,689
Low-technology exports
611, 612, 613, 642, 651, 652, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 
659, 665, 666, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 679, 691, 692, 
693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 699, 821, 831, 841, 842, 843, 
844, 845, 846, 848, 851, 893, 894, 895, 897, 898, 899
Medium-technology exports 
266, 267, 512, 513, 533, 553, 554, 562, 571, 572, 573, 
574, 575, 579, 581, 582, 583, 591, 593, 597, 598, 653, 
671, 672, 678, 711, 712,713,714, 721, 722, 723, 724, 
725, 726, 727, 728, 731, 733, 735, 737, 741, 742, 743, 
744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 761, 762, 763, 772, 773, 
775, 778, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 791, 793, 811, 
812, 813, 872, 873, 882, 884, 885
High-technology exports
525, 541, 542, 716, 718, 751, 752, 759, 764, 771, 774, 
776, 792, 871, 874, 881, 891
Missing	value	treatment	in	the	CIP	index	(by	indicators	and	year)
MVA Indicators
For 2010, data from the following years were used in place of missing values:
MVA per capita
2009: China, Macao SAR.
Share of MVA in GDP 
2009: China, Macao SAR.
Share of medium- and high-technology activities in:
MVA
1991: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi; 1992: Belize, Croatia; 1993: Central African Republic; 1994: 
Zambia; 1995: Gabon, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic; 1996: Algeria, Honduras, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Switzerland; 1997: Barbados, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Saint Lucia; 1998: Bangladesh, El Salvador, 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ); 1999: Rwanda; 2000: Cambodia, Uganda, Viet Nam; 2001: Bolivia 
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(Plurinational State of ), Panama, Sudan; 2002: Argentina, Cameroon, Niger, Paraguay; 2003: Ghana; 
2004: Gambia; 2005: China, Macao SAR, Colombia, Iceland; 2006: Australia, China, Taiwan Province, 
Egypt, Madagascar, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Yemen; 2007: Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mexico, Oman, 
Peru, United Republic of Tanzania; 2008: Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, India, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of ), Israel, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Turkey, United States of America, Uruguay; 2009: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, China, Hong Kong SAR, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyr-
gyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Morocco, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Roma-
nia, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, The 
f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia, United Kingdom; Armenia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, 
Suriname, Tajikistan, Ukraine.
Output (when MVA data is missing)
1993: Suriname; 1997: Haiti; 1998: Guatemala, Mozambique; 2007: Kazakhstan; 2008: Tajikistan; 2009: 
Armenia, Ukraine. 
Share in world MVA
2009: China, Macao SAR. 
 
Export Indicators
For 2010, data from the following years were used in place of missing values:
Exports per capita
1997: Haiti; 2000: Tajikistan; 2003: Eritrea; 2007: Bangladesh, Mongolia, Swaziland; 2008: Saint Lucia; 
2009: Gabon, Honduras, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia, Uruguay.
Share of manufactured exports in total exports 
1997: Haiti; 2000: Tajikistan; 2003: Eritrea; 2007: Bangladesh, Mongolia, Swaziland; 2008: Saint Lucia; 
2009: Gabon, Honduras, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia, Uruguay; 
Share of medium- and high-technology products in manufactured exports 
1997: Haiti; 2000: Tajikistan; 2003: Eritrea; 2007: Bangladesh, Mongolia, Swaziland; 2008: Saint Lucia; 
2009: Cape Verde, China, Macao SAR, Gabon, Honduras, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, The f. Yugosl. Rep 
of Macedonia, Uruguay.
Share in world manufactured exports
1997: Haiti; 2000: Tajikistan; 2003: Eritrea; 2007: Bangladesh, Mongolia, Swaziland; 2008: Saint Lucia; 
2009: Gabon, Honduras, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, The f. Yugosl. Rep of Macedonia, Uruguay; 
When net export data (gross exports minus re-exports) is not available, gross export figures are used as 
provided by UN Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade).
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Statistical Annex: Sensitivity Analysis
Introduction
The UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index is a composite index designed to compare 
the competitiveness of national industries across countries. It is defined as a non-linear combination of 
eight component indicators: Manufacturing Value Added per capita, Manufactured Exports per capita, 
Medium- and High-tech manufacturing Value Added share, Medium- and High-tech manufactured Exports 
share in total manufactured exports, Manufacturing Value Added share in total GDP, Manufactured Exports 
share in total exports, Impact of a country on World Manufacturing Value Added and Impact of a country 
on World Manufactures Trade. Such a combination of sub-indicators is needed, as a single sub-indicator 
is insufficient to capture the complex reality of the degree of competitiveness of a country’s industrial 
performance. 
The construction of the CIP is the result of several stages that involved subjective decisions. A sensitivity 
analysis is therefore useful to assess the robustness of the CIP calculation to variations on the decisions 
made and to analyse how much each source of uncertainty contributes to the total uncertainty of the CIP 
index. 
One central issue that arises when using the CIP index is the impact of changing the relative importance 
of each sub-indicator on the rankings produced by the CIP index. This will be analysed in this appendix, 
together with other important methodological choices made in the construction of the CIP index. In 
particular, we will evaluate the sensitivity of the rankings to the weights, treatment of missing and/or 
outlying values, the choice of normalization method and the choice of aggregation method.
If different assumptions are found to have a strong impact on the order of countries, it follows that the 
original order is not unambiguous or robust. 
This statistical annex first briefly reviews the important building blocks of the CIP and the different 
modeling choices associated with them. Section 2 describes the design of the sensitivity study. Section 3 
introduces the data. The results are presented in section 4. The main results and recommendations are 
summarized in the conclusion of section 5.  
1.	 Construction	of	the	CIP	
The CIP index is a composite index aggregating eight sub-indicators into a unique measure for the indus-
trial performance of a country. Crucial ingredients in the construction of the CIP index are the selected 
sub-indicators, the methods used for handling missing and outlying data, the method used for normaliza-
tion and the aggregation technique. The next paragraphs discuss these briefly. 
1.1	List	of	sub-indicators
We consider the list of sub-indicators determined by UNIDO as fixed, but will examine various weighting 
schemes that may exclude some of the sub-indicators. 
The first two basic indicators aggregated in the CIP index are Manufacturing Value Added per capita 
(MVApc) and Manufactured Exports per capita (MXpc). 
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While providing information about the country’s capacity to produce and export manufactures, these 
indicators do not allow to distinguish between industrial (or export) structures based on genuine techno-
logical capabilities. For this reason, the CIP index also considers the Medium- and High-tech manufacturing 
Value Added share (MHVAsh) and the Medium- and High-tech manufactured Exports share in total 
manufactured exports (MHXsh). These additional indicators capture the technological complexity of manu-
facturing and exports, thereby grouping medium- and high-tech activities.  
Further, the Manufacturing Value Added share in total GDP (MVAsh) and the Manufactured Exports 
share in total exports (MXsh) are included as a measure for the relative importance of manufacturing in 
the entire economy and exports, respectively. 
Finally, the global impact of a country’s manufacturing and export sector is measured by the share of a 
country’s MVA in world MVA (ImWMVA) and the share of a country’s manufactured exports in world 
manufactured exports (ImWMT).
Finally, it is important to note that in the construction of the CIP, MHVA and MVAsh are equally 
weighted, grouped in a new sub-indicator called Industrial intensity (INDint), and the average of MHXsh 
and MXsh is called Manufactured Exports Quality (MXQual). 
1.2	Technology	classification	of	sectors
To compute the share of medium- and high-technology activities in manufacturing value added, the OECD 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) is used. The MHT sectors are those with ISIC codes 
24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 (excluding 351). 
An alternative classification is that proposed by Sanjaya Lall, which is based on the 3-digit ISIC level. For 
Lall, the MHT sectors are 233, 241, 242,243, 252, 271, 291, 292, 293, 300, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 
319, 321, 322, 323, 331, 332, 333, 341, 342, 343, 351, 352, 353 and 359. 
The ‘original sin’ of these classifications is attributable to the fact that they attempt to capture an inher-
ently dynamic object in a static way. Since industries are continuously transforming, what was high-tech 
yesterday may well be low-tech tomorrow. In fact, the problem is more serious than simply the changing 
nature of particular sectors. There is also no simple way of aggregating sectors such that their complexity 
level is homogenous. Thus, within the same technology groups and the same division (e.g. the manufacture 
of electrical machinery and apparatuses), there might be production tasks of extremely different technologi-
cal complexity. Additionally, the most cutting edge and innovative firms tend to not fit into any existing 
category by their very nature and are not easily tracked in government statistics, if they appear at all.  
1.3	Missingness
The sub-indicator data may have missing values. If not all observations are missing in the series, informa-
tion from the available data can be extracted to impute values to the missing observations. Dealing with 
missingness through imputation takes place before normalization and aggregation. 
Only univariate time series methods are considered for imputation. By default, missing observations are 
filled in with the last available observation prior to the missing observation. An alternative that we consider 
is to use linear interpolation between the last available observation before the missing observation, followed 
by imputation of the remaining missing observations with the last one available. 
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One could also consider to not do any imputation, but this has the disadvantage in the Monte Carlo analysis 
to study that the set of CIP values can have a different size and the values can therefore not be compared 
in a straightforward manner. For an example of cross-sectional imputation, see Cherchye et al. (2011).
1.4	Outlier	cleaning
The sub-indicator data can have outlying values that distort the CIP measurement of the country’s industrial 
performance. There are several approaches to handling outliers. 
As an alternative to the default choice of ignoring outliers, we investigate the sensitivity of the index by 
applying a simple but effective univariate outlier cleaning rule. The rule is as follows. Observations that 
are more than 3 (resp. minus 3) times the median absolute deviation from the median are winsorized and 
replaced by the median plus (resp. minus) 3 times the median absolute deviation. To account for time 
variation in the location and scale of the data, the median is computed on a local window of 5 observa-
tions. With the two-sided approach, this is the window [-2,2] around each observation (excluding 2 
observations at the beginning of the sample, and 2 observations at the end of the sample). Under the 
one-sided approach, this is [-4,0], excluding 4 observations at the beginning of the sample. 
1.5	Normalization	technique
Normalization is required prior to any data aggregation, as the indicators have different measurement units. 
To place all indicators on a common basis, the data are normalized using a rescaling technique. 
Among the various rescaling techniques available, the CIP index adopts the Min-Max technique which 
normalizes indicators to have an identical range [0, 1] by subtracting the minimum value and dividing it 
by the range of the indicator values.36 The general formula follows:
                                  
(1)
where Iijt is the index value i for country j in period t, Xijt is the indicator value i for country j in period 
t, and min (resp. max) are the minimum (resp. maximum) operators returning the smallest (resp. largest) 
value in the sample. As a result, the top country in the sample is assigned the value 1, while the worst 
performer is given the value 0. 
The rescaling by means of the Min-Max normalization method also has a few drawbacks. Clearly, on the 
one hand, extreme values/or outliers could distort the transformed indicator; on the other hand, Min-Max 
normalization could widen the range of indicators lying within a small interval, increasing the effect on 
the composite indicator more than the z-score transformation.
In the sensitivity analysis, we therefore also consider the standard z-score transformation as well as the 
robust one: 
                              
(2)
36  Recall that all indicators are defined such that higher values are indicators of a better industrial performance.
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and
                                 
(3)
where mean, median, StdDev and Mad are the sample mean and median location estimators, and the 
sample standard deviation and median absolute deviation scale estimators, respectively. In some cases, the 
scale estimates were close to zero, leading to an explosion of the sub-indicators. We therefore truncate the 
z-score normalized indicators at [-3,+3].
1.6	Weighting	scheme
Each indicator receives a certain weight. These weights are based on equal weighting important dimensions 
in the construction of the CIP index. An alternative technique is the Data Envelopment Analysis of 
Cherchye et al. (2008), but this is beyond the scope of the report.37
In the past, the CIP index has been constructed using either four, six or eight indicators and a linear 
weighting scheme. See Table 50 for an overview of the weights associated with these approaches. 
                                 
(4)
(Cherchye et al., 2011).
In general, an equal weight approach is taken, with the exception that in the six and eight indicator 
approach, the average of MHVA and MVAsh (called Industrial intensity) and the average of MHXsh and 
MXsh (Manufactured Exports Quality) is used. 
Recently, a major change was made in the weighting, whereby the CIP is computed as the equal weighted 
geometric average of MVApc, MXpc, INDint, MXQual, ImWMVA and ImWMT. 
Table 50: Weights to the indicators for the four indicator, six indicator and eight indicator approach 
to constructing the CIP index
 
MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT
CIP.4 (linear) 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
CIP.6 (linear) 1/4 1/4 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8
CIP.8 (linear) 1/6 1/6 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/6 1/6
Default (geometric) 1/6 1/6 Averaged into  
INDint 1/6
Averaged into  
MXQual 1/6
1/6 1/6
 
37  See also Decanq and Lugo (2012) for an overview.
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1.7	Aggregation	method
Two aggregation methods are available: linear and geometric aggregation. Under the linear aggregation 
method, the CIP index is constructed as a weighted average of the q sub-indicators:  
                                    
(5)
with wj being the weight of indicator i (i=1,..,q), and the requirement that all weights should be positive 
adds up to 1.
Under the geometric aggregation method, the CIP index is constructed as a weighted geometric average 
of the q sub-indicators: 
                                    
(6)
with wi being the weight of indicator i, and the requirement that all weights should be positive and add 
up to 1. The weights we use are those of Table 1. The type of aggregation problem faced by composite 
indicators relates to the choice of aggregating different components under the implicit assumption that 
they are substitutable. 
Additive aggregations imply full compensability among variables. In other words, poor performance in one 
sub-indicator can be compensated for by high values in other sub-indicators. In contrast, geometric aggre-
gation is better suited if we want to maintain a certain degree of non-compensability between individual 
sub-indicators (OECD, 2008). Moreover, while linear aggregation rewards base indicators proportionally 
to the weights (so compensability is constant), geometric aggregation rewards countries with higher scores 
(so compensability is lower for the composite indicators with low values). 
Given these considerations and the advantage offered by the geometric mean in avoiding factor substitut-
ability, the CIP index adopts a non-linear aggregation technique. The weighting schema remains one of 
simple equal weights, provided that disaggregated statistics included in each composite indicator are also 
shown and the transparency of the composite is maintained. 
2.	 Design	of	the	sensitivity	analysis
We fully focus on the impact of changes in the design of the CIP index on the ranks implied by the CIP 
values, as the ranks are more important than the values themselves. 
We study the impact on the values and rankings of the composite index due to a change in:
a) Weights and in particular the eight, versus six, versus four indicator method
b) Normalization method
c) Imputation method of missing data
d) Linear versus geometric weighting.
Several comparison methods are used to summarize the impact of a change in one or more of the assump-
tions defining the CIP index. We describe the metrics for measuring the impact on ranking when changing 
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one assumption in subsection 2.1 In subsection 2.2, the Monte Carlo analysis to study the sensitivity to 
joint changes in the assumptions is presented. 
2.1	Metrics	for	measuring	the	aggregate	impact	on	rankings	due	to	changing	a	single	
assumption	in	the	design	of	the	CIP	index
These methods also feature the analysis of Saisana et al. (2005), as well as the OECD (2008) handbook 
on composite indices. 
The first criterion that we consider is the Spearman rank correlation between the original CIP values and 
the CIP values under a different definition. Suppose we have M countries and let CIPjt and CIPjt* be 
the CIP index of country j in year t using two different definitions, then the rank correlation between 
the two methods is defined as: 
                     
(7)
The second criterion that we consider is the average absolute shift in the rank of the CIP index due to a 
change in method (also known as Spearman’s footrule). Suppose we have M countries and let CIPjt and 
CIPjt* be the CIP index of country j in year t using two different definitions, then the average absolute 
rank shift is defined as:
                     
(8)
2.2.	Impact	on	the	distribution	of	CIP	
We subsequently study the impact of joint changes in the assumptions underlying the CIP calculation on 
the distribution of the CIP values and CIP ranks. 
For this, we follow the Monte Carlo approach of Saisana et al. (2005) whereby a distribution is generated 
based on a set of randomly chosen variations on the definition of the CIP index. This leads to a so-called 
“Monte Carlo CIP”: a complete distribution of the CIP per country as generated by the random draws 
from the distribution of the uncertainty factors in the calculation of the CIP index. We take 250 draws. 
The uncertainty factors are described in Table 51, together with their associated probability distribution 
function (PDF). 
The resulting distribution of the CIP index-implied rankings across the range of calculation methods will 
be visualized via a boxplot, with whiskers that extend to the minimum and maximum of the data. 
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Table 51: Input factors for Monte Carlo analysis of CIP construction method 
Input factor Definition PDF
Method Four indicators, six indicators or eight 
indicators approach
Discrete, Uniform on [1,2,3]
Aggregation Linear or geometric Discrete, Uniform on [1,2]
Normalization Min-Max, z-score and robust z-score* Discrete, Uniform on [1,2,3]
Weights Either deterministic as a function of 
method (see Table) or random uniform
Discrete, Uniform on [1,2]
Action on missing data Last price or linear interpolation Discrete, Uniform on [1,2]
Outlier cleaning Cleaning of the outlying observations 
in the indicator data. Possible values 
are no cleaning, two-sided and one-
sided local winsorization using the 
median and mean absolute deviation. 
Discrete, Uniform on [1,3]
Technology classification OECD or Lall Discrete, Uniform on [1,2]
 
*38
3.	 Data	availability	and	summary	statistics
The initial data is unbalanced, with observations for 125 countries and the years 1996 till 2010. 
Table 52 shows the number of available observations per year for each of the eight indicators. Note that 
the total number of variables is 9 because for MHVAsh, we consider the one computed using the OECD 
classification (MHVAsh) and the one under Lall’s classification (MHVAsh_Lall). 
Except for MHVAsh_Lall, all variables have a sufficient and relatively stable coverage over the years. 
Table 52: Number of observations per year
MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT MHVAsh_Lall
1996 125 104 85 125 104 104 125 104 50
1997 125 109 102 125 109 109 125 109 53
1998 125 110 108 125 110 110 125 110 63
1999 125 113 110 125 113 113 125 113 61
2000 125 120 115 125 120 120 125 120 70
2001 125 120 117 125 120 120 125 120 73
2002 125 119 118 125 119 119 125 119 71
2003 125 120 120 125 120 120 125 120 76
2004 125 118 121 125 118 118 125 118 77
2005 125 118 124 125 118 118 125 118 81
2006 125 120 124 125 120 120 125 120 83
2007 125 118 124 125 117 118 125 118 72
2008 125 115 125 125 115 115 125 115 62
2009 125 118 125 125 118 118 125 118 42
2010 124 112 125 124 110 112 124 112 0
38  In case of the z-score or robust z-score, the aggregation method is restricted to be linear, to avoid having to raise negative 
numbers to a fractional power.
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Table 53 reports the summary statistics on the input data. The distribution of the input data for MVApc, 
MXpc, ImWMVA and ImWMT is extremely skewed to the right.   
Table 53 Summary statistics of input data
Minimum Q1 Median Mean Q3 Maximum
MVApc 4.33 108.61 371.89 1236.13 1173.42 9452.30
MXpc 0.44 105.10 546.03 2782.90 2646.41 39871.77
MHVAsh 0.25 10.83 21.39 24.10 34.91 78.35
MVAsh 0.64 9.55 14.38 14.65 17.91 36.99
MHXsh 0.00 14.85 31.66 34.56 52.38 85.39
MXsh 0.08 42.22 75.21 65.37 88.02 99.90
ImWMVA 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.79 0.33 27.18
ImWMT 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.86 0.55 14.06
MHVAsh_Lall 0.26 18.11 34.48 33.73 45.35 86.09
If we normalize the data with the Min-Max of each individual series, we see in Table 54 that the skewness 
in the MVApc, MXpc, ImWMVA and ImWMT remains. We additionally add the normalized indicators 
for the INDint and MXQual. 
Table 54 5-year average of average and median of normalized data using the Min-Max method 
Median Mean
MVApc 0.04 0.15
MXpc 0.02 0.10
MHVAsh 0.29 0.32
MVAsh 0.40 0.41
MHXsh 0.36 0.41
MXsh 0.76 0.65
ImWMVA 0.00 0.03
ImWMT 0.01 0.07
MHVAsh_Lall 0.38 0.39
INDint 0.34 0.37
MXQual 0.51 0.53
 
The higher the correlation between the normalized sub-indicators, the smaller the impact of changing the 
weights (Foster et al., 2012). The year-average correlation between the normalized indicators is shown in 
Table 55. We see that the correlation between all sub-indicators is rather high, except for ImWMVA which 
has a low correlation with MXpc, MVAsh and MXsh, and between MVAsh and MVApc.
Table 55 Correlation between the Min-Max normalized sub-indicators 
 MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT MHVAsh_
Lall
INDint MXQual
MVApc 1.00 0.79 0.66 0.32 0.63 0.37 0.46 0.57 0.65 0.58 0.60
MXpc 0.79 1.00 0.57 0.26 0.50 0.38 0.08 0.32 0.53 0.49 0.53
MHVAsh 0.66 0.57 1.00 0.50 0.73 0.48 0.37 0.55 0.97 0.88 0.73
MVAsh 0.32 0.26 0.50 1.00 0.49 0.43 0.19 0.31 0.59 0.86 0.55
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 MVApc MXpc MHVAsh MVAsh MHXsh MXsh ImWMVA ImWMT MHVAsh_
Lall
INDint MXQual
MHXsh 0.63 0.50 0.73 0.49 1.00 0.38 0.37 0.53 0.78 0.71 0.82
MXsh 0.37 0.38 0.48 0.43 0.38 1.00 0.20 0.32 0.47 0.53 0.84
ImWMVA 0.46 0.08 0.37 0.19 0.37 0.20 1.00 0.82 0.37 0.34 0.34
ImWMT 0.57 0.32 0.55 0.31 0.53 0.32 0.82 1.00 0.54 0.51 0.51
MHVAsh_
Lall
0.65 0.53 0.97 0.59 0.78 0.47 0.37 0.54 1.00 0.88 0.73
INDint 0.58 0.49 0.88 0.86 0.71 0.53 0.34 0.51 0.88 1.00 0.74
MXQual 0.60 0.53 0.73 0.55 0.82 0.84 0.34 0.51 0.73 0.74 1.00
4.	 Results
4.1.	Impact	of	individual	changes	construction	method	on	the	ranks	of	CIP		
We now consider the impact on the country rankings due to a change in one of the implementation 
choices, keeping all others fixed. Table 56 reports the year-average of the average absolute difference in 
ranks between the perturbed and default method, as well as the correlation. 
For all changes, the correlation in ranks is substantially high (89 percent or higher), indicating that, on 
average, countries with a high CIP value under one method will also have a high CIP value under a dif-
ferent method. Given that we are ranking around 125 countries, the average shift in ranks is also rather 
modest. 
Table 56 Impact on ranks due to changing a single assumption, keeping all other assumptions fixed
Change Year-average of average absolute dif-
ference in ranks between the modified 
and default method
Year-average of correlation between 
ranks of new method and default 
method
Use 6 sub-indicators (instead of 8) 13.82 0.8968
Use 4 sub-indicators (instead of 8) 13.71 0.9006
Use linear aggregation (instead of geometric) 13.21 0.9141
Use z-score to normalize (instead of Min-Max, 
together with linear aggregation)
12.81 0.923
Use robust z-score to normalize (instead of 
Min-Max, together with linear aggregation)
11.77 0.9537
Use linear interpolation (instead of last price 
interpolation)
9.932 0.9724
Use two-sided outlier cleaning (instead of no 
cleaning)
9.891 0.973
Use one-sided outlier cleaning (instead of no 
cleaning)
9.891 0.973
Use Lall’s technology classification (instead 
of OECD)
5.732 0.9752
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4.2.	Impact	of	changes	in	construction	method	on	distribution	CIP	
For the year 2010, we now assess the impact of joint changes in the construction method on the distribu-
tion of the CIP ranks. In Figure 1, we let all choice parameters vary following the possibilities in Table 
2, with 250 random draws (excluding the technology classification, because of data availability limitations 
for the Lall technology classification). The whiskers of the reported boxplot extend to the minimum and 
maximum values of the CIP index obtained. 
Note that for the bulk of the distribution, the median of the obtained distributions follows more or less 
the obtained CIP ranks under the default implementation (red line), but that the distributions are wide, 
emphasizing the uncertainty of the CIP rankings and that in the extremes, the medians deviate from the 
ranks obtained using the default CIP method. 
 
Figure 1 Bootstrap distribution index ranks
5.	 Conclusion
The UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index is a composite index designed to compare 
the competitiveness of the national industries across countries. It is defined as a non-linear combination 
of eight component indicators and its construction is a result of several stages that involved subjective 
decisions. We performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the CIP calculation to variations 
on the decisions made and to analyse how much each source of uncertainty contributes to the total 
uncertainty of the CIP index. All factors seemed to have a considerable impact on the country rankings, 
and the rankings should be considered as estimates with standard errors of non-negligible magnitude. 
Overall, the correlation between the default CIP ranking and the alternatives is relatively high, indicating 
the qualitative robustness of the proposed methodology to rank countries in terms of their competitive 
industrial performance.
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